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         Post-development theorist, Arturo Escobar’s influential work, Encountering 
Development as well as other post-development academic works discussed the concept 
and delivery of “development” based on known antecedents— Western countries as 
practitioners and non-Western countries as beneficiaries. Even though cultural sensibility 
has become a significant issue in development today, there is little research that analyzes 
the construction of non-Western donors’ discourse such as those of the Japanese 
governmental aid agency, Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers. Moreover, non-
Western aid donors and practitioners’ engagement with indigenous development in Latin 
America has not been discussed. This dissertation aims to answer the following 
questions: How do Western and non-Western governmental donor agencies construct and 
deliver ‘development’ to ‘non-developed’ countries in Latin America, particularly to 
 viii 
countries with large indigenous populations? How do these donor agencies’ volunteer 
practitioners implement development projects in the field? What are the differences in the 
aims and delivery of development projects between Western and non-Western donors and 
their volunteer practitioners, especially in those projects aimed at indigenous 
populations? A corollary to those questions was to attempt to discover how the agencies 
and their volunteers negotiated notions of development with indigenous peoples as well 
as how agencies and volunteers perceived and addressed ethnic differences in the aid 
recipients’ countries.  
        To answer these questions I compared and contrasted two governmental 
agencies that are the most prominent and with the longest record of volunteer aid in Latin 
America: the United States Peace Corps and the Japanese agency, Japan Overseas 
Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV). Although the U.S. Peace Corps and its notion of 
development were models of “development” for the JOCV program, JOCV’s discourse of 
development and its development practices are not the same as the Peace Corps. Both 
agencies’ cross-cultural policies for their volunteers as well as the development practices 
the agencies adopted likely reflect how the Japanese and United States understand their 
own societies in general cultural terms, as well as in terms of moral and religious 
preferences, ethnicity and sexual orientation. The Peace Corps and JOCV volunteers’ 
experiences with indigenous populations showed several limitations to their programs 
and provided suggestions for the future particularly in the area of indigenous 
development.  
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 1 
Introduction 
Post-development theorist, Arturo Escobar’s influential work, Encountering 
Development discusses how the discourses of development have emerged and how they 
dominated and under what historical conditions. Escobar argued that development 
discourses as constructed are based exclusively on the western knowledge system 
(natural and social science discourses), on Western historical experiences and social 
norms and behaviors. In his work, Escobar said that “development” is a form of 
domination by Western knowledge systems over non-Western societies; in other words, 
the notion of development has been shaped by Western standards of “normal” behaviors 
and thinking. However, as John W. Traphagan noted, “Western notions about the nature 
of humans—their components parts, the relationship between the mental and physical, 
and “natural” tendencies in behavior and thinking—are obviously not universal.1  
In the case of Latin America, indigenous people’s cultural values are not treated 
as equal to Western-centric values. The degradation of indigenous values and practices 
started in the colonial period; many colonial records in the Americas show negative 
attitudes toward indigenous practices. Also, scholars have warned about the continuation 
of colonial thinking in today’s development discourses; for instance, Shannon Speed and 
Jane F. Collier showed that the state government of Chiapas utilized the human rights 
discourse to justify considering indigenous practices as “repugnant.”2 Andrew Gray also 
mentioned the imbalance of power relationships between the World Bank and the 
                                                
1 Traphagan, Rethinking Autonomy, 41.  
2 Speed and Collier, “Limiting Indigenous Autonomy in Chiapas, Mexico,” 878.   
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indigenous people in terms of the direction of development projects for indigenous 
peoples in Ecuador. He also noted that both sides contest the notion of “best practices” 
and “worst practices.”3 These studies showed that the degradation of indigenous 
practices and the promotion of Western behaviors and knowledge as “best practices” 
have continued and remain with us today.     
Even though the concepts of “civilized” and “primitive” societies had appeared 
since the colonial period, Escobar’s work argued that the emergence of the notions of 
“underdevelopment,” and “Third World,” arose world-wide in the early post-World War 
II under the U.S. hegemonic power and in the Cold War climate. The key behind the 
rapid expansion of the notion of “development” was due to the “institutionalization of 
development.” Escobar stated, “ the institutionalization of development took place at all 
levels, from the international organizations and national planning agencies in the Third 
World to local development agencies, community development committees, private 
voluntary agencies, and non-governmental organizations.4 That is, “the 
institutionalization of development” spurred the promotion of mono-cultural (Western 
cultural) development discourses and practices on “under-developed” societies 
throughout the world. Escobar mentioned that the objectives of development were varied 
and numerous, such as poverty, insufficient technology and capital, inadequate public 
services, rapid population growth, and agricultural methods. In addition to those, he noted 
                                                
3 Gray, “Development Policy—Development Protest,” 276-277.   
4 Escobar, Encountering Development, 46.    
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that cultural attitudes and values and other ethnic factors, which are considered backward 
under the Western worldview, are also the targets of development.5      
Although Japan entered the field of development aid projects before the 
publication of Escobar’s Encountering Development, other non-Western powers such as 
South Korea and China have since joined the field. Still, Escobar’s work did not discuss 
East Asian countries’ participation in projects of “development.” In other words, this 
landmark work as well as other post-development academic works discussed the concept 
and delivery of “development” based on known antecedents— Western countries as 
practitioners and non-Western countries as beneficiaries. Even though cultural sensibility 
has become a significant issue in development today,6 there is little research that 
analyzes the construction of non-Western donors’ discourses such as those of the 
Japanese governmental aid agency, Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers. Moreover, 
non-Western aid donors and practitioners’ engagement in indigenous development in 
Latin America has not been discussed. 
One of the aims of my dissertation is to present development as a multilayered 
cross-cultural project delivered from different world perspectives (e.g., ethnicity, 
language, sexuality, and even national collective histories) to local beneficiaries. My 
research illustrates how the donor’s society’s ethnocentric cultural and social values, 
perceptions and contexts are deeply embedded in the process of constructing notions of 
development. These issues are reflected into the donor’s development discourses and 
                                                
5 Escobar, Encountering Development, 41.    
6 Radcliffe and Laurie, “Culture and Development.”    
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practices whether consiously and unconsiously. However, what I observed in my field 
work and my research in archival materials exemplified post-development thinkers’ 
critique that development contains the dangerous possibility to reinforce unequal 
relations between aid practitioners (which embody not only Western knowledge 
production, but also each doner’s values) and the beneficiaries. Moreover, I want to 
deliver the voices of Peace Corps and JOCV volunteers who work hard and encounter 
daily the local realities, which are different from the conceptual formulations and 
practices of “development” they have learned from the agencies in some cases. 
Deliverying their views also confirmed that development is a multi-layered cross-cultural 
project and it is fruitful to hear the volunteer’s experiences because in their daily work 
they face the essential question of what development is as they interact with aid recipients 
who have different cultures and living conditions than those of the volunteers.  
In light of these issues, this dissertation aims to answer the following questions: 
How do Western and non-Western governmental donor agencies construct and deliver 
‘development’ to ‘non-developed’ countries in Latin America, particularly to countries 
with large indigenous populations? How do these donor agencies’ volunteer practitioners 
implement development projects in the field? What are the differences in the aims and 
delivery of development projects between Western and non-Western donors and their 
volunteer practitioners, especially those projects aimed at indigenous populations? As a 
corollary to those questions I attempted to discover how the agencies and their volunteers 
negotiated notions of development with indigenous peoples as well as how agencies and 
volunteers perceived and addressed cultural and ethnic differences in the aid recipients’ 
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countries, and to a certain extent, how the volunteers and the agencies assessed the 
impact of their programs on their lives and on the beneficiaries. To answer these 
questions I compared and contrasted two governmental agencies that are the most 
prominent and with the longest record of volunteer aid in Latin America: the United 
States Peace Corps and the Japanese agency, Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers 
(JOCV). These agencies were chosen because of their history, their record of 
participation in development projects, as well as their parallel activities in time and in 
Latin American countries. JOCV is the first non-Western governmental agency that 
provides people-to-people foreign assistance to developing countries. The U.S. Peace 
Corps is a leading agency of people-to-people foreign assistance in the world. These two 
agencies have accumulated about five decades of first-hand experiences through their 
volunteers who have participated in development projects for indigenous people in Latin 
America, but these experiences have not been studied from the perspective of how the 
cultural and social norms of the practitioners’ societies affected the construction of 
development discourse. Although I discuss these agencies’ activities and outcomes in 
various Latin American countries, I used Ecuador as the principal case study to evaluate 
the social and political impact of the delivery and implementation of development 
projects. 
One of the problems clearly evident in the historical background of the two 
chosen agencies was the impact of unforeseeable political events on the ability of the 
agencies and volunteers to construct and implement development projects in foreign 
countries. My project was no exception. While I was able to conduct fieldwork and 
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interviews with JOCV officials and volunteers in Ecuador, political disagreements 
between the United States and Ecuador made access to data, officials and volunteers 
nearly impossible. Similarly, access to annual reports and volunteers’ reports was 
sometimes difficult or uneven, as was the presentation of data on volunteers’ numbers 
and their participation in specific projects. These difficulties led me to lessen the 
comparative aspect of my study and re-direct somewhat my objectives and observations 
to address in greater detail the lack of analysis on non-Western agencies involved in 
development projects, while including as much data as I could obtain on the Peace Corps. 
Regardless of these problems JOCV, as the leading non-Western governmental agency 
engaged in people-to-people development projects in Latin America and the one with the 
longest and best track record, constitutes the best example to study the construction, 
implementation and delivery of development projects to developing countries and to 
indigenous peoples.  
JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES IN DEVELOPMENT  
 
In 1853, upon arrival of U.S. warships under Commodore Matthew Perry, Japan 
was forced to open to the world, and Japan terminated more than 200 years of national 
isolation under the Tokugawa shogunate.7 In 1858, Japan had been forced to sign an 
unequal treaty, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the United States. After 
concluding that unequal treaty with the United States, Japan was forced to sign similar 
‘unequal’ treaties with other Western powers such as England, France, Netherlands, and 
                                                
7 There are some exceptions; the Tokugawa shogunate had kept trading and limited political relations with 
China, Korea Netherlands, Ryūkyū (Okinawa), and the Ainu even under the closed-door policy.  
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Russia. Due to those treaties, Japan did not have tariff autonomy and consular 
jurisdiction. Under these conditions, Japan urgently needed to promote the rapid 
modernization and westernization of the country to gain equal status to the Western 
powers. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, winning the revision of unequal 
treaties with Western powers became a strong motivation for Japan to achieve rapid 
modernization and westernization. However, at the same time, not only the Western legal 
and political systems, but also the Japanese government promoted the eradication of 
some of their own cultural practices and social values to bring Japan up to Western 
standards.8 Although Japan’s foundation of capitalist economic system began emerging 
during the late Edo period,9 Japan adopted a capitalist economic system together with 
imperial expansionist political approaches and incorporated these discourses into their 
foreign policy even though these notions had not existed under the Japanese Closed-Door 
policy.10 It took over five decades for the Japanese government to accomplish the 
revision of unequal treaties with Western powers. During this period, Japan adopted 
imperialistic policies and rapidly changed its notion of development; it expanded its 
                                                
8 The pioneer scholar of native Japanese folklore, Kunio Yanagida, recorded the Japanese government’s 
persecution of Japanese folk for “religious” practices in the Meiji era (1868-1912). For instance, 
worshipping Jizō, which is a stone image related to both Buddhism and the regional folk beliefs, was 
prohibited. Some folk Shintō features were also forbidden; for instance, worshipping large trees and sacred 
forests, and mountains were considered “primitive” activities. Also, the revision of the calendar 
implemented from the lunar calendar to the solar calendar and many ceremonies and regional festivals were 
observed with accordance with the solar calendar. The government tried to make people celebrating 
according to the solar calendar and not lunar as they had done before, although the policy was not so 
successful in the beginning. See more detail, Yanagida, Japanese Culture in the Meiji Era, 291-299. 
9  Bellah, Tokugawa Religion. 
10 See Azuma, Between Two Empires; Weiner, “The invention of identity.” 
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territories and resources by colonizing neighboring countries and ethnic groups in Asia.11 
In order to mobilize Japan into a so-called “civilized” “modern” country like the Western 
countries, Japanese political elites and intellectuals heavily promoted the idea of 
imperialistic expansionism.  
In the nineteenth century, the Japanese government spent considerable amounts of 
money to hire thousands of foreign advisors and technicians who came mainly from 
Western countries, but Japan also hired Chinese advisors and technicians. The Japanese 
government’s great expense to hire government advisors and technicians, —oyatoi 
gaikokuji (“hired foreigners” in English) exemplified not only Japan’s notions of 
development today but also the idea behind JOCV’s notion of development—‘technology 
transfer’. Most of these “hired foreigners” earned high salaries comparable to the top 
officials in the government.12 Shoji Uemura’s article showed that salaries were different 
between the foreign advisors depending on specialty, knowledge, the year in which they 
got their assignment or worked, and even nationality quite possibly affected the amount 
of the salary. According to the article, the top five countries that supplied “hired 
foreigners” were: England, the United States, France, China and Germany.13 Andrew 
Gordon said that the term –oyatoi gaikokujin had “a pejorative connotation suggesting 
that they brought no value beyond detailed technical expertise.”14 This indicates that if 
                                                
11 The Japanese government colonized neighboring countries and ethnic groups; for example, Ainu’s land 
in Hokkaido (1869), Okinawa (1879), Taiwan (1894), south Sakhalin (1905), Kwantung Province (1905), 
and Korea (1910).      
12 Gordon, A Modern History of Japan, 71. 
13 Uemura, “Meiji zenki oyatoi gaikokujin no kyuyo” [Salaries of Oyatoi (Japanese Foreign Employees) in 
Early Meiji].   
14 Gordon, A Modern History of Japan, 71.  
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the “hired foreigners” did not bring appropriate knowledge and technical expertise for 
Japan’s development, they were useless. This idea has been deeply embedded into 
Japan’s aid agency’s attitudes since Japan started participating in development projects in 
the post-war period. These issues, and how JOCV volunteers in Ecuador continue to see 
‘technology transfer’ as very important that concept in their self-evaluation of the service 
and performance, are discussed further in Chapter 5.  
Japanese national history and Japan’s experiences to achieve development have 
strongly influenced the shaping of its notions of development. After World War II, Japan 
entered the field of development to obtain recognition as a member of the international 
community. In 1954, Japan started to implement its project of “development” 
internationally by participating in the Colombo Plan.15 The following year, the 
government of Japan began sending Japanese experts to developing countries in Asia; at 
the same time, Japan also had received trainees who came from developing countries. 
This was the beginning of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (hereafter, ODA). 
In addition, Japan’s impetus to develop its system of foreign assistance was linked 
to its compensation for past colonial and military experiences in Asia. In reality, 
participating in the Colombo Plan was an actual starting point for Japan to build and 
practice its notion of development in its beneficiary countries in Asia. According to 
Norihiro Kuroda’s review of government reports and academic literature in terms of 
Japan’s aid philosophy (particularly in the field of education), Japan’s mode of aid to 
                                                
15 The Colombo Plan was established in 1950, and it was the earliest regional aid organization in the Asia 
Pacific region in the post-war period. The objective of the plan was to stimulate economic and social 
development in the region mainly through providing technical assistance.    
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compensate for war damages, “kenkyona taido” (modesty) became one of the central 
Japanese development philosophies. Kuroda said that it is logical to understand that 
Japan built its aid philosophy under the notion of “kenkyona taido” due to this historical 
background. This “kenkyona taido” also came from Japan’s own experience of being 
occupied by GHQ (General Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers). The US intervened strongly in Japan’s educational reform; thereby, Kuroda said 
that this experience affected Japan’s preference for “kenkyona taido” toward beneficiary 
countries in development projects.16 Kenneth King and Simon McGrath also mentioned, 
that the “colonial episode and the consequent sensitivities in Asia seem to have 
confirmed Japanese preference for their aid to support technical and infrastructural areas 
and not the so-called softer fields, such as human resource planning and governance”.17  
Scholars studying aid philosophy have paid attention to the Japanese “request-
based system” as its traditional aid philosophy. Regarding the origin of this “request-
based system,” David Arase explains that, “the passive request-based system was 
institutionalized at this time (right after the era of World War II), and was particularly 
suitable as Japan sought to demonstrate its respect for sovereignty of its Asian neighbors 
and to win back their trust.”18 However, Since September 11, the trend in development 
programs has changed. September 11 influenced the selection of beneficiary countries 
according to their stance toward terrorism. Since then, the United States has put a great 
                                                
16 Kuroda, “Nihon no kokusai kyōiku kyōryoku ni kansuru jikoninshiki”(Self-Reflection on Japan’s 
International Cooperation in Education), 87.  
17 King and McGrath, Knowledge for Development?, 159.  
18 Arase, “Japan and U.S. Bilateral ODA programs,”118.      
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deal of effort in shaping the content to emphasize the establishment of democracy in 
developing countries, particularly those at risk for terrorism.  
Japan’s own experience as aid recipient shaped Japanese notion of development. 
After World War II, Japan received large amounts of aid from the World Bank and the 
U.S. government. Wilkins said that current health education programs were developed 
based on the Japanese experience with severe parasite infestations following World War 
II.19 Thanks to foreign aid, including loans, Japanese infrastructure improvements and 
the economic success of the production sector led Japan’s rapid economic development. 
Thus, Japan relied on this experience and placed great emphasis on infrastructure 
improvements in its beneficiary aid countries. On the other hand, scholars and foreign aid 
practitioners criticized this approach as they saw it as a means to expand Japanese 
markets in the beneficiary countries and further Japan’s economic interests.20   
During that time, Japan became recognized as one of the first non-Western 
economic powers in the world. In the 1990s many publications addressed the Japanese 
ODA’s approach to development and researchers pointed out how that approach is related 
to Japan's own experiences.21 For instance, King and McGrath noted that Japan’s ODA’s 
construction of its notion of development is not influenced by either Christian or Western 
                                                
19 Wilkins, “Japanese Approaches to Development Communication.” 
20 JICA, “Project kenkyū nihongata kokusai kyōryoku no yūkōsei to kadai” [Project Study: Effectiveness 
and Challenge of Japanese International Cooperation]. Multiple aid practitioners and scholars as well as 
JICA officials wrote this JICA report. The report discussed criticisms and future suggestions regarding the 
Japanese ODA program.  
21 For instance, see Wilkins, “Japanese Approaches to Development Communication”; King and McGrath, 
Knowledge for Development?     
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traditions.22 They pointed out the importance of seeking “to understand perceptions of 
how discourses and practices were culturally embedded.”23 However, many works 
published during the period of intensive study of Japan’s ODA emphasized studying 
Japanese development approach in terms of how the amount of aid correlated to Japan’s 
commercial and political interests, and to the structure and the system of Japanese 
bilateral assistance. Similarly, the correlation between U.S. foreign policy with Japanese 
ODA’s choices in the distribution of aid was a popular topic of discussion.24  
In sum, Japan’s philosophy and approaches to aid development are embedded into 
its history and its own development processes and these approaches are historically 
linked to the United States intervention in Japan and Japan’s earlier imperialistic policies 
in East Asia. These connections will be explored in the dissertation chapters as they 
influence Japan’s construction, delivery and practices of development aid to Latin 
American countries. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The Peace Corps and the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV)  
A substantial amount of literature on the Peace Corps has been produced since the 
Peace Corps was established. On the other hand, literature on JOCV is extremely limited. 
Under this circumstance, this section will first review literature on the Peace Corps. Since 
the Peace Corps was established in1961, substantial amounts of scholarly books, doctoral 
                                                
22 King and McGrath, Knowledge for Development?, 159.   
23 Ibid., 5-6.      
24 For example, see Anderson, “Latin America”; Ensign, Doing Good or Doing Well? ; Tuman, Emmert, 
and Sterken, “Explaining Japanese Aid Policy in Latin America”; Katada,“Two Aid Hegemons.”        
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dissertations, and journal articles related to Peace Corps issues have been published. In 
addition to academic works, autobiographies written by former Peace Corps volunteers 
have been published in significant numbers in the past decades. In terms of academic 
writings, there are four prominent themes addressed in the last four decades: (1) research 
about selection procedures and training; (2) psychological research regarding issues of 
volunteers’ mental health, culture shock, intercultural communication, and racial 
representation; (3) historical analysis of the organization; and (4) the role of the Peace 
Corps in U.S. foreign policy. In addition, in the early stage of the Peace Corps, some 
scholars discussed the Peace Corps’ services within the larger framework of Christianity 
or compared the Peace Corps with Christian missionaries.25   
In terms of the role of the Peace Corps in US foreign policy, historian Gerardo 
Rice’s The Bold Experiment: JFK’s Peace Corps is an in-depth study of the Peace Corps’ 
history from 1961 to the middle of 1980s.26 His extensive archival research conveyed 
political negotiations and institutional changes within/around the Peace Corps. Rice 
mentioned that, as soon as the program started, the U.S. government and Peace Corps’ 
officials predicted the volunteers would influence not only host countries, but also U.S. 
public opinion regarding U.S. foreign policy. Marshall Windmiller, a scholar in the field 
of international relations, criticized the Peace Corps operations and its objectives as U.S. 
expansionism.27 Windmiller stated that the Peace Corps is highly politicized and it is an 
instrument of American foreign policy. On the other hand, historian Elizabeth Cobbs 
                                                
25 For instance, see Hegel, “Peace Corps Volunteers or Missionary—Does It Really Make Any 
Difference?”   
26 Rice, The Bold Experiment.  
27 Windmiller, The Peace Corps and Pax Americana.   
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Hoffman concluded that the Peace Corps operations improved U.S. relations with the 
host countries in most cases.28                                              
In terms of the literature on the Peace Corps in the Andean region, scholars 
described not only the relations between the Peace Corps and U.S. foreign interests, but 
they also focused on the programs’ details such as community development.29 
Community development is a major field of the Peace Corps program; a large share of 
the program was actually carried out by U.S. Peace Corps volunteers and the model for 
the programs was derived almost entirely from the U.S. experience.30 Because 
community development programs have been developed along with agrarian reform in 
the Andean region, community development is influential in indigenous people’ lives in 
most cases. The Peace Corps Impact in the Peruvian Andes is an ethnographic study that 
provides data and describes the state of community development and the interactions 
between indigenous people in rural Peru and the volunteers.31 In addition, since 
community development directly reflects volunteers’ ideology and personality, 
Volunteers for Peace is a fruitful study to understand what type of volunteers were 
selected by the Peace Corps to serve in community development in the Andes.32  
Literature on the Peace Corps has been developed independently from that of the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (hereafter, USAID), although both agencies 
are ODA agencies of the U.S. government. Unlike the literature on U.S. ODA, the 
                                                
28 Cobbs Hoffman, All You Need Is Love.   
29 For example, Sheffield, “Peru and the Peace Corps, 1962-1968.”   
30 Wiarda, “The Problem of Ethnocentrism in the Study of Political Development,”104-106.    
31 Dobyns, Doughty and Holmberg, Peace Corps Impact in the Peruvian Andes.  
32 Stein, Volunteers for Peace.  
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literature on Japanese ODA has focused much more on Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (hereafter, JICA) than on JOCV because JOCV is a division under JICA.33 
Consequently, compared to the literature on the Peace Corps, the literature on JOCV is 
limited in topics. Except for a few journalistic books,34 and as far as I could determine, 
JOCV’s organization and goals have not been studied systematically in academia. Even 
though the literature on JOCV is scarce, research on JOCV has been produced with 
publications on specific topics related to JOCV. Some of the major themes on JOCV are: 
(1) agriculture, health and nursing in development fields,35 (2) volunteers’ cross-cultural 
adaptation to development fields, 36 and (3) founding history of JOCV.37 
Autobiographies written by former JOCV volunteers have been published in the past 
decades.38 Unlike the literature on the Peace Corps, there is no research analyzing the 
role of JOCV in Japanese foreign policy and issues of race and ethnicity are absent.
 In terms of the region of research and because Asia is the largest area of JOCV 
operations, it has been the primary region for JOCV research. The second largest area is 
Africa. Even though JOCV literature in Latin America has rarely been developed, more 
articles on Guatemala have been produced than on any other country in Latin America. 
                                                
33 JOCV was established in 1965 and became a long running program of the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA), which has provided technical assistance to developing countries on behalf of 
the Japanese government. For more information on the JICA, please see below. 
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/oda/index [accessed in April 5. 2013].  
34 For instance, Maeda, Nippon heiwa butai [Japanese Peace Corps]; Yoshida, Seinen kaigai kyōryokutai 
no shōtai [Reality of Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers].   
35 For example, see Sudo, “Activity as a JOCV first generation of clinical nursing in Mongolia.”  
36 See Nakane, Nihonjin no kanōsei to genkai [The Possibilities and Limitations of Japanese People]; 
Horie, “Kokusai kyōryoku to ibunka tekiō: [A Study of International Cooperate Activities and Cross-
cultural Adaptation]; Horie, “Seinen kaigai kyōryokutai no kokusai kyōryoku katsudō ni kansuru 
kenkyū”[Study about JOCV’s International Cooperation Activities].    
37 Suetsugu, Mikai to hinkon he no chosen [Challenge to the Underdevelopment and Poverty].  
38 For example, Ban, Borantia supiritu [The Volunteer Sprit]; Hayakawa, Ketsuaru ha tobu [Quezal Flies].  
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Even though “anthropology has little involvement in aid programs,”39 ‘culture’ appears 
increasingly in Japanese development discourse as a form of capacity development. For 
instance, Japanese scholars Yūji Seki, Yūsuke Nakamura, and Tomomi Kozaki illustrated 
how JICA has implemented indigenous development projects in postwar Guatemala in 
relation to the Japanese experience as a developing country.40 However, the study did not 
extend the discussion to the involvement of JOCV in indigenous development. Due to the 
fact that research on JOCV and its indigenous development programs is still 
underdeveloped today, my dissertation will explore how the Japanese aid agency has 
incorporated ‘culture’ into their development discourse.    
METHODOLOGY  
 
My research was conducted in Ecuador, Japan, and the United States. This project 
relied on archival research, participatory observation, interviews as well as small surveys. 
Under the approval of IRB (#2010-11-0134) and with the consent of the research 
subjects, I conducted my field research. In the next sections I discuss the definition of 
some terms relevant to my research as well as my program and data collection 
methodologies. 
 
 
 
                                                
39 Matsuzono, “International Cooperation Activities and Anthropology.”  
40 Seki, Nakamura and Kozaki, Guatemara naisengo ningen no anzenhoshō no chōsen [Human Security 
Challenge in postwar Guatemala].    
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Definition of Terms     
The concept of culture has no agreed definition and it remains highly ambiguous. 
Also, it is difficult to distinguish it from concepts of class, race, nation and history.41 
According to Clifford Geertz, culture is “a historically transmitted pattern of meanings 
embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by 
means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and 
attitudes toward life.”42 I accept his definition of culture; however, I wish to consider the 
meaning of “culture” in a broader sense of norms rather than in a narrower sense of 
symbols. My understanding of culture in this study is meant to specifically include social 
norms, belief systems (including religion), customs (including dress and household) that 
are acquired by individuals as members of society. This dissertation analyzes the 
volunteers’ variety of personal experiences and opinions in the development field, and 
these volunteers came from different countries, have different backgrounds and hold to 
different cultural standards. Because of this, I also adopted John W. Traphagan’s nuanced 
comments on culture. He stated that, “it is essential to recognize that “culture” is actually 
a complex flow of subjectively defined abstractions (constructs) that exists only in 
individual heads, even while sets of behaviors and ideas associated with a particular 
culture may be shared among many people through abstract processes of collectivization 
and, thus, tend to be assumed to be universally natural and normal.”43 I also kept in mind 
this definition of “culture,” when I analyzed JOCV and U.S. Peace Corps volunteers.
                                                
41 Trouillot, “Adieu, Culture,” 41.  
42 Greetz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 89.   
43 Traphagan, Rethinking Autonomy, 22.  
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 Frequently used since the 1970s, the concept of ‘ethnicity’ has been debated in a 
variety of disciplines and linked to those of nation, culture, race, and people. In my 
dissertation, I take ethnicity to be what Richard N. Adams showed. He defined ethnicity 
through dividing it into two different perspectives: 1) “internally defined ethnicity” (the 
speaker is referring to his/her own ethnic group) and 2) “externally defined ethnicity” (an 
externally defined category of people). That is, “internally defined ethnicity” is more 
related to a person’s own identity than to the terms of reference used by others, and 
internal definitions select features that are presumed to be advantageous to the individual. 
On the other hand, “externally defined ethnicity” is much more explicit than internal 
definitions; that is, the expression of “externally defined ethnicity” is more linked to the 
terms of reference. However, Adams argued that “externally defined ethnicity” did not 
reflect an objective reality because it also reflected the observers’ subjective reality 
toward the identified group.44 Regardless, internal or externally defined ‘ethnicity’ is 
always constructed vis-à-vis others—people are only aware of their ethnicity when they 
are in contact with others who are different or who they perceive as different.  
 As with the concepts of ethnicity and culture, defining development is 
difficult. Modernization theorists have shaped the concept of “development” and the term 
‘development’ often has been used to refer to the structural transitions and economic 
growth of a society. In the case of the United Nations, “the UN indicators of human and 
political development do demonstrate a high correlation with economic development, as 
                                                
44 Adams, “Internal and External Ethnicities.” 
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the modernization thesis would predict.”45       
 The notion of ‘indigenous development’ can roughly be distinguished in two 
categories. Since the 1980s, international organizations began dealing with indigenous 
issues. Along with the process of debating the recognition of indigenous rights in 
international organizations, multilateral and bilateral organizations, religious institutions, 
and international and domestic NGOs offered numerous projects to indigenous peoples. 
Indigenous development, in a broad sense, includes all the processes for debating and 
enacting international and domestic laws related to the recognition of indigenous rights. 
In a narrow sense, indigenous development means a development program, which aims to 
implement a culturally appropriate development for specific indigenous peoples. That is, 
indigenous development today is negotiated and implemented through the interaction 
between the international (or domestic) actors’ worldviews, ideologies, customs and 
social norms and those of indigenous people in order to seek appropriate development 
practices for indigenous people. In this dissertation, I use the term ‘indigenous 
development’ in the narrow sense: that is, a development program that aims to implement 
a culturally appropriate development for specific indigenous peoples.  
 
Archival Research     
I examined both JICA/JOCV annual reports and Peace Corps annual reports from 
1961 to 2011 in order to study the development of the organizations, the development of 
their programs in Latin America, as well as analyze the pattern of their programs’ 
                                                
45 Roberts, Cushing and Wood, The Sociology of Development, xix-xx.  
 20 
terminations in Latin America. Since the literature of JOCV has been less published, I 
also explored JOCV monthly magazines—Wakai chikara and Crossroads from 1965 to 
2009.46 Because the JICA/JOCV annual report and JOCV magazines are not available 
online, I went to JICA’s Research Institute (hereafter, called JICA Archive) located in 
Tokyo, Japan.47 The JICA Archive has extensive archival materials such as JICA’s 
annual reports, project reports, country studies, evaluation of JICA projects, visual 
sources, and JICA monthly magazines, non-published old materials as well as JOCV 
volunteers’ autobiographies. While only the recent data including the recent JICA/JOCV 
annual reports are available online, all Peace Corps annual reports were published online. 
Moreover, Peace Corps newsletters, magazines, brochures, training manual and resource 
kits, as well as photographs are available at the Peace Corps Digital Library. In addition 
to these agencies’ primary data, I accessed the congressional reports to explore how 
Japanese and U.S. governments and the public perceived the two agencies. 
In addition to the annual reports and other official primary sources for these two 
agencies, one of principal sources for the study was 隊員報告書 Taiin hōkoku sho 
(hereafter, JOCV working report). Wakako Horie, who studied cross-cultural adaptation 
using JOCV working reports, said that this large amount of accumulated JOCV 
experiences has not gotten attention from academia as well as from the general public 
                                                
46 Wakai chikara was published from 1965 to 1978. From 1978, Crossroads replaced Wakai chikara. 
However, after budget cuts in 2009, the general public is not allowed to access the Crossroads magazine, 
even the National Diet Library does not have it. Both JOCV and JICA archives show the magazines only to 
JICA/JOCV authorized persons. However, the magazines before 2009 are accessible to the general public.  
47 JOCV (Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers) is one of the programs of JICA that aims to provide 
technical assistance to developing countries. Therefore, JOCV-related materials were gathered in JICA’s 
Archives. The largest JICA archives are located in Ichigata and Hiroō, in Tokyo.    
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expect for the extremely successful or unsuccessful few cases; that is, this matter has not 
become the subject of systematic study. Horie pointed out that the JOCV working reports 
constitute very fruitful data to learn about JOCV volunteers’ subjective view of their 
experience as part of development projects.48   
JOCV volunteers are required to submit to the JOCV office a working report. As 
of 2012, JOCV volunteers need to submit reports five times during their assignment. 
Although the format of the report has changed over time, JOCV volunteers need to report 
on: (1) description of the host country and working site, (2) description of the job and 
future plan for activities, (4) suggestions for the JOCV program and (4) provide a self-
evaluation. However, depending on the individual, the volunteers reported various 
different things from cultural differences and relationships with local people, to t he 
validity of the JOCV assignment of volunteers to their individual sites. That is, JOCV 
working reports are a very rich source of data to study volunteers’ experiences in the host 
countries as well as the development practices they employed in their projects. The length 
of the reports varied. Short working reports are around 15 pages to 20 pages while the 
longest one was over 100 pages with rich appendixes and written both in Japanese and 
Spanish (as a report on Latin America).  
In order to collect JOCV working reports, I went to JICA Global Plaza; its official 
name is chikyū hiroba in Japanese ( hereafter, JOCV Archive).49 In JOCV Archive 
                                                
48 Horie, “Kokusai kyōryoku to ibunka tekiō” [A Study of International Cooperate Activities and Cross-
cultural Adaptation], 129.  
49 In JOCV archive is located in JICA Global Plaza. This is the only place to access JOCV working reports 
for the Japanese public. JICA Global Plaza had been located in Hiroo, Tokyo. However, JICA Global Plaza 
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JOCV applicants, trainees, and volunteers who are currently working in the host countries 
have access to previous JOCV reports in order to grasp the idea of their future jobs and 
experiences in the host countries as well as technical knowledge they might need (e.g., 
teaching methods and materials). In addition to the JOCV/JICA appropriate persons, the 
general public has access to JOCV Archive. According to Wakako Horie’s dissertation, 
the JOCV office did not obtain permission from the JOCV volunteers to make public 
their JOCV working reports, so that she was not allowed to read reports written before 
1980s or she needed to negotiate access to specific reports by herself, by contacting the 
former volunteer directly. However, in 2011, when I was doing archival work in Tokyo, 
JOCV official told me that only JOCV working reports issued since 2003 were accessible 
to the general public. This affected my data collection. Under this circumstance, I 
analyzed JOCV working reports from volunteers who worked or were working in 
Ecuador from 2003 to the summer of 2011.50 The total number of JOCV working reports 
I obtained and analyzed is 192, so was able to study 192 individual different experiences 
of participation in development projects in Ecuador.51 For supplemental purposes and to 
better understand JOCV indigenous development processes, I also obtained five JOCV 
working reports from participants who worked in Bolivia in the area of indigenous 
development. I also did a skype-interview with one JOCV volunteer who is still in 
                                                                                                                                            
was moved into the same building of the JICA Institute where the 2012 JICA Archive is located.  
However, during my archival research in Tokyo, I collected data at the previous location.  
50 192 JOCV working reports mean that I obtained those from the JOCV Archive. In addition to these 
reports, I also obtained some of the latest JOCV working reports from JOCV volunteers who were/are 
working in Ecuador at the time of my fieldwork. I obtained those reports directly from the volunteers I 
interviewed in Ecuador.  
51 Some of the JOCV working reports are not complete. Horie’s article (2008) and her dissertation (2006) 
also pointed out that a few of JOCV working reports were scattered and lost so she collected randomly.   
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Cochabamba, Bolivia. 
Fieldwork in Ecuador 
 
The fieldwork took place mainly in several different cities, towns, and 
communities located in the northern and southern Highlands of Ecuador: Pichincha, 
Imbabura, Chimborazo, and Loja provinces. In Quito, I conducted semi-structured 
interviews with both Peace Corps and JOCV officials working in the Ecuador Branch in 
order to figure out the current area of emphasis and direction of the agencies providing 
aid in Ecuador as well as the management of the volunteers. In addition to this, I wanted 
to find out the agencies’ directions and perspectives toward indigenous development 
projects in Ecuador and how the volunteers cooperated or not with those objectives.  
When I visited the JOCV and Peace Corps offices in Quito, I submitted official 
letters from my dissertation supervisor together with IRB approval and verbal consent 
forms as well as documents listing the objective of my study, methods to recruit 
volunteers and contact information. JOCV office cooperated to help me access JOCV 
volunteers. On the other hand, due to on-going political conflicts between the Ecuadorian 
government and U.S. government,52 The country director for the Peace Corps decided 
not to cooperate with my research explaining that his decision was due to the “bad 
timing” of my request and to protect Peace Corps volunteers’ “security”. This became a 
                                                
52 On September 30, 2010, Ecuadorian National Police did strike against the government and occupied 
illegally the National Parliament and the TV station and blocked international airports (The incident is 
known as 30S). Wikileaks reported the possible involvement of U.S. government in the incident. In 
response to that, the Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa ordered the expulsion of the U.S. ambassador in 
2011 as persona non grata. Then the U.S. expelled the Ecuadorian ambassador to the United States in 
2011. Moreover, Rafael Correa made a declaration that he would expel USAID form the country but that 
has not happened yet (as of May 2013).  
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major obstacle to collect Peace Corps data during my fieldwork. The Peace Corps Quito 
office stored Peace Corps volunteers’ working reports written by volunteers who worked 
in Ecuador. Under these circumstances, the Peace Corps office did not let me read their 
reports. Instead, the Peace Corps office provided me with an annual report that contained 
a summary of the volunteers’ working reports. To conduct interviews and for other data 
collection I had to rely on personal connections and I led a focus group discussion with 
the JOCV and Peace Corps volunteers at their working site.  
(a) Semi-structured Interviews  
The methods of data collection in the field include semi-structured interviews 
mainly with JOCV volunteers working with indigenous peoples in the Ecuadorian 
Highlands. Recruitment of my informants was through the JOCV office in Ecuador. The 
office has a list of JOCV volunteers who work with/in indigenous communities in the 
Highlands and the office contacted the volunteers and informed them of my study. 
Afterward, I got a list of contact addresses for the volunteers who wished to participate in 
my study; then, I sent email and contacted them by phone or skype to explain about my 
study and set up a schedule of interviews and visits. Some of the volunteers wanted to 
participate as informants only through an interview. Other volunteers welcomed me to 
visit and stay at their sites.  
All interviews were open-ended and semi-structured. The basic questions asked in 
every interview session were: (1) reason why they decided to apply to the JOCV 
program, (2) their JOCV current job description and their plan for JOCV future activities, 
(3) their perspective on indigenous peoples in Ecuador, and (5) their experiences with 
indigenous peoples in Ecuador and their development practices including challenging 
points, and (6) suggestions for indigenous development. These five key questions were 
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the basis for the interview sessions; however, individual experiences are very diverse so 
each interview session has a different focus.  
 
(b) Survey 
Before starting an interview with a JOCV volunteer who currently works with 
indigenous peoples in the Highlands of Ecuador (as of July 2012), I provided a short 
survey in order to explore JOCV volunteers’ image of indigenous people. I asked the 
interviewee to complete the survey, which listed 28 items describing certain 
characteristics associated with indigenous peoples (See Table 6.1). I quickly reviewed the 
survey during my interview session, and I asked the interviewee why he/she selected the 
answers and how their answers were related to his/her notion of development and their 
actual development practices in their working sites. The length of interview for each 
volunteer was about 2 hours.  
 
 (c) Observation  
Besides the interviews, I visited three indigenous bilingual primary schools in the 
rural Highlands (Imbabra and Loja provinces) and six indigenous communities in the 
Chimborazo province in order to observe the sites where JOCV volunteers worked and 
how the volunteers employed development practices as well as how they and the 
indigenous people interacted. Not only was I present and observed the classroom 
interactions, but I also taught small classes in English conversation and Japanese Origami 
to indigenous children. I also participated in holding JOCV volunteer’s workshops in 
rural indigenous communities, traveled with the volunteers, helped distribute materials, 
held posters, distributed sample foods and sung along with workshop participants. In 
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addition, when I visited sites, I conducted casual interviews with some JOCV volunteers 
working in bilingual primary schools in indigenous communities.    
(d) Disclaimer  
 
My native language is Japanese and I was educated in Japan. My first contact 
with Latin American culture was 20 years ago. While I was an elementary school student, 
my family participated in a volunteer program and welcomed two university students 
from Brazil and Mexico into my home in Japan. This wonderful experience gave me a 
strong motivation to go and to experience Latin American culture. Consequently, I 
attended the local high school in Quito, Ecuador and lived there with a host family. Even 
though I grew up in Japan, I have also been educated in Costa Rica, Ecuador, and the 
United States. My first contact with JOCV volunteers took place when I was in Ecuador 
and I volunteered for JOCV activities and events. My multicultural upbringing, 
background, and experiences probably affect my analysis when I read reports, diaries, 
autobiographies, and I conduct interviews. Moreover, my study connects three different 
groups with different languages, culture, and national histories. As Maria F. Wade stated, 
“Language differences affected what people heard and recorded, how they perceived the 
landscapes, and what comparative models and cognitive maps they brought to bear on 
their descriptions of peoples and landscapes in the New World (Wade 2003, xxi).”53 
Similarly, the people I interviewed, the diaries they wrote and their perceptions of 
‘others’ will reflect their cultural background. Also, the way I read their writings and my 
                                                
53 Wade, The Native Americans of the Texas Edwards Plateau, 1582-1799, xxi.  
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interpretation of what they say will reflect my Japanese cultural background and 
experiences in Latin America and the United States. I am aware of these issues and have 
tried to be mindful of my subjectivity and position. To minimize those issues and to let 
the subjects speak, my interview questions were open-ended. 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE RESEARCH DATA 
I protected the privacy and confidentiality of my participants. My study was 
totally based on voluntary participation. Thi s  dissertation project is IRB approved 
(Protocol Number 2010-11-0134) according to US legislation. Before starting an 
interview, I handed out verbal consent forms written in Japanese or in Spanish to every 
participant. Participants had the choice to skip questions they felt uncomfortable 
answering. The forms were also reviewed and proved by IRB. Participant’s answers were 
anonymous. I used pseudonyms for every volunteer as well as for the names of the 
primary schools where I did fieldwork.  
I will not upload my transcriptions, notes, surveys, or recorded interviews to the 
web. Regarding JOCV working reports, I deleted the names and places where they 
worked, although their names and the places where they worked had been already 
published in the JOCV Archive. In fact, the volunteers already signed contracts with the 
JICA/JOCV office in regarding the publication of their JOCV working reports.  
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OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
The following chapter compares and contrasts the historical background and 
ideologies of the Peace Corps and JOCV. Both agencies were established under the same 
trend among the developed countries—sending ‘secular’ volunteers to developing 
countries. However, concepts such as development, volunteerism, and pioneer spirit were 
imported from Western countries and the background and motivation behind the two 
countries—the United States and Japan, were different. Also, the existence in Japanese 
society of a different concept of work and different social values from those of the U.S. 
society affected the way JOCV designed its agency. The following chapter also presents 
information on such topics as recruitment, selection and training of the volunteers.  
  In the next two chapters (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3), I explore the Peace Corps and 
JOCV’s operations in the Latin American region. The two chapters illustrate the 
experiences of the two agencies as they operated and implemented “development” 
initiatives in Latin America. The Latin American experiences highlight the reasons why 
the Peace Corps was very much concerned about the political status of the agency. 
Before discussing Ecuador as the Peace Corps and JOCV’s case study, Chapter 4 
discusses why I chose Ecuador as case study and why Ecuador is an appropriate region to 
study indigenous development. Since the indigenous issue is a significant part of 
development projects in Latin America, exploring the experiences of the Peace Corps and 
of JOCV as case studies will bring greater insight to the issues involved in indigenous 
development, its limitations and possibilities in the sphere of international cooperation.  
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So, Chapter 4 is intended to briefly illustrate Ecuador’s past experience and the on-going 
situation of indigenous development as well as the participation of international 
organizations in development projects.   
  After a short introduction to the history of the JOCV and the Peace Corps in 
Ecuador, Chapter 5 focus on JOCV and Peace Corps experiences’ in a multiethnic 
Andean country, Ecuador. In particularly, the chapter discusses the concepts of 
development of these two agencies and follows that with a discussion on cross-cultural 
issues related to their development projects. This case study is intended to show the 
contradiction between the ideal role of international cooperation, which the volunteers 
were trained to uphold and embody, and the realities experienced after they started 
working at a particular site.  
Chapter 6 extends the analysis of Chapter 5 by focusing on the volunteers’ 
development practices and their experiences by considering indigenous development in 
the Ecuadorian Highlands at the micro level. Chapter 6 discussed almost exclusively the 
experiences of JOCV volunteers in the area of indigenous development due to Peace 
Corps lack of data. The comparison between the JOCV volunteers’ experiences and those 
of Peace Corps volunteers showed they differ on some issues, but agree on others. The 
concluding chapter, which extends to the results discussed in Chapter 6, summarizes the 
limitations of the volunteer’s involvement in the area of indigenous development. Finally, 
I make some suggestions how the volunteers are able to cope and cooperate and about the 
support needed for the volunteers. 
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Chapter 1: Historical Background and Ideologies of Peace Corps and 
JOCV 
Missionaries, like the poor, have always been with us. Even before the Crusades, 
Christians went off to foreign continents to convert, uplift, or if necessary beat 
into submission native peoples. But in the middle of the twentieth century there 
appeared the secular volunteer.1   
 
Between 1960 and 1965, sending young volunteers to the third world became a 
prominent trend among the developed countries with dominant international influence.  
Previously, the emergence of mid-twentieth century ideas of “universalism,” which was 
manifested in things such as the establishment of the United Nations, played a central 
role in establishing secular volunteer programs among post-war generations in Western 
countries.2 The U.S. Peace Corps was a key player in the design of this international 
trend, and the Japanese Government followed suit. In 1965, the JOCV was founded as a 
government program. Unlike the United States and the American young people in 
the1960s, Japanese participation in international development projects was very 
significant for Japan and the Japanese people because it meant their return to the fold of 
the international community in the post-war period. Concepts such as development, 
volunteerism, and pioneer spirit were imported concepts from Western countries, which 
guided the international community. This chapter will compare the organizational 
structures of the Peace Corps with those of JOCV.  
 
 
                                                
1 Cobbs Hoffman, All You Need Is Love, 13.   
2 Ibid.,13-24.       
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND IDEOLOGIES OF PEACE CORPS  
 
The Establishment of the Peace Corps  
 
In 1961, President John F. Kennedy established the Peace Corps through the 
Executive Order 10924. The Peace Corps was designated as an independent agency of the 
U.S. government, and it has been sending ordinary young Americans abroad as a means 
to foster international cooperation for more than fifty years. The Peace Corps has been 
not only widely recognized as a volunteer-based-development agency, but also as a 
popular choice for young American men and women who want to experience living in a 
foreign country.  
      John F. Kennedy proposed the idea of the Peace Corps during his presidential 
election campaign. In the political climate of the Cold War era, this idea made Kennedy’s 
foreign policy look fresher and more exciting than that of his rival, Richard Nixon.3  
Also, the idea of the Peace Corps was a hit with the American public. After winning the 
presidential election against Nixon, Kennedy implemented this campaign promise as his 
first executive order in March 1961. Soon after issuing this first executive order, the 
President appointed his brother-in-law, Sargent Shriver as the first Peace Corps Director 
and handed the task of organizing the Peace Corps to Shriver.   
William Lederer and Eugene Burdick’s The Ugly American, a popular book at the 
time, had been a direct motivation for the foundation of the Peace Corps. The novel 
described U.S. bureaucrats’ imperialistic attitude and their poor ability to communicate 
with local people and in the 1960s many Americans criticized this approach. The 
                                                
3 Fischer, Making Them Like Us, 12.       
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popularity of the novel led to public support for the Peace Corps’ independent status. 
However, from the Peace Corps’ inception, its organizational status was controversial in 
the White House and there were strong objections from government circles against 
separating it from other government existing agencies. Some bureaucrats appointed by 
Kennedy, such as Henry Labouisse, insisted that Peace Corps should be a subdivision of 
the Agency for International Development but Shriver’s point of view was ultimately 
victorious.4     
The Peace Corps’ organizational status related to an important question—whether 
or not the Peace Corps was, and is, an instrument of foreign policy. Contrary to President 
Kennedy, Shriver tried to avoid the volunteers being seen as “Cold War warriors.”5 He 
insisted that the Peace Corps was an apolitical agency and implemented two policies in 
order to avoid associating the image of the program with U.S. Cold War politics.6 First, 
the Peace Corps adopted a strict protocol regarding the exclusion of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in September 1961 from Peace Corps’ affairs. Shriver 
recognized that keeping spies out of the Peace Corps was important, and he was 
particularly concerned about the CIA. He and others believed that separating Peace Corps 
volunteers from the CIA confirmed that the Peace Corps was not established with the aim 
of functioning as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Today, this policy is still in vigor, 
and the Peace Corps’ Manual, Section 611, states that persons currently or formerly 
employed by the CIA are permanently ineligible to be Peace Corps volunteers and 
                                                
4 Rice, The Bold Experiment, 60-67.    
5 Fischer, Making Them Like Us,16.    
6 Rice, The Bold Experiment, 259; Shriver, Point of the Lance, 72. 	  
 33 
employees. Significantly, the manual also explains the reasoning for this exclusionary 
policy as the following: “Any semblance of a connection between Peace Corps and the 
intelligence community would seriously compromise the ability of the Peace Corps to 
develop and maintain the trust and confidence of the people of the host countries.”7 This 
policy exemplifies the Peace Corps’ own position, that the Peace Corps is not an 
instrument of the U.S. foreign policy.         
Secondly, the Peace Corps policy during the early years was extremely strict in 
suppressing their volunteers’ political expression and their participation in political 
activities. For instance, Joseph Haratani, Ecuador’s Country Director in the late 1960s, 
described the most stressful part of his job as having to respond to the U.S. ambassador 
regarding some “rebellious” volunteers who had expressed their criticism against the 
Vietnam War to a local newspaper.8 These restrictions regarding political expression are 
still in effect today and, in recent years, the Peace Corps Handbooks have provisions 
about “Political Expression” and “Contact with Media Representatives.” Both the 
Handbooks for 1990 and for 2006 state that Peace Corps volunteers are forbidden to 
express their political views, such as those on the internal political situations in the 
countries where they serve, as well as to mention issues relating to U.S. foreign policy in 
public. 9       
                                                
7 See Section 611 of the Peace Corps Manual, MS 611 Eligibility for Peace Corps Employment or 
Volunteer Service of Applicants with Intelligence. The quote came from Policy 1.0 in MS 611. The Peace 
Corps Manual is available on its official website, www.peacecorps.gov.    
8 Zorovich, 40 Years of Peace Corps Ecuador, 15.     
9 Peace Corps, The United States Peace Corps Handbook (1990), 41-42. Also, see Peace Corps Volunteer 
Handbook (2006), 72-73.          
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Though the Peace Corps has prohibited volunteers from expressing their own 
political viewpoints, Peace Corps Handbooks encourage writing articles and sharing 
opinions with locals. The Handbook states, “You are free to discuss your role in the 
Peace Corps with the press or anyone else, but volunteers must notify the country 
director.”10 This statement is paradoxical. That is, volunteers are free to write about their 
own Peace Corps experience, but their freedom of speech is quite limited because they 
are required to submit their writings to the Country Director for review. Moreover, the 
Handbook states that violation of these policies may result in termination.11    
Despite the Peace Corps’ insistence that volunteers should behave apolitically in 
order to achieve the organization’s mission, some volunteers have opposed that idea. For 
instance, volunteer Bruce Murray, who served in Chile in the late 1960s, believed that, 
“part of the job of a Peace Corps volunteer is to give an opportunity to citizens in a 
foreign country to know an American citizen in all the varied aspects of his personality 
including his thoughts on important issues.”12According to the Peace Corps, the two 
aforementioned policies—exclusion of CIA and control of volunteers’ political 
expression, protect both the agency and volunteers from being seen as an instruments of 
                                                
10 See Peace Corps, Peace Corps Volunteer Handbook (2006), 73. There is almost the same statement in 
The United States Peace Corps Handbook (1990) as well. 
11 See Peace Corps, The United States Peace Corps Handbook (1990), 42.   
12 Quoted in Fisher, Making Them Like Us, 86. Bruce Murray signed a petition opposing the Cold War 
with other signatories. The Peace Corps ordered Murray and other signatories to stop making their political 
position public. However, Murray sent a letter to the New York Times about this incident. To respond to 
Murray’s action, the Peace Corps expelled Murray form Chile. After retuning home, he was reclassified 1-
A by his local board without explanation. See more details about Bruce Murray’s case in Fischer, Making 
Them Like Us, 86-87.        
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U.S. foreign policy. On the other hand, and as Murray points out, the latter policy takes 
away opportunities to inform a great variety of citizens in the host countries.      
Regardless of the Peace Corps’ official position, Marshall Windmiller criticized 
the Peace Corps for being highly political and characterized its objectives as U.S. 
expansionism. In The Peace Corps and Pax Americana, Windmiller constructed his 
arguments through a study of congressional records such as those of the Appropriations 
Committee during the 1960s. Windmiller said, “It is clear that the Peace Corps is an 
instrument of U.S. foreign policy, specifically a propaganda or public relations 
instrument. Whatever it maybe in the minds of the more native volunteers, this is clearly 
what it is to the State Department and the Congress.”13 Differing views towards the 
Peace Corps’ position in terms of its political role have existed clearly between 
politicians, the Peace Corps’ leaders, and the volunteers. From Shriver’s point of view, 
the “Peace Corps Volunteers are not trained diplomats; they are not propagandists; they 
are not technical experts. They represent our society by what they are, what they do, and 
the spirit in which they do it.”14 Shriver’s comment exemplifies the complexity of the 
Peace Corps’ organizational status. According to Shriver, the Peace Corps was not 
training men and women to promote U.S. foreign policy; however, he charged volunteers 
with the duty to act as representatives of American society. In other words, volunteers 
have been expected to be apolitical, but required to act as representatives of the United 
                                                
13 Windmiller, The Peace Corps and Pax Americana, 47.    
14 Shriver, Point of the Lance, 72.    
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States. This contradictory expectation sometimes caused volunteers to misunderstand 
their role in the Peace Corps.   
The Peace Corps and the Cold War  
 
The Cold War certainly influenced the Peace Corps. The association of the Peace 
Corps with U.S. foreign policy was related to the era when the Peace Corps was created. 
The program arose in the middle of the Cold War, so it was difficult for the organization 
to escape the stigma of the Cold War ideology. In the international context, Communist 
countries reacted negatively to the establishment of the Peace Corps. The First Annual 
Peace Corps Report recounted how the Communists depicted the Peace Corps, including 
statements from Communist magazines, newspapers and radio. For instance, the Peace 
Corps was described as “an arm of the CIA,” and Sargent Shriver as a “bloodthirsty 
Chicago butcher and sausage-maker.”15 The Second Annual Peace Corps Report spent 
even more pages reporting similar stories.16 These annual reports showed that there were 
active anti-Peace Corps movements among Communists in the early 1960s, and 
Communist propaganda probably influenced other people’s view of the Peace Corps, 
regardless of the quality of the volunteers and their achievements at work. On the other 
hand, by including these Communist viewpoints, the annual reports of the Peace Corps 
also promoted more anti-Communist sentiment among the American public in the 1960s.  
In the domestic context, Peace Corps Volunteer training was likely to share the 
same paranoia against Communism prevalent within the United States, despite the 
                                                
15 Peace Corps, The First Annual Peace Corps Report (1962), 61-63.       
16 Peace Corps, The Second Annual Peace Corps Report (1963), 61-65.     
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agency’s leadership publicly rejecting using the Peace Corps as an instrument of U.S. 
foreign policy. Due to the political climate, many trainers in the 1960s felt that “the most 
important part of the training in world affairs involved teaching about communism.”17 
For instance, trainers who designed the training plan for the first group to serve in Ghana 
spent more time teaching Marxism’s theory and practices than teaching language.18 In 
another case, volunteers who were to serve in rural communities in the Andes took 48 
hours of training classes called American Studies, World Affairs, and Communism. In 
them, trainers explained the Soviet belief system, its political control and the system of 
mass communication, which included a discussion on Soviet versus democratic concepts 
regarding the role of the press. The Peace Corps Advanced Training Program in Rural 
Community Action: Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru stated the reason why these lectures were 
important for future Peace Corps volunteers:  
    
This lecture series will attempt to familiarize the Peace Corps Volunteer with the 
nature of international relations. Emphasis will be placed upon the problems of 
free society, the United States in particular. The nature and role of world 
communism will be discussed along with other forms of totalitarian systems. 
The course is designed to develop a comprehension of key political forces at 
work in the world so that the PCV (Peace Corps Volunteer) may understand 
current events as they happen. In addition, it is intended to better prepare the 
Volunteer to explain and interpret his society to those who may question him, or 
to those who may criticize him, concerning it.19    
 
                                                
17 Fischer, Making Them Like Us, 37.  
18 Rice, The Bold Experiment, 158.    
19 Peace Corps and Texas Technological College, Peace Corps Advanced Training Program in Rural 
Community Action: Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, 41.  
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These passages showed that trainers believed making volunteers understand U.S. political 
ideology and its position in the world politic were important bases for working as Peace 
Corps volunteers in host countries.   
Despite instruction about Communism during their training period in the United 
States and after serving in their host country, many volunteers felt that the reality in 
developing countries was not the same as the U.S. government and the American public 
believed. They felt that America was overreacting to the possibility of Communism 
spreading throughout the world. A volunteer who served as a community development 
worker in Guatemala from 1974 to 1975 stated, “Too many Americans see the situation 
in Central America as a Communist vs. Anti-Communist conflict. It need not to be true 
unless we will that situation. The questions are not ideological really. The problems are 
survival for too many and quality of life for all…”20 Also, people in many areas where 
the Peace Corps volunteers worked mixed up “communists” and “capitalists.” For 
instance, local people in one village believed a Peace Corps volunteer was a communist 
because they understood any stranger was a communist.21 
The Cold War helped to create the Peace Corps’ image as associated with the U.S. 
foreign policy because of its opposition to Communism. It was true that Peace Corps 
training was influenced and shaped by Cold War ideology, particularly in its early years. 
Contrary to the intentions of the Peace Corps training at the institutional level, however, 
some volunteers ironically began to question U.S. Cold War politics while serving in the 
                                                
20 RPCV Committee on Central America, Voices of Experience in Central America, 67.   
21 Fisher, Making Them Like US, 112.    
 39 
host countries and wondered whether or not the American way of governing over the 
developing countries was appropriate.  
Peace Corps Mission Statement and Volunteers  
 
Since the Peace Corps’ founding, three goals have remained consistent to this day. 
These three goals are: (1) helping the people of interested countries to meet their need for 
trained men and women, (2) helping promote a better understanding of Americans on the 
part of the people served and (3) helping promote a better understanding of other peoples 
on the part of Americans. Shriver stated, “The Peace Corps’ contribution has been less in 
direct economic development than in social development–health, education, construction, 
and community organization.”22 As the three goals and Shriver’s statement demonstrate, 
the Peace Corps has placed more emphasis on cross-cultural exchange between the 
United States and the host countries than on stimulating the host country’s economic 
development. Regarding the program’s contributions, Rice T. Gerard considered 
measuring and quantifying the Peace Corps’ overall impact to be impossible because the 
agency has sent volunteers to a great variety of countries with different political and 
social situations. Also, the projects and host communities’ expectations have varied by 
site.23  
Young, white college graduates holding bachelor’s degrees have represented the 
Peace Corps volunteers since the organization was founded. In the first two decades, only 
                                                
22 Shriver, Point of the Lance, 78.   
23 Rice, Twenty Years of Peace Corps.   
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5% of volunteers came from minority groups.24 In one study, psychologist Morris Stein 
examined the first group of 62 volunteers who went to Colombia, and there was only one 
minority volunteer in the group.25 Despite these small numbers, the Peace Corps has 
been actively recruiting minorities since the program started. The reasoning is that 
recruiting and sending more volunteers from minority backgrounds is worthwhile to 
achieve the goal of helping people around the world gain a better understanding of 
Americans and American society. Peace Corps administrators have distributed brochures 
and set up special workshops to recruit a variety of minority groups, such as African 
Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans. The Peace Corps’ brochure entitled 
Hispanic Americans and the Peace Corps, distributed in the late 1980s, stated that the 
“Peace Corps seeks greater ethnic and cultural diversity among its volunteers.”26 
In spite of the effort to recruit volunteers from minority groups, the plan did not 
turn out successfully in the early decades because Peace Corps leaders did not understand 
correctly why most people in minority groups had no desire to join. The leaders were 
well aware of minority groups’ economic hardships and educational disadvantages; 
therefore, they offered some economic and educational benefits to current and returned 
volunteers. Despite the awareness of the economic difficulties facing minority groups, the 
leaders could not understand the cultural sensibilities of minority groups. This 
                                                
24 Ibid., 20.   
25 Stein, Volunteers for Peace, 9.   
26 The quote came from a Peace Corps brochure entitled Hispanic Americans and the U.S. Peace Corps. 
There is no page number and no publishing date. However, the brochure discussed the late 1980s’ situation 
in the Peace Corps and the United States.  
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misunderstanding was quite possibly the primary reason why the Peace Corps did not 
succeed in recruiting a larger number of volunteers from minority groups.    
During the early years of the Peace Corps program in the 1960s, visible racial 
discrimination such as housing segregation was still going on in the United States. As a 
leader of the Civil Rights movement, Shriver was well informed on the issue of poverty 
and recognized how much African Americans had suffered in terms of employment, 
education, and health relative to white Americans. Shriver was the first on the list of the 
agency leaders who believed that participating in the Peace Corps was a great opportunity 
for minority groups to develop their future careers. The Peace Corps pamphlet entitled, 
Black Americans and the U.S. Peace Corps exemplified this position. The pamphlet 
explained that volunteers were able to obtain job skills needed in the United States while 
they were getting training and working in host countries. Also, the same pamphlet drew 
attention to the additional benefits of becoming a volunteer: receiving a one-year period 
of preferential hiring status from the federal government, partial forgiveness or deferment 
of National Direct Student Loans (NDSLs), and academic credits, as well as scholarship 
and assistantship opportunities.27   
Despite the desire to represent America’s multicultural society and an awareness 
of minority groups’ economic disadvantages, Peace Corps leaders demonstrated a lack of 
cultural sensitivity that drew criticism and discouraged minorities from joining the 
program. Project Peace Pipe is an excellent example. In 1967, the Peace Corps 
                                                
27 Peace Corps, Black Americans and the U.S. Peace Corps: Washington D.C.: Peace Corps [University of 
Texas in the box of U.S. Document Collection of PCL], n.d. The pamphlet mentioned the year of 1987 in 
the paragraph explaining the deferment of payment on NDSLs so it probably was published in the 1980s. 
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implemented the Peace Pipe Project in cooperation with Oklahomans for Indian 
Opportunity (hereafter OIO), the Bureau of Indian Affairs (hereafter BIA), and the 
University of Oklahoma. The Peace Pipe Project aimed at recruiting and training more 
Native Americans, and also developing Native Americans’ leadership. In addition, the 
program prepared Native American prospects to pass the Peace Corps selection and 
training process. OIO and Peace Corps officials were concerned that the major problem 
for Native Americans was not overseas service, but “the ability ...to survive Peace Corps 
training.”28 Alyosha Goldstein noted, “The project emphasized the racialized and 
economic inequalities within the United States rather than the impending “culture shock” 
abroad.”29 That is, this five-week pre-training program was designed to make Native 
American trainees adjust to White American cultural norms before going to ‘real’ Peace 
Corps training.  
The main focus of the Peace Pipe Project was the White “American” cultural 
values in the 1960s. However, not only Native Americans but also many other Peace 
Corps recruits felt pressure and anxiety during the training. Thus, in order to avoid being 
selected out, some trainees simply played the role of an “ideal” American according to 
the Peace Corps’ point of view. What the Peace Corps selected was a reasonably bright, 
attractive group of middle-class young people, some of who made a good impression on 
the local inhabitants.30 Fisher’s study showed that Peace Corps training in the 1960s was 
built on the image of the ‘pioneer,’ and he noted that many minority youths were not 
                                                
28 Harris and Ginsberg, “Project Peace Pipe Indian Youth Pre-Trained for Peace Corps Duty,” n.p.   
29 Goldstein, “On the Internal Border,”51.        
30 Windmiller, The Peace Corps and Pax Americana, 7.  
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willing to become pioneers.31 With the aim of creating that type of American, two of the 
three Peace Pipe Project’s curricula focused on improving communication and attitudinal 
skills in order that volunteers adjust to White American cultural values as well as develop 
self-confidence. After the five-week pre-training, Harris and Ginsberg made the 
following conclusion regarding Native Americans’ trainees’ performance: “The Peace 
Pipe trainees lacked self-confidence and skill in communication. It may be impossible to 
eliminate such lacks in many short range endeavors.”32 The Project Peace Pipe 
demonstrated how much Peace Corps officials actively desired to recruit more Native 
Americans, and that these same officials expected to change the Native Americans’ 
attitudes to fit into a more mainstream ideal. This type of approach in the early decades of 
the organization was responsible for the criticism that the Peace Corps ignored the       
cultural sensibility of minority groups.33  
Since the establishment of the Peace Corps, the agency has responded to       
criticisms from abroad, from the American public, as well as from Peace Corps 
volunteers and the agency has improved in some of these areas. Regarding the 
                                                
31 Fisher, Making Them Like Us.   
32 Harris and Ginsberg, “Project Peace Pipe Indian Youth Pre-Trained for Peace Corps Duty,” n.d.   
33 In terms of examples of ignoring cultural sensibilities in the training, according to Harris and 
Ginsberg’ s study, for instance, one training module was called ‘Attitudinal Training’ and it is designed to 
change native youths’ attitudes because the team was concerned that their attitudes tended to cause 
problems. According to Harris and Ginsberg, “The attitudinal training included a one-week course led by 
teachers from the Ecumenical Institute of Chicago, who were experienced in “imaginal education,” and the 
training included small discussion groups that met with an “attitudinal” trainer three times a week. This 
trainer was a social scientist, and a conscious effort was made in all classroom counseling and in other 
situations to give the pre-trainees an opportunity to develop self-confidence.” In addition, native youths 
were provided with a ‘cultural enrichment program.’ They needed to attend movies and plays chosen by the 
trainees with the help of the attitudinal trainer and develop communication skills with staff members. For 
more details see Harris and Ginsberg, “Project Peace Pipe Indian Youth Pre-Trained for Peace Corps 
Duty.”  
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recruitment of minority groups, the Peace Corps official website today says that 
participation of minority groups has increased, and that 19% of volunteers in 2011 were 
minorities. The average age of volunteers has also increased to 28 years, while the 
average volunteer age was 24.5 years in the fall of 1961.34  
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND IDEOLOGIES OF JOCV 
 
The Establishment of JOCV 
 
In 1965, four years after the Peace Corps was established, the JOCV program 
began by sending five volunteers to Laos. Unlike the Peace Corps’ independent status, 
JOCV was created as a part of the projects from the Overseas Technical Cooperation 
Agency (hereafter OTCA), which had conducted government-sponsored technical 
cooperation programs, such as dispatching Japanese professional technical experts to 
mainly developing countries in Asia, acceptance of foreign trainees, and supply of 
equipment and materials.     
According to the Operational Directive for Japan Overseas Cooperation 
Volunteers of 1965 (hereafter Operational Directive of JOCV), the three objectives of 
JOCV were: (1) to cooperate with host countries by providing technical cooperation; (2) 
to contribute to the establishment of friendship with the host countries; (3) to offer 
international experience to the Japanese youth.35 More specifically, and regarding 
technical cooperation, under the OTCA Law, the JOCV’s objective was defined as a part 
                                                
34 Lihosit, Peace Corps Chronology, 8.    
35 JOCV, Seinen kaigai kyōryokutai 20 seiki no kiseki [JOCV’s Activities in the Twentieth Century], 351.   
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of technical expert dispatch.36 On the other hand, in terms of a national project for the 
Japanese youth, OTCA’s 1968’s Annual Report stated, “It also is a sort of youth 
movement to train and educate young people and to engender in them a wider vision 
through participation in the nation’s overseas technical cooperation activities.”37   
During the time when the program was under OTCA and regarding these three 
goals, Japanese politicians frequently questioned which one of these objectives was the 
principal goal of the agency, and they asked the agency to clarify its objectives in terms 
of a national project for Japan. Unlike the Peace Corps, which has sent a large number of 
“pioneer type” volunteers, JOCV officials and Japanese politicians were particular about 
recruiting young Japanese who acquired ‘technical skills’ since the establishment of the 
program, because they thought sending JOCV volunteers who had only passion and 
courage would not gain the trust of the host countries for the JOCV project.38 In 1966, 
the Minister of International Trade and Industry, Takeo Miki, commented that if a young 
Japanese, who had only passion but did not have technical skills, was sent to help Asian 
countries, he or she could not be of help to the host country or to the volunteer.39 As 
these opinions show, JOCV’s principal aim— whether it was for technical assistance or 
to educate Japanese young people and provide them with experience, was frequently 
                                                
36 JICA, JICA Annual Report 1975, 169. Even though JOCV was defined as one of expert dispatching 
programs, it was different from OTCA/JICA’s Expert Dispatch Programme, which has constituted the most 
typical pattern of Japan’s technical cooperation activity. Even today, JOCV’s experts are called 
“Volunteers,” but experts from Expert Dispatch Programme are called, “Specialists.”     
37 OTCA, ’68 Annual Report Technical Cooperation of the Japanese Government, 95.       
38 Japanese Diet Rec., House of Representatives, Committee on Budget (Session 2), Item 4, February 25, 
1965, 6.    
39 Japanese Diet Rec., House of Councilors, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Item 2, July 15, 1966,15.  
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discussed by the Japanese Government. Unlike the Peace Corps, whether or not the 
JOCV was an instrument of Japanese foreign policy has been less discussed.   
The 1974’s organizational change of OTCA made JOCV’s principal objective 
clearer. In 1974, JOCV came under the control of Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (hereafter JICA), which is an independent governmental agency that integrated 
the services and operations of OTCA and the Japan Emigration Service. At the time, 
JICA was established to integrate all Japanese ODA related projects. In the process of 
being taken over by JICA, JOCV’s objectives and contents of services were enacted for 
the first time. Because of the enactment, the principal objective of the agency and the 
relationships between each volunteer and the agency were clarified: each individual 
young volunteer aspiring to participate in overseas cooperation activities would play a 
central role in the operations of JOCV, and the Agency would provide assistance to 
promote and encourage the volunteer’s activities.40   
The latest version of JOCV mission statement has three goals. These three goals 
under JICA are: (1) to contribute to the socioeconomic development or reconstruction of 
developing countries and regions, (2) to strengthen friendship and mutual understanding 
between developing countries and regions and Japan, (3) to give back to society the fruits 
of volunteer-activity experience.41 Since the early years JOCV has aimed to gain the 
trust of Asian countries principally by sending skilled young Japanese people to Asia. 
                                                
40 JICA, JICA Annual Report 1975, 59.     
41 JICA, 40 Years of Grassroots Cooperation.   
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Success in gaining trust was considered essential to promote mutual understanding and 
strengthen the friendship between Japan and host countries that Japan colonized.    
The Peace Corps and the Establishment of JOCV  
 
The Peace Corps and the JOCV have operated their agencies under similar 
systems; for example, they both train and place ordinary citizens as volunteers who serve 
for two years in foreign countries, particularly “underdeveloped” countries. Because of 
the similar operational systems, some scholars have remarked that the Peace Corps was 
considered as a major factor in stimulating the establishment of JOCV.42 According to 
the JOCV’s magazine Wakai chikara [Young Power], a plan to send skilled young 
Japanese to developing countries was discussed and prepared by a group of politicians in 
the Liberal Democratic Party together with activists and businessmen before the Peace 
Corps was established. However, it took a long time to obtain approval from the Japanese 
government so that JOCV’s establishment was approximately four years later than that of 
the Peace Corps.43 However, to some extent it is true that JOCV’s model followed the 
U.S. Peace Corps because the principal JOCV founder traveled to where Peace Corps 
volunteers actually worked and talked to Peace Corps volunteers about their 
experiences.44  
Peace Corps’ organizational structures and experiences probably were a model for 
JOCV in the early years. Since the National Diet Library of Japan in Tokyo has Japanese-
translated Peace Corps training program marked by OTCA, it means the OTCA office 
                                                
42 Skinner, “Internationalism and the Early Years of the Japanese Peace Corps,” 318-319.                                              
43 JOCV, Wakai chikara No. 2, 24-25.    
44 Suetsugu, Mikai to hinkon he no chōsen. 
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asked the Peace Corps headquarters office to send their training manual for reference. In 
the program, there is detailed information about Peace Corps training. Interestingly, 
however, the requested Peace Corps training manual from the early 1960s included anti-
communist training, but the JOCV did not regard this part as significant and left it out of 
their manual.45 Actually, one of funding fathers of JOCV, Ichiro Suetsugu’s Mikai to 
hinkon he no chōsen [Challenge to the Underdevelopment and Poverty] mentioned that 
Suetsugu himself met various Peace Corps volunteers and local people who received 
Peace Corps volunteers and discussed the Peace Corps program in order to construct the 
JOCV organizational structures, such as the training program. 	 	  
According to the records of the National Diet, when Japanese politicians 
discussed the JOCV in the 1960s they called JOCV “Iwayuru nihon no heiwabutai [the 
so-called Japanese Peace Corps],” and this way of referring to the JOCV lasted until the 
early 1970s. In addition, one of Japan’s major newspapers, Mainichi Newspaper, 
published a series of articles entitled Nippon no heiwa butai [The Japanese Peace Corps]. 
As these examples show, applying the name of Peace Corps to JOCV helped Japanese 
people understand what the JOCV was. This explains the Peace Corps’ popularity in 
Japan during the 1960s.   
At the time, both Japanese media and politicians evaluated the JOCV by 
comparing and contrasting it with the Peace Corps. Toshirō Maeda, a Japanese journalist 
who researched JOCV’s activities and visited eight different Southeast Asian countries, 
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heard from JOCV volunteers that the Peace Corps volunteers faced more difficulties than 
JOCV volunteers did in the 1960s. He pointed out that U.S. foreign policy made it 
difficult for the Peace Corps volunteers to work in Asia. The Vietnam War, and the U.S. 
military aid and political intervention influenced some host countries’ views negatively 
toward the Peace Corps’ presence in Asia, regardless of the Peace Corps’ volunteers’ 
goodwill and their hard work in the host countries.46   
In the case of the JOCV, the history of Japanese military occupations during the 
World War II made it difficult for JOCV volunteers to work in some host communities in 
Asia. Besides Japanese participation in the Colombo Plan in 1954, another aspect that 
motivated the Government of Japan to provide aid to developing countries as 
compensation for past colonial and military operations in Asia, which means that JOCV 
also took on that role.47 Actually, in the early years, JOCV emphasized sending 
volunteers mainly to Asian countries. For example, JOCV’s first four host countries were 
Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia and the Philippines.48 In some places in Asia where Japanese 
military engaged in warfare, such as in the Lingayen Gulf in the Philippines, JOCV 
volunteer, Kenji Higashi, was blamed on a public bus for the manner in which Japanese 
military treated local people at that time. In addition to this experience, for a long time he 
did not get help from the local people for his work, but by the middle of program he 
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in order to promote economic and social development for developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region. 
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accepted the community and the people, and he came to be accepted by the community; 
even the local mayor praised his contribution.49 Yoshiyuki Harada, a JOCV volunteer in 
Malaysia, also experienced troubles with his Chinese boss. For a long time, the Chinese 
supervisor neither believed Harada nor his work. Finally, Harada’s co-worker told him 
that a Japanese soldier treated the Chinese supervisor badly when he was young.50 
Besides these stories recounted by Maeda’s in his 1967’s book, the JOCV’s magazine 
Wakai chikara,  published the experiences of some volunteers who encountered anti-
Japanese feeling in Asia during their service.  
In terms of freedom of expression and political comments in public, JOCV 
volunteers were also instructed not to get involved in political matters. JOCV warned that 
the volunteers should not make political comments in the host countries. However, 
compared to the Peace Corps, JOCV volunteers have not actively engaged in expressing 
their political opinions in public in Japan. As noted in an earlier section, the Peace Corps 
has been strict about volunteers’ expressing their political opinions and about 
participation in political activities, particularly in the earlier decades. Nevertheless, some 
of Peace Corps volunteers led anti-war activities against the Vietnam War and against the 
Iraq War not only in their host countries, but also in the United States.51 In the case of 
the JOCV, volunteers have neither participated nor led demonstrations against Japanese 
foreign policy. Unlike the Peace Corps, the JOCV never had any protocol that separated 
the JOCV from any intelligence agency.  
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In terms of relations with the media, JOCV volunteers’ opinions are not supposed 
to be released to the media without prior JOCV approval while they served as JOCV 
volunteers. Particularly in the early years of JOCV, volunteers were instructed not to 
interfere in political matters. Regarding political expression, journalist Maeda met a few 
JOCV volunteers who became suddenly silent when the topic of discussion touched on 
the host countries’ politics.52 Former Peace Corps volunteer, Keiko Ishibashi, who sent a 
small article about her JOCV life in Honduras to a major Japanese publication, the Asahi 
Newspaper, while she was doing JOCV work, got in trouble. Eight years later, Ishibashi 
wrote about this experience in her autobiography published in 1997. Ishibashi said that a 
JOCV official scolded her for sending the article without getting permission from him 
and the agency; at the same time, she was also blamed for what she wrote by other JOCV 
volunteers in Honduras.53  
JOCV and the Cold War  
 
Both the JOCV and the Peace Corps were established in the middle of the Cold 
War. Due to the Cold War, Peace Corps volunteers and their projects were affected by 
U.S. political attitude toward the Cold War. Also, to the U.S. government, Japan was a 
vital capitalist ally for its anti-Communist campaign in Asia. Similarly to the Peace 
Corps, which was viewed as an “agent of CIA” and a “spy,” China and the Soviet Union 
regarded the establishment of the JOCV as the vanguard of Imperialism.54 In addition, 
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Congressman Sōsuke Uno stated that since the Beijing Broadcasting criticized the 
establishment of the JOCV as the “Return of Japanese Militarism,” some Japanese 
Congressmen, who were influenced by that criticism, were opposed to the establishment 
of JOCV.55 Thus, the following section examines whether or not the JOCV adopted anti-
Communist ideas into its policies.  
To begin with, unlike the Peace Corps, the Cold War influenced JOCV’s policy 
less, although the JOCV program also arose in the middle of the Cold War. An analysis 
of the early years of JOCV by the monthly magazine Wakai chira and of annual reports 
shows that the word “Communists” never appeared. Moreover, these publications never 
called the readers’ attention to the threat of Communism to Japan’s national security or to 
the fact that the volunteers could contribute to an anti-Communism campaign.   
       My examination of JOCV publications shows that the existence of a North-
South Divide [sometimes referred North-South Problem, Nanboku mondai in Japanese] 
and the reactions from former Japanese colonies in Asia were more important and 
sensitive issues for the JOCV than was the Cold War.56 The JOCV’s publications 
frequently mention the ‘Nanboku mondai,’ particularly in the early years. In terms of 
discussing solutions to the North-South Divide, the JOCV publications stressed the 
importance of cooperating with developing countries by placing Japanese youth with 
technical skills in those countries.  
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In addition to placing stress on the North-South divide, the JOCV was sensitive to 
the former Japanese colonies’ reactions to the JOCV program much more that it worried 
that its volunteers might spread communist ideas in the host countries. For example, 
Wakai chikara published letters JOCV volunteers wrote about their experiences as they 
encountered anti-Japanese feelings in the Asian host countries. That is, JOCV was more 
sensitive to the presence of anti-Japanese sentiment in the host countries than it was to 
Communism’s influence.     
       JOCV volunteer training also did not reflect anti-Communism ideologies. JOCV 
volunteer training did not teach the importance of the free market or emphasize anti-
Communism, and, there was no class teaching about Communism. According to the 
annual reports, instead of offering lectures on Communism, JOCV provided lectures on 
international relations, the north-south divide, host country studies, and the philosophy of 
JOCV. However, JOCV volunteers had to spend considerable time acquiring proficiency 
in a foreign language. For instance, in 1977, the volunteers were required to take 362 
hours of foreign language classes, and they had to take 105.5 hours of lectures, which 
included not only classes on political and social issues but also medical, safety, and 
technical instruction, and Japanese culture classes.57 In other words, an examination of 
JOCV’s training schedule shows the agency did not feel that training in world affairs, 
including teaching about Communism, was important for JOCV volunteers. However, 
this lack of emphasis on political matters was not always welcome by some host 
countries. For instance, according to JOCV’s follow-up report in 1967, host nationals in 
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Kenya and Malaysia pointed out that JOCV volunteers had less knowledge of host 
countries’ cultural, social and political matters compared to Peace Corps volunteers.58 	  
      In the Diet Record, questions about the association of JOCV and Japanese foreign 
policy are rarely found. Whether or not the JOCV project was related to an anti-
Communism campaign was discussed in detail only once, in 1971. In the Diet Record, 
JOCV’s first Director, Kimio Shinoura, said that JOCV did not send the volunteers as a 
part of an anti-Communism campaign. Congressman Bunzo Ninomiya pointed out a 
rumor by Japanese media that JOCV volunteers in Laos were viewed as persons 
promoting anti-Communism and he asked Director Shinoura the reason why this rumor 
originated. Shinoura responded that the volunteers were not sent as instruments of anti-
Communism campaigns. In addition, Masao Sawaki, who was then an OTCA official, 
mentioned that JOCV sent volunteers to Syria, which was a socialist regime. He also 
added that as long as the country that requested JOCV volunteers was a developing 
country, the agency could send the volunteers.59 The JOCV consistently denied that 
sending volunteers was part of an anti-Communist campaign. In short, the analysis of the 
Diet Records shows that the issue of Cold War politics or the relationship between JOCV 
and Japan’s foreign policy were rarely discussed. Moreover, unlike the United States, 
there was no discussion regarding the selection and screening of volunteers’ for their 
political preferences. 
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       Even though JOCV’s policy did not reflect anti-Communist ideologies, the Cold 
War affected JOCV. For instance, Laos was the first host country in the JOCV program; 
however, JOCV had to terminate its program in 1978. From the beginning of the 
program, the Communist political organization, the Pathet Lao, claimed that the objective 
of JOCV was to promote aggressively US Imperialism and Japanese militarism.60 When 
JOCV started sending volunteers, the country was already under the Laotian Civil War, 
but JOCV placed the volunteers in host communities far away from the battlefields, thus 
the Civil War did not affect JOCV activities. However, in December 1975, the Pathet Lao 
took control of the country and they established the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
After that, the new government regarded development agencies from the Western world 
as the product of Imperialism; therefore, the Laotian government stopped requesting new 
JOCV volunteers. Under these circumstances, in March 1978, the last JOCV volunteers 
left Laos.61    
       In the case of the volunteers to China, JOCV started working in China earlier 
than the Peace Corps. The first group of JOCV volunteers was dispatched in December 
1986. From then to today, China’s most frequent request to JOCV is for Japanese 
language instructors. However, in terms of numbers of volunteers dispatched, the Peace 
Corps sent a greater number of volunteers to China than did the JOCV. Even though the 
Peace Corps started sending volunteers seven years later than JOCV, as of 2012 their 
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total number of volunteers is almost the same as that of JOCV, approximately 750 
volunteers. Neither agency has ever sent volunteers to Cuba.  
      Overall, under the Cold War climate, the JOCV was suspected by association with 
the image of Japanese militarism rather than with the Cold War as seen in the cases of 
Laos and the Philippines. Unlike the Peace Corps, JOCV training was not be influenced 
and shaped by Cold War ideology, even in its early years. Also, analysis of the Diet 
Record rarely shows the intention of the Japanese government to utilize the JOCV 
volunteers in anti-Communist campaigns.       
JOCV Volunteers  
 
JOCV’s emphasis on recruiting specialized, skilled volunteers demonstrates a 
different conceptualization of the program than that of the United States. This reflects 
differing points of view regarding development between the Japanese society and that of 
the United States. First, the JOCV sent, and sends, volunteers on a “request-based 
system,” responding to the host country’s own requests and needs. With more than 160 
categories of professions, the JOCV responds to the varied needs of host countries.62 
Applicants check the list of requested professions—boshū borantia yōbō chōsa hyō,—
(hereafter, ‘JOCV Volunteers Request Sheet’ in English) from host countries to select 
which qualifications match their skills and  knowledge.63 Under this system, JOCV 
recruits applicants who already have job experience rather than recently graduated 
                                                
62 JICA, JICA Info-Kit (File D-7): A Comprehensive People-to-People Program for Progress [Tokyo: 
JICA, 2003].  
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college students. Thus, in 2007 only12 % of volunteers were recent graduates or college 
students.64 In order to obtain skilled volunteers, the agency has a policy that provides a 
subsidy to companies that temporarily fill jobs resulting from employees who become 
JOCV volunteers. Responding to the problem, in April 1973 JOCV issued regulations to 
compensate companies whose employees leave the company to serve as JOCV volunteers 
and these subsidies may last for two years. Behind this policy was the intention of 
politicians and JOCV officials to make sure the volunteers have a job when they return to 
Japan. Under this policy JOCV will enter into a contract with the company to ensure the 
volunteers’ employment after their return. Unlike the JOCV, the Peace Corps does not 
have this type of policy.   
The reason why JOCV has a policy that provides a subsidy to companies for 
filling lost jobs is the existence of a different concept of work between the Japanese and 
the U.S. societies. Anthropologist Chie Nakane provided an example by comparing 
JOCV’s situation with that of the Peace Corps in each society. In Japanese society, being 
a JOCV volunteer is regarded as a disadvantage for job hunting because most Japanese 
companies prefer recruiting college graduates fresh out of school, and they do not want 
persons who have been abroad for two years. Furthermore, in most cases, Japanese new 
employees are expected to work for the same company until retirement. According to 
Nakane, some returned JOCV volunteers conceal their experience as JOCV volunteers 
from their prospective employers. Contrary to the Japanese, U.S. society places high 
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value on the experience that Peace Corps’ volunteers acquire. According to her, the 
Japanese traditional concept of work affected negatively the meaning of participating in 
JOCV programs.65 Since Nakane’s study was published in 1978, the situation is slowly 
changing due to both international and domestic influences. However, this perspective 
has not gone away completely in Japanese society. For example, an article in JOCV 
Monthly Magazine Crossroads presented a discussion held in 1996 between returned 
volunteers and the Director of JOCV. According to the article, the returned volunteers 
mentioned that leaving their jobs was very difficult, particularly for employees who 
worked for small companies. One of participants in the discussion, Mr. Maeda, said that 
when he returned to Japan the reaction of ex-coworkers was sometimes negative to his 
experience of working with JOCV.66     
Even though JOCV focuses on recruiting volunteers who have technological skills 
or working experience, recently JOCV shifted from that emphasis. In 1983, the President 
of JICA, Keisuke Arita, proposed a plan to increase the number of new JOCV trainees 
per year from around 400 to 800 within the next three years. If the number of new 
trainees was increased as he proposed, between 1600 to 1700 JOCV volunteers would be 
working abroad. One possible reason behind the plan is to respond to Western countries’ 
criticism that the Japanese ODA spending was relatively small for its economic power. 
After the 1980s’ plan, the number of JOCV volunteers steadily increased during the early 
                                                
65 Nakane , Nihonjin no kanōsei to genkai,156-159.     
66 JOCV, JOCV Monthly Magazine Crossroads, 6-16.    
 59 
1990s.67 With the number of volunteers getting larger, JOCV has also begun to recruit a 
generalist type of volunteer like the Peace Corps does, and areas such as Community 
Development and Environment are becoming popular among JOCV applicants. For 
instance, at the end of the spring of 2003, 761 people applied for only 78 positions in 
Community Development.68 Also, the number of JOCV volunteers who are recent 
graduates without job experience has increased, compared with earlier times. However, 
the number of applicants has been reduced from its peak—FY1994, 11,832 people 
applied (whole year). For the 2011 JOCV’s spring selection (the first half of 2011), which 
was right after the Tohoku earthquake, the number of applicants for JOCV programs was 
the lowest ever. One thousand three hundred and fifty one people applied for the spring 
selection in 2011 while there were 2045 applicants for the spring selection in 2010.69  
Unlike the Peace Corps, the JOCV official webpage for recruitment does not 
include any comment about the ethnic diversity in Japan. As with the Peace Corps, all 
JOCV applicants must have Japanese citizenship. In its official webpage, the Peace Corps 
comments on the ethnic diversity of volunteers and tries to recruit ethnic minorities. On 
the other hand, and as far as I could determine from my research in JOCV materials, the 
JOCV does not discuss either issues of race and ethnicity within Japan or how minority 
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groups participated in JOCV programs.70 In fact, JOCV does not show the percentage of 
participation of minority groups. As I will discuss later, scholars pointed out that the 
Japanese society was constructed on the basis of a “myth of homogeneity.”71 To reflect 
this tendency of Japanese society, recruitment of JOCV volunteers likely rests on the 
premise that all JOCV applicants’ ethnic backgrounds are “Japanese.”      
CONCLUSION 
 
The Peace Corps and the JOCV have operated their agencies under similar 
systems and the agencies were established close to the same time. Since the Peace Corps 
was founded earlier and runs its program on a large scale, the JOCV was aware of the 
Peace Corps experiences and its system of operation in the early years. Although the 
JOCV seemed to learn many things from the Peace Corps experiences and operational 
system, each agency had, and has, different emphases and policies. As Nakane stated, 
Japan was a newly “developed” country during the first decade of the JOCV programs. 
Also, because concepts such as “aid to developing countries” and “volunteerism” were 
developed under Western norms, Japan needed to follow and learn from Western 
countries to manage development projects successfully. Still, adjusting concepts of “aid 
to developing countries” and “volunteerism” to existent Japanese social norms and 
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institutions was difficult for the agency.72 Also, as discussed previously in this chapter, 
the existence in Japanese society of a different concept of work and different social 
values from those of the U.S. society affected the way JOCV designed its agency.      
Under these circumstances, there is a difference in the degree of sensitivity 
between the ways Peace Corps and the JOCV operate. Also, domestic and international 
political conditions in the United States and in Japan affected the emphases these 
organizations placed on specific operations and programs. The Peace Corps’ management 
of volunteers apparently has been more sensitive to avoid being seen as ‘political’ by the 
host countries; in the other words, the architects of the Peace Corps poured enormous 
efforts into making sure their agency and volunteers were, and are, ‘apolitical.’ That is, 
compared to JOCV, depoliticizing the agency and its volunteers is one of the biggest 
concerns for the Peace Corps.  
In the next two chapters, I explore the Peace Corps and JOCV’s operations in the 
Latin American region. The two chapters illustrate the experiences of the two institutions 
as they operated and implemented “development” initiatives in Latin America. The Latin 
American experiences highlight the reasons why the Peace Corps was very much 
concerned about the political status of the agency. These chapters also demonstrate that 
there is a gap between the ideal notion of “development” and the realities caused by 
confronting issues related to U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. Further, the next two 
chapters illustrate how the political conditions affected the host countries’ views toward 
the agencies and the volunteers, as well as the way the programs worked in light of the 
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fact that the people in the field who implemented the agencies’ development programs 
were, and are, ‘ordinary’ U.S. and Japanese citizens.  
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Chapter 2: The Peace Corps in Latin America 
 
Between the JOCV and the Peace Corps, there is a difference in the degree of 
sensitivity on how to operate an agency and manage volunteers. Also, both domestic and 
international political conditions affected the United States and Japan in unique ways, 
differentiating the emphasis of their programs by region. The management of the Peace 
Corps volunteers has been more sensitive to avoid having the agency seen as ‘political’ 
by the host countries. In the next two chapters, I will present two cases: the experiences 
of the Peace Corps in Latin America and the experiences of the JOCV in Latin America. 
In this chapter I discuss the Peace Corps in Latin America, primarily based on the 
analysis of the Peace Corps annual reports from 1961 to 2012. This case study 
exemplifies some possible reasons why the architects of the Peace Corps poured 
enormous efforts into depoliticizing the agency. 
     In the first part of the chapter, I will briefly discuss U.S.-Latin American relations. 
Although the first Peace Corps Director, Sargent Shriver, tried to prevent the agency 
from being seen as an “instrument of foreign policy,” U.S. foreign policy and host the 
countries’ politics influenced the Peace Corps’ policies and operations throughout the last 
five decades. In the second part of the chapter, I will present the development of Peace 
Corps operations in Latin America. The last part of the chapter focuses on the cases of 
Peace Corp’s program terminations in Latin America. These experiences in Latin 
America highlight the reasons why the agency was very much concerned about its 
political status and the control of volunteers’ political expressions.  
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U.S.- LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 
 
Much of the scholarship on U.S.–Latin American relations categorizes the U.S. 
tendency of dominance in Latin America as imperialistic rule. The declaration of the 
Monroe Doctrine and the 1898 victory in the Spanish-Cuban-American War were 
significant openings for the United States to construct its imperialistic presence in Latin 
America. After gaining influence over the hemisphere, the U.S. intervened repeatedly in 
the politics of Latin America in order to protect not only its own political ideology, but 
also its economic and commercial interests. Upon entering the contemporary post-Cold 
War era, the United States also expanded its economic power by institutionalizing U.S.-
based international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank and spurring Latin 
America into taking action such as the introduction of neo-liberal reforms. According to 
Peter H. Smith, U.S. interests have varied over time. He stated that in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, economic considerations were more important among U.S. 
policy makers; during the Cold War, political considerations were topmost; then, after the 
Cold War, economic considerations returned as the priority.1 
U.S. perception of the rise of Anti-Americanism in Latin America also affected 
the development of U.S.-Latin American relations. According to Alan McPherson’s 
historiographical analysis of scholarship on Anti-Americanism, the earliest studies of 
“Yankeephobia” appeared in the 1920s. U.S. observers concluded that the criticism of the 
United States came from Latin Americans’ irrational fear of U.S. progress. That is, those 
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early U.S. writers conceptualized Anti-Americanism as a “disease,” and denied Latin 
America’s capacity to be responsible for their own political culture under the notion of a 
“pathological metaphor.” Emphasizing Latin American lack of capacity, “Yankeephobia” 
was used as a “reasonable” justification for U.S. domination of the Caribbean and Central 
America at that time.2  
After World War II, the notion of development emerged all over the world, and 
Latin American countries were no exception. As a result, economic development became 
one of the most important objectives of national policy for Latin American countries. 
However, the economic development of Latin America was not as much of a U.S. 
priority as rebuilding the economy in Europe. According to Joseph Smith, Latin 
American governments showed dissatisfaction regarding the allocation of U.S. economic 
aid, particularly the Marshall Plan, which provided massive financial aid for the recovery 
of Western Europe. Although Latin American countries supported the United States 
during World War II, the United States did not provide a counterpart of the Marshall Plan 
for Latin American countries. Moreover, in addition to providing massive financial aid to 
Western Europe, the United States also arranged financial aid for East Asia in order to 
prevent emerging Communist governments there. Latin American governments showed 
dissatisfaction towards this aid distribution. Unlike their counterparts in the United 
States, leaders in Latin American countries did not think that the Cold War battles in 
Europe and the Far East were urgent strategic concerns or personal threats.3                     
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3 Smith, The United States and Latin America, 114-117.  
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U.S. foreign policy, however, changed its direction in the late 1950s. U.S. policy 
to Latin America became overwhelmingly directed to preventing the threat of 
Communism in the Western Hemisphere. U.S. government intervened in the politics of 
Latin America both clandestinely and overtly. Noted journalist Grace Livingstone said 
that the Cold War was one of the most disturbing periods in the history of U.S. foreign 
policy towards Latin America, and it distorted Latin American political life.4 Also, Smith 
mentioned that U.S. political involvements in Latin America (e.g. Guatemala in 1954) 
could become a major obstacle to the achievement of social and economic progress in 
Latin America.5       
In response to consecutive U.S. political interventions in Latin American politics, 
anti-U.S. sentiment has heated up in Latin America since the 1950s. Peruvian and 
Venezuelan reactions toward the 1958 tour of South America by then Vice President 
Richard Nixon resulted in a strong show of Anti-Americanism. Due to such overt Latin 
American expression of Anti-Americanism, the U.S. government realized the necessity of 
establishing strong alliances with Latin American countries through the provision of 
massive foreign aid.6 The Peace Corps was established in the middle of that time period, 
growing out of the U.S. government’s fear of the expanding Soviet and Cuban influences 
in Latin America. In addition, the United States realized that the emergence of Anti-
Americanism in Latin America was becoming a threat to the United States during the 
Cold War.  
                                                
4 Livingstone, America’s Backyard, 23-24.   
5 Smith, The United States and Latin America, 123.   
6 Ibid., 148-154.  
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Dominance of U.S.-led neoliberal reforms in Latin American countries is one of 
the turning points as U.S. interests in Latin America gradually shifted from political to 
economic. Latin American countries were in a serious debt crisis in the 1980s, which was 
known there as the “lost decade.” In fact, Latin America’s total foreign debt increased 
from around U.S. $30 billions in 1970 to U.S. $240 billion in 1980.7 U.S.-led neoliberal 
policies provided a framework for Latin American countries to recover from this serious 
economic crisis. Also, during the late 1980s and 1990s, the link between neoliberal 
policies and democratic governance was a salient issue in Latin America because many 
Latin America countries changed from authoritarian regimes to democratic systems 
during this period.8         
Even though neoliberal reforms resulted in rapid economic recovery and created 
new space for “democratic” participation in most countries in Latin America during the 
1990s, the negative effects of these policies were not being ignored. Since neoliberalism 
implemented market-and-employer-friendly reforms, “labour has become more 
vulnerable and insecure through the growth of short-term contracts, the shift to more 
competitive labour markets and decline of social security.”9 Thereby, the vulnerable 
classes of citizens in Latin America suffered the most from increasing income inequality 
and social exclusion. Also, the decrease of the role of the state in the area of social 
welfare spurred a widening gap between the classes. Bryan Roberts stated that, “the 
emphasis on individual citizenship and participation has limited utility when citizens 
                                                
7 Smith, Talons of the Eagle, 250.   
8 Gwynee and Kay, “Views from the Periphery,” 143.  
9 Ibid.,148.    
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have inequality of access to needed services and where the potentially integrating 
institutions of citizenship—the health and educational services—segregate citizens by 
their social class.”10  
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the U.S. war against terrorism, 
Anti-Americanism swelled in the early twenty-first century with the rise of populist 
movements in Latin America. Alan MacPherson summarized the results of polls 
conducted in Latin American countries, noting that there was a significant drop in the 
image of the U.S. among Latin Americans after 9/11.11 He concluded that Anti-
Americanism is an ideology which has “almost always been” in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, but it has also been a manifestation of their national response to U.S. foreign 
policy which has exploited them both economically and politically.12   
In short, U.S.-Latin American relations reflected the rise and drop of Anti-
Americanism in Latin America; at the same time, this has affected attitudes toward Peace 
Corps volunteers, even though the Peace Corps claimed to be an “apolitical” agency. In 
reality, as a strategy against the rise of Anti-Americanism, the U.S. government has 
expected Peace Corps volunteers to present a good image of Americans and American 
society. This expectation was particularly higher whenever nationals in the host countries 
held negative and even hostile feelings toward the United States as a response to U.S. 
foreign policy. On the other hand, Latin American responses to U.S. foreign policy 
sometimes made Peace Corps volunteers’ work difficult regardless of their efforts.  
                                                
10 Roberts, “Citizenship, Rights, and Social Policy,” 158.     
11 McPherson, Anti-Americanism in Latin America and the Caribbean, 22-23.  
12 Ibid., 271-274.   
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PEACE CORPS PROGRAM IN LATIN AMERICA  
 
Since the Peace Corps was established, it has sent a large number of volunteers to 
Latin America; in the past five decades, approximately 20-30 % of Peace Corps 
volunteers each year work in Latin America. The Peace Corps program in Latin America 
started sending 45 volunteers to Chile, 62 volunteers to Columbia, and 15 volunteers to 
St. Lucia in 1961.13 Regarding the non-participation of Mexico and Argentina in the 
program, Peace Corps Regional Director for Latin America in 1965, Frank Mankiewcs, 
explained, “…Those countries have not asked for Peace Corps Volunteers, feeling, I 
think, … the Peace Corps is primarily designed for underdeveloped countries that does 
not include them.”14 Even though there were some Latin American countries that the 
Peace Corps had not yet approached, throughout the1960s the Peace Corps steadily added 
new host countries in Latin America. By June of 1963, 17 countries including 
dependencies concluded country agreements with the Peace Corps.15     
 
                                                
13 St. Lucia was not a fully independent state at that time. Due to the West Indies Federation collapse in 
1962, St. Lucia became a member of a novel form of cooperation-associated state, which was developed by 
the United Kingdom and included six windward and leeward islands (Grenada, St. Vincent, Dominica, 
Antigua, St. Kitts and Nevis, Anguilla and St. Lucia).    
14 U.S. Congress, Peace Corps Activities in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2.     
15 According to the Second Annual Peace Corps Report, the host countries in Latin America were Brazil, 
Bolivia, British Honduras, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Peru, St. Lucia, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  
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Figure 2.1: Map of Latin America (Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The    
          University of Texas at Austin)  
 
Since the agency’s founding, a prominent characteristic of the Peace Corps in 
Latin America in its early decades has been a heavy focus on projects in community 
development. According to the Peace Corps Tenth Annual Report, the total number of 
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volunteers assigned to community development projects was overwhelmingly high in 
Latin America, particularly in its first decade.16 For instance, according to Glenn Francis 
Sheffield, of 1,492 Peace Corps volunteers were assigned to rural community 
development worldwide in 1964, 1,207, and approximately 69% were in Latin America. 
Moreover, in the case of Peru, he pointed out that approximately a third of Peace Corps 
volunteers had been assigned to rural community development by 1964.17  
      Since the late 1960s, the Peace Corps has faced the problems of loss of autonomy 
and massive budget reductions. In 1969, Republican Richard Nixon, who had been 
opposed to the idea of establishing the Peace Corps, was elected as the 37th President of 
the United Sates. Around that time, Peace Corps volunteers were participating in antiwar 
activities inside and outside of the United States; thus, the characterization of the 
volunteers as activists was a widely held public perception.18 Several congressmen, such 
as Otto Passman, opposed the active protest against U.S. foreign policy by Peace Corps 
volunteers. Also, the Nixon Presidency considered that the agency’s activist identity was 
problematic and needed to be reformed.  
In response to the domestic criticism of the Peace Corps, President Nixon 
restructured the Peace Corps’ independent status and it, along with other programs such 
as VISTA and the Foster Grandparents, were merged into a single agency called 
                                                
16 Peace Corps, Peace Corps Tenth Annual Report, 16-23. The Annual Report provided a statistical figure 
at the time of publication, but did not mentioned the year for the statistical figure. The Annual Report was 
published in 1971, so that figure was probably for a year close to 1971. According to the figure, 12% of 
volunteers (229 volunteers) were assigned to community development in the Latin American region; 6% of 
volunteers (105 volunteers) were assigned to Africa; 2% of volunteers (23 volunteers) were assigned to 
East Asia and the Pacific, and 1% of the volunteers (5 volunteers) was assigned to North Africa/Near East/ 
South Asia.  
17 Sheffield, “Peru and the Peace Corps, 1962-1968,” 257 and 259.     
18 Reeves, The Politics of the Peace Corps & Vista, 52, 62-63.  
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ACTION. In order to survive, the Peace Corps began implementing radical 
organizational reforms. The Nixon Presidency had two goals for creating ACTION: 
increase effectiveness through reorganization and implement a conservative strategy to 
destroy the activist culture at the Peace Corps and replace it with conservative ideological 
values.19 Additionally, the Peace Corps Director Joseph Blatchford implemented the 
“new directions program” in order to “dismantle the activism of the Corps by redirecting 
Volunteer recruitment so that it would be aimed at more acceptable Volunteer 
applicants.”20 For example, the Peace Corps recruiters concentrated on attracting an older 
and more technical specialist-type of volunteer. They also opened the door for volunteers 
to participate in the program accompanied by their families.21   
Unfortunately, their attempts to recruit and send “specialist” volunteers to Latin 
America did not work well. Most of the volunteers serving in Latin America at that time 
worked at the village level and two-thirds of all volunteers were assigned to projects, 
which were called community development. Due to that, program leaders concluded that 
the Peace Corps projects in Latin America needed a large number of “generalist” 
volunteers and recruiting the “generalist” type of volunteer was the only way to assure 
that more volunteer requests were filled.     
During its second decade (1971-1981), the Peace Corps was seen negatively in 
developing countries as well. Gerardo Rice said that the Vietnam War experience made 
Peace Corps operations difficult, and that people in the developing world had difficulty 
                                                
19 Reeves, The Politics of the Peace Corps & Vista, 55.   
20 Ibid., 63.  
21 Ibid., 63-64.  
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understanding the significance of its programs.22 Thereby, during this second decade, the 
Peace Corps terminated the largest number of programs in the Latin American region in 
its history. Moreover, the 1970s was the decade of budget crises for the Peace Corps. 
According to Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, in January 1971, Blatchford received a notice 
regarding budget cuts for the fiscal year (FY) 1972. The Executive Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) had cut the number of volunteers from 9,000 to 5,800, 
and reduced the agency budget from $90 million to $60 million. Then, in February 1972, 
the House-Senate Conference Committee announced a compromise appropriation for the 
Peace Corps that reduced the budget from $90 million to $72 million. That would have 
necessitated the recall of 2,313 volunteers stationed in thirty-three countries. Because 
Blatchford appealed to the Congress and the press, the Peace Corps finally obtained the 
extra funds.23 However, the FY 1972’s budget, $72.5 million, was the smallest budget 
allotted to the Peace Corps in its five decade history. As they did in other regions, both 
the tremendous budget cuts and the new recruiting policy diminished the Peace Corps’ 
program in Latin America during the 1970s.   
In December 1981, the Peace Corps was back to being an independent federal 
agency. Republican Loret Milller Ruppe became Director of the Peace Corps, and she 
eventually served longer than any other director.24 She was known as “a champion of 
women in development,” and she connected the Peace Corps to the business world.25 
                                                
22 Rice, Twenty Years of Peace Corps, 32.    
23 Cobbs Hoffman, All You Need is Love, 230-232.  
24 She served as Peace Corps Director from 1981 to 1989.   
25 Peace Corps, “Past Directors,” http://www.peacecorps.gov/index.cfm?shell=about.history.pastdir 
[accessed Nov 30, 2011].  
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According to the Peace Corps Annual Report in FY 1985, 400 volunteers served as 
business advisors, and these volunteers transferred accounting, marketing and 
management skills to their counterparts in the host countries.26 The Annual Report stated 
that the “ Peace Corps is working to stimulate economic development within developing 
countries.”27 This statement points to distinct differences in the agency since its 
founding, as the first Director Sargent Shriver, emphasized Peace Corps’ contributions as 
stimulating social rather than economic development.   
In the 1980s, acting on Director Ruppe’s initiative, the Peace Corps in Latin 
America established some projects to respond to the international debt crisis. Under 
neoliberal reforms in Latin America, the Peace Corps programs also aimed at economic 
recovery in the region, emphasizing business-oriented projects, particularly in the 
Caribbean region. The Peace Corps established a project called the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI) in order to assist in the development of small and medium scale 
agricultural enterprises in Caribbean area. To accomplish this, the agency developed 
selective recruitment and training programs focused on developing business-related skills 
to carry out agricultural business effectively in short period.28   
        In addition to work in the Caribbean region, the Peace Corps developed the 
Initiative for Central America (hereafter,  IFCA) to meet the needs of teacher training, 
small business development, housing and health in Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
                                                
26 Peace Corps, Peace Corps Congressional Presentation Fiscal Year 1985, 12.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Peace Corps, Peace Corps Congressional Presentation Fiscal Year 1984, 20 and 21.  
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Costa Rica.29 An analysis of the allocation of the number of volunteers in the Peace 
Corps annual reports reveals that for all countries in the IFCA program, the number of 
volunteers increased remarkably during the 1980s. For instance, there were only 105 
volunteers in Costa Rica in 1980, but that number increased to 210 in 1990. Guatemala 
showed the same tendency as Costa Rica; the Peace Corps sent 151 volunteers in 1980 
and 249 in 1990.30  
During the 1990s, the Peace Corps was more likely to pay attention to assisting a 
“new wave of democracy” in Latin America. The agency began projects supporting 
decentralized municipal management. The Peace Corps FY 1997 Annual Report 
explained the role of volunteers as helping “ the people of these communities build and 
strengthen the representative, and participatory organizations through which they seek to 
improve their lives and participate in the development of their countries.”31 In addition to 
increased participation in the political arena, the Youth Development project was another 
new trend in the Peace Crops.  
     The Peace Corps’ expectation of adding new host countries and re-entering former 
host countries reflected its goal to help promote a better understanding of Americans in 
Latin America by sending a large number of volunteers. The late 1980s and 1990s was 
                                                
29 Peace Corps, Peace Corps Congressional Presentation Fiscal Year 1987, 4 and 43.   
30 In order to explore the Peace Corps’ allocation of the number of volunteers to each Latin American 
country, I tracked down the Peace Corps congressional presentation reports published annually (I called 
these Peace Corps annual reports) from 1961 to 2011. Peace Corps annual reports contain information on 
the number of volunteers who served annually based on where they were assigned. On its official website, 
the Peace Corps presented the information of the total sum of volunteers who served in Latin America by 
country; however, using these numbers, one cannot obtain annual data by country. In order to see how the 
Peace Corps’ allocation of volunteers correlates to U.S. foreign policy, it is necessary to track annual data 
by country to get useful results. For more detail see Table 2 in the Appendix.      
31 Peace Corps, Peace Corps Congressional Budget Presentation Fiscal Year 1997, 163.     
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the transitional period from authoritarian regimes to new democratically elected 
governments in Latin America, and the Peace Corps annual reports in the 1990s 
repeatedly mentioned the agency’s hope to be able to enter into discussions with some of 
the new governments. The Peace Corps Annual Report for 1992 said that the agency was 
preparing to reenter Bolivia, Haiti, and Panama in 1990 and Nicaragua, Uruguay, and 
Chile in 1991. The Peace Corps continued to explore its reentry possibilities in Guyana 
and two other Latin American countries in 1992, as well.32 The practice of reentry into 
former host countries after several decades or years is common in the case of Latin 
America even outside of the 1990s. Re-entering countries and expanding U.S. presence is 
also a strategy to justify budget expansion.   
Entering the millennium and throughout the following decade, the most 
significant issue for the Peace Corps was the safety and security of the volunteers. During 
the 2000s, the U.S. public raised questions about the agency’s responsibility for 
volunteers’ safety and security. In the fall of 2003, The Dayton Daily News published a 
weeklong series of articles regarding the issue of increasing violence against Peace Corps 
volunteers overseas.33 The following year, American Taboo: A Murder in the Peace 
Corps was published. It described the tragedy of a male Peace Corps volunteer who 
killed a female Peace Corps volunteer in Tonga. Under these circumstances, the U.S. 
Congress began hearings about the safety and security of Peace Corps volunteers in 
March 2004. An additional reason for the public debate about the agency’s security issues 
                                                
32 Peace Corps, Peace Corps Congressional Presentation Fiscal Year 1992, 98.  
33 Lihosit, Peace Corps Chronology, 53-54.  
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during the 2000s was the post-9.11 world reaction to the United States. Post- 9.11, the 
U.S. government started paying attention not only to the security of Peace Corps 
volunteers, but to that of all American citizens who worked overseas as well as in the 
country.  
The purpose of the hearing held on March 24, 2004 in the U.S. Congress was to 
examine the safety and security practices of Peace Corps volunteers. Witnesses in the 
hearing included Peace Corps Director Gaddi H. Vasquez; Walter Poirier, the father of a 
missing Peace Corps volunteer assigned to Bolivia, and Jeff Bruce, editor of the Dayton 
Daily News. Director Vasquez explained that he had approved the creation of the new 
Office of Safety and Security in 2002 and increased the number of full-time safety and 
security staff in the agency by 80. According to Vasquez’s statement, the reorganization 
had resulted in a significant drop in the number of deaths, major sexual assaults, and 
minor assaults of volunteers during the previous two years (2002 to 2004).34 Even though 
Vazquez did not provide statistical data in the hearing regarding the death rate of the 
volunteers, he showed that the Peace Corps had experienced a 27 percent decline in the 
rate of major sexual assault events from 2001 to 2002.35 In addition, Vasquez said that 
the Peace Corps monitored the safety and security of volunteers throughout each post and 
had taken action immediately whenever needs such as political unrest, war, or epidemic 
were recognized in the host countries.36    
                                                
34 House Committee on International Relations, Safety and Security of Peace Corps Volunteers: Hearing 
before the Committee on International Relations, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., Mar 24, 2004, 11.     	  
35 Ibid., 16.  
36 Ibid., 11.    
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Other witnesses, such as Mr. Poirier and Mr. Bruce, criticized Peace Corps’ 
responses to safety and security. After communicating with the agency regarding his 
son’s disappearance, Walter Poirier felt the “Peace Corps to be more concerned with its 
image and protecting the aura and prestige of the Peace Corps than any other issue.”37 
Jeff Bruce reported findings from the investigation conducted by Dayton Daily News.  
He said that 250 volunteers had died since 1961, and yet the Peace Corps did not even 
start collecting worldwide crime statistics until 1990.38 Additionally, Mr. Bruce stated 
that it had been very difficult for them to obtain information regarding volunteer assaults 
prior to suing the agency, and that the Dayton Daily News had to acquire the records 
relating assaults on volunteers from other countries. He concluded that, “it was easier 
getting information out of the former Soviet Union that it was out of the Peace Corps.”39      
       Regarding Latin America, both the U.S. Congress and the Peace Corps admitted 
that the rate of sexual assaults against volunteers was higher in the Inter-American and 
Pacific Region (hereafter, IAP region) than in any other region. Regarding this situation, 
Tom Landon, a member of the Committee on International Relations said, “Although 
Latin America should be a top priority for receiving United States development 
assistance, we must make sure that we do not place more volunteers into high risk areas 
without first augmenting safety and security of precautions for them.”40 To respond to 
the rising criticism over safety and security management, since the FY 2002 Annual 
Report the Peace Corps has been open in its recognition of safety-related problems in 
                                                
37 Ibid., 22.    
38 Ibid., 31 and 32.    
39 Ibid., 32.   
40 Ibid., 7.  
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Latin America. The agency improved the security management in the IAP region. For 
instance, “the region has significantly expanded both pre-service and in-service training 
for Volunteers so they are more aware of, and better prepared for, potential safety risks. 
The region has also upgraded the physical security at its overseas posts, including 
improvements to equipment, communications, and transportation.”41 That is, the 2000s 
was the decade for the Peace Corps to admit its failure in managing the security of 
volunteers.  
Peace Corps activities in Latin America in the past five decades have reflected 
U.S.-Latin American relations as well as U.S. domestic issues such as budget constraints. 
Also, throughout five decades of Peace Corps history, the predominant strategy in Latin 
America aimed at sending a large number of “generalist” type volunteers, rather than a 
small number of “specialist” type volunteers. On the other hand, the agency’s consistent 
attempts to add new host countries and re-enter former ones show that the Peace Corps 
emphasized its role to help promote a better understanding of Americans in the Latin 
American region. However, the terminations at times requested by host countries also 
showcase the Peace Corps’ difficulties in Latin America.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
41 Peace Corps, Congressional Budget Presentation Fiscal Year 2002, 32.   
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   Table 2.1: THE NUMBER OF PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS IN LATIN AMERICA 
FROM 1961 TO 2010 
USA 
DEM. 
(JFK & 
LBJ) 1961-
1968 
REP. 
(Nixon & 
Ford) 1969- 
1976 
DEM. 
(Carter) 
1977 - 
1980 
REP. 
(Reagan& 
Bush) 1981 
- 1992 
DEM. 
(Clinton) 
1993 - 
2000 
REP. 
(Bush) 2001 
- 2008 
DEM. 
(Obama) 
2009-2010 
Argentina - - - 2 148 - - 
Belize - 181 232 1,058 382 466 150 
Bolivia 1,556 263 - 119 937 1,192 80 
Brazil 3,318 2,285 384 3 - - - 
British 
Honduras 267 146 - - - - - 
Chile 1,845 554 400 155 224 - - 
Colombia 3,734 1,752 767 46 - - - 
Costa Rica 598 778 493 1,831 1,009 712 181 
Dom. Rep. 923 469 359 1,594 1,178 1,316 386 
E. Caribbean 446 1,231 609 1,876 850 903 210 
Ecuador 1,776 1,430 752 2,284 1,268 1,152 309 
El Salvador 532 533 403 - 445 1,070 277 
Guatemala 614 852 613 1,989 1,422 1,476 402 
Guyana 140 79 - - 135 396 111 
Haiti  -   -   -  
                                                                                                                                                      
146   137   331   -  
Honduras  769   1,043   721  
                                                                                                                                                   
2,989   1,460   1,768   341  
Jamaica  565   1,340   463  
                                                                                                                                                   
1,541   830   776   142  
Mexico  -   -   -  
                                                                                                                                                          
-   -   212   123  
Nicaragua  37   518   208  
                                                                                                                                                        
14   247   1,277   408 
Panama  823   191   -  
                                                                                                                                                        
43   528   1,121   370  
Paraguay  86   497   474  
                                                                                                                                                   
1,712   1,466   1,487   409  
Peru  2,303   847   -  
                                                                                                                                                          
-   -   776   428 
Suriname   -   -   -  
                                                                                                                                                          
-   124   341   79.5  
Uruguay  181   51   -  
                                                                                                                                                        
36   92   -   -  
Venezuela  1,654   1,115   -  
                                                                                                                                                          
-   -   -   -  
Total  22,167 16,155 6,878  17,438 12,882 16,772 4,406 
Source: Peace Corps Annual Report from FY 1961 to FY2012  
Note: Peace Corps annual reports utilized different measurements by period, the number of Peace Corps volunteers in 
the table was not consistent due to different measurements such as in what month the number of volunteers was 
counted or who was included or not included (e.g., early termination and trainees). Since the table presents “actual” 
number of volunteers it seems to mean that the volunteers are actually present in the host countries. Possibly the Peace 
Corps counted the same person repeatedly. Table created by the author.  
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WITHDRAWAL OF THE PEACE CORPS PROGRAM FROM LATIN AMERICA 
 In Latin America, 12 countries terminated receiving Peace Corps volunteers 
during the 1970s and the early 1980s.42 As touched on briefly earlier in this chapter, this 
decade was the most intensive period of loss of host countries in Latin America. 
Consecutive terminations of programs in the region were a testament to the political 
instability there during those years. In addition, the terminations requested by host 
countries implied that people in Latin American countries saw the Peace Corps as a 
political agency, in contrast to many Americans who regarded the Peace Corps as a non-
political volunteer-based agency. An analysis of Peace Corps’ official documents and 
scholarly writings reveals four major factors relevant to the Peace Corps’ withdrawal: (1) 
increased development, (2) political unrest in the host country, (3) expulsion from the 
host country, and (4) U.S. budget cuts.  
The termination of the Peace Corps program in Chile on March 31, 1982 is an 
example of increased development leading to withdrawal. The Peace Corps Annual 
Report FY 1983 summarized the reasoning behind the termination in the following 
sentences: “Given Chile’s relatively advanced level of development and the existence of 
a growing pool of skilled Chilean technicians who could carry on the work of Peace 
Corps, it was decided that Peace Corps’ available resources would be reallocated to 
countries where the need is greater.”43 The time period during which the Peace Corps 
praised the government of Chile as “developed,” was not a peaceful one for Chilean 
citizens. Military dictator Augusto Pinochet held power and its presidency drafted a new 
                                                
42 Twelve countries terminated receiving volunteers during the 1970s and early 1980s: Bolivia, Panama 
and Guyana terminated in 1971; Uruguay in 1974; Peru in 1975; Venezuela in 1977; Nicaragua in 1979; El 
Salvador in 1980; Brazil and Colombia in 1981; and Grenada and Chile in 1982.   
43 Peace Corps, Peace Corps Fiscal Year 1983 Budget Estimate Submission to the Congress, 32.     
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constitution for Chile in 1980.44 As this case exemplifies, recognition of “development” 
by the Peace Corps as justification for leaving a host country is not entirely sufficient.45 
Political unrest in the host country was the most common factor contributing to 
the consecutive terminations of Peace Corps programs in Latin America during the Cold 
War. As with the first factor, there were neither clear guidelines nor existing studies 
measuring what degree of political unrest justified closing down a program. As examples, 
the Peace Corps stated that terminations in Colombia (in 1981), El Salvador (in 1980), 
and Nicaragua (in 1979) were due to reasons vaguely described as “political uncertainly,” 
“political unrest,” and “potential danger to volunteer and staff.”46  
In 1977, a group known as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(hereafter, FARC) kidnapped Richard Starr, a Peace Corps volunteer. At the time Starr 
was kidnapped the Latin American press, such as El Tiempo reported that Starr might be 
a CIA agent or a member of the Summer Institute of Linguistics even though there was 
no evidence. In the late 1970s, the Peace Corps started pointing out the existence of a 
security problem for volunteers in Colombia. However, except for Peace Corps Annual 
Report in FY 1982, the agency made no mention of the serious safety issues that 
volunteers faced in the country. None of details about Starr’s tragic incident ever 
appeared in Peace Corps annual reports. Starr’s release was facilitated neither by the U.S. 
government nor the Peace Corps. Instead, internationally known journalist Jack Anderson 
                                                
44 Smith, Talons of the Eagle, 206.    
45 Augusto Pinochet was a good friend of Ronald Reagan who served as the President of the United States 
from 1981 to 1989. Reagan’s foreign policy toward Latin America emphasized more implementing 
neoliberal reform and combating Communism than denouncing human rights violations. However, later the 
presidency of Jimmy Carter emphasized human rights issues in U.S.-Latin America relations, and the State 
Department accused Chile of condoning, “international terrorism.” 
46 For the El Salvadorian case, see Peace Corps, Peace Corps Congressional Submission Budget 
Justification Fiscal Year 1982, 34. For the Columbian case, see Peace Corps, Peace Corps Fiscal Year 
1983 Budget Estimate Submission to the Congress, 33. For the Nicaraguan case see, Peace Corps Fiscal 
Year 1983 Budget Estimate Submission to the Congress, 60.    
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negotiated with FARC and arranged a ransom using his private connections.47 In March 
of 1981, the Peace Corps made the decision to terminate program; the Peace Corps 
Annual Report FY 1983 explained that the reason for closing the Peace Corps program 
was the presence of guerilla activities and drug trafficking in Colombia.48 After a thirty-
year hiatus, the Peace Corps finally re-entered Colombia, and the first group of 
volunteers arrived as English teachers in September 2011.49  
According to the Peace Corps annual reports, the major reason for the termination 
of the programs in El Salvador and Nicaragua was political unrest.50 According to the 
book Voice of Experience in Central America: Former Peace Corps Volunteers’ Insights 
into a Troubled Region, former volunteers who served in El Salvador and Nicaragua 
recounted severe political situations in the decade of the 1970s. In the case of Nicaragua, 
eighty-one percent (17 out of 21 volunteers who served in Nicaragua) of respondents had 
either indirect knowledge or first hand experience of political violence.51 
Among volunteers in El Salvador, all thirty-nine-survey respondents had been 
affected or had known incidences of violence, disappearances, and forced emigration 
during their service. A former female volunteer in Nicaragua recounted, “I myself was 
raped and assaulted by two military men and the neighbor boy I was with then had to 
leave the country for some time (as I did).”52 Another volunteer described, “In Nicaragua 
people occasionally ‘disappeared.’ This was most common with young men. Mothers 
                                                
47 Joanne Roll, “Peace Corps Stories: Colombia PCV Richard Starr: He Served with Honor,” Knol: A Unit 
of Knowledge, http://knol.google.com/k/peace-corps-stories-colombia-pcv-richard-starr-he-served-with-
honor#[accessed Nov 1, 2011].   
48 Peace Corps, Peace Corps Congressional Submission Budget Justification Fiscal Year 1983, 33.  
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were always concerned about their teenage children and feared for their safety and 
lives.”53	 In El Salvador, the number of Peace Corps volunteers’ accounts regarding 
violent experiences increased greatly in the mid-1970s. A volunteer who served as a 
university instructor of teacher education from 1977 to 1978 said, “Many of my students 
disappeared and never returned to class. The rector of the University was assassinated in 
front of the building.”54 Narratives recounted by returned volunteers about violence in 
Nicaragua lasted eight-pages-long. This showed that some Peace Corps volunteers were 
working there in very insecure situations.  
Unlike the countries in which the Peace Corps terminated programs due to 
political unrest, Guatemala experienced civil war and yet the Peace Corps neither 
terminated the program nor reduced the number of volunteers sent. The Peace Corps 
annual reports from these times conveyed little of the reality of violent situations 
occurring in Guatemala, particularly in indigenous communities. Finally, FY 1982’s 
Annual Report said that Peace Corps/Guatemala reassigned about 25 percent of the 
volunteers to the eastern portion of the country because of growing civil and politico-
military unrest in certain of the highland indigenous communities.55 While the Peace 
Corps became aware of the safety of volunteers and relocated them, the agency continued 
sending around 100 volunteers each year during Guatemala civil wars.56 Compared to 
the narratives told by former Peace Corps volunteers in Nicaragua and El Salvador, no 
respondents in Guatemala reported first-hand experiences of violence. However, all 
respondents had knowledge of violent incidents in Guatemala while they were in in the 
country. Three respondents answered that their close Guatemalan or American friends 
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were murdered. The majority of the volunteers obtained information from friends and 
media about the violence in Guatemala.57 The narratives show that the volunteers 
recognized the serious situation, and they quite possibly felt fear when they served in 
Guatemala. 
Continuation of the Peace Corps program in Guatemala was affected by the 
change of U.S. foreign policy toward Central America. Unlike Jimmy Carter’s policy, 
which emphasized respect for human rights, Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy in Latin 
America emphasized combating Communism, particularly in Central America. Joseph 
Smith stated, “The Reagan Administration referred to the region as America’s ‘backyard’ 
and saw the struggle taking place there as an East-West confrontation that would play a 
significant part in the global crusade to roll back International Communism.”58 The 
change of U.S. political leadership and its change of foreign policy affected the Peace 
Corps’ continuation of its Guatemala program. Despite the series of severe massacres that 
occurred in Guatemala during the 1980s, the Reagan Administration made concerted 
efforts to combat Communism. On the other hand, the Peace Corps terminated programs 
in Nicaragua in 1979 and El Salvador in 1980 in the name of political unrest. Both of 
these terminations, however, occurred during the Carter Administration. 
The Peace Corps’ Grenada program in the Eastern Caribbean Islands seemed to 
be temporarily terminated by the end of 1982. Although Lowrence F. Lihosit’s study said 
the program in Grenada was closed in 1982,59 the Peace Corps annual reports did not 
report the year and date of the program’s closing or the possible reasons why the program 
was temporarily terminated. However, since the Peace Corps’ Annual Report FY1985 
listed “Re-established program in Grenada in 1984” as an accomplishment during 1983 to 
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1984,60 the program was clearly suspended for some reason. Reestablishment of the 
Peace Corps in Grenada is evident in the FY1986 Annual Report, which said, “The 
program in Grenada has been warmly received. At the end of 1985 seventeen Volunteers 
were in service…with another eighteen requested.”61  
Around the time that the Peace Corps program was temporarily terminated, 
Grenada became a battlefield of the Cold War; therefore, termination of activities there 
was affected by both Grenada’s internal political structure as well as the U.S. invasion of 
Grenada. In 1983, an internal coup occurred with the capture and murder of Prime 
Minister Bishop. Leaders gained support from several Communist countries and Grenada 
became a threat to the United States. Joseph Smith commented that like the Johnson 
Administration’s 1965 decision toward the Dominican Republic, the Reagan 
administration believed that armed intervention was necessary to defeat a Communist 
design to establish military bases in the Caribbean in order to undermine democracy 
throughout the Western Hemisphere.62 Consequently, under the name of a ‘rescue 
mission’ for U.S. citizens who lived in Grenada, Reagan took military action in October 
1983— Operation Urgent Fury. The unstable political situation in Grenada, along with 
the U.S. invasion, was possibly what caused the termination of the Peace Corps program  
around 1982. An analysis of Peace Corps annual reports, however, did not uncover any 
reason why the program closed. 
The expulsion of the Peace Corps volunteers also was one of the four major 
factors causing Peace Corps withdrawals. There are a few case studies analyzing Peace 
Corps volunteers’ expulsions from a community/university or from the entire country. 
However, as James F. Siekmier said, “no works have systematically examined any host 
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nation’s decision to break the initial agreement that invited the Peace Corps inside its 
borders.”63 In Latin America, the expulsion of Peace Corps volunteers occurred as a form 
of Anti-Americanism rather than the result of the failure of individual volunteers’ work.
 In some cases, the Peace Corps had predicted the possibility of expulsion from 
certain areas. The Peace Corps expulsion from the University of Huamanga in Ayacucho, 
Peru is an example. According to “Expulsion from a Peruvian University,” soon after 
diplomatic relationships were temporarily suspended between Peru and the United States 
in 1962 after national elections, the Peace Corps staff carefully chose three volunteers 
who had experience living in Latin America and were fluent in Spanish.64 At the time, 
however, Anti-American sentiment in the university promoted by communist students, 
was dominant on campus. Also, the University of Huamanga was where Abimael 
Guzmán, who founded the Sendero Luminoso (Shinning Path), had taken a post as a 
philosophy professor and had started a Maoist radical movement in 1962.65 Due to the 
spread of Anti-Americanism around the university, many students and faculty members 
tended to believe that “the Volunteers must have had ulterior motives for their presence 
and friendship—such as “stopping their revolution” or “spying for the C.I.A.”66 Even 
though there are other factors that caused the expulsion, Anti-Americanism in the host 
communities or institutions made the presence of the Peace Corps extremely difficult. 
Also, there are some case studies about the expulsion of Peace Corps volunteers from 
Peruvian communities during the 1960s.67 Unfortunately, there is no in-depth study about 
the termination of the Peace Corps program in Peru, as far as I know. According to Peace 
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Corps Wiki, the “Peace Corps’ departure from Peru in 1975 was due to political and 
economic instability.” 68  
The Bolivian case is clearer than the Peruvian case. Bolivia terminated its Peace 
Corps program twice in the last five decades. James F. Siekmier’s article “A Sacrificial 
Llama?: The Expulsion of the Peace Corps from Bolivia in 1971” explored the reasons 
why Bolivia forced the Peace Corps to leave in 1971. Siekmier showed that the expulsion 
of the Peace Corps at that time was as a result of Anti-Yankee attitudes in Bolivian 
society that emerged in the late 1960s. According to the article, the most vital factor 
behind it was Bolivian’s opposition to U.S.-sponsored efforts to promote birth control. 
Family planning to the Peace Corps was different from how Bolivians saw it. At the time, 
for many Bolivians (most of them Catholic), the introduction of birth control was 
perceived as “outside coercion,” or “a form of genocide.”69 Thereby, birth control 
programs led by the Peace Corps in rural Bolivia were described as a new form of U.S. 
imperialism as portrayed in a popular Bolivian movie, Yawar Mallku [Blood of the 
Condor]. Due to rising pressures by the Bolivian Left, the government expelled the Peace 
Corps in 1971, but did not throw out USAID or the U.S. military. Siekmier asserted the 
Bolivian strategy of expelling the Peace Corps satisfied Bolivia’s anti-U.S. sentiments, 
particularly those felt by the Bolivian Left. This meant that the government thought 
expelling the Peace Corps, but not USAID, would not excessively damage Bolivian-U.S. 
relations or the economy.70 The expulsion of the Peace Corps in Bolivia was a form of 
rebellion against U.S. imperialism, and the crush of the birth control program exemplified 
remaining questions of how much Western cultural values help non-Western people.  
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In 1990, Bolivia and the Peace Corps agreed to the re-entry of the Peace Corps 
volunteers. However, in September 2008, the Peace Corps announced that the program 
was temporary suspended and it remained that way for approximately three years. 
According to the Peace Corps, the reason for suspending its program in Bolivia was “to 
ensure the safety of the Peace Corps volunteers serving there” because the agency was 
concerned about “growing instability” in Bolivia.71 Finally, in the fall of 2011, the Peace 
Corps website announced that its program in Bolivia was officially closed.72 
Regarding this second termination of Peace Corps/Bolivia program, the Bolivia-
U.S. relations might be a direct cause, although the Peace Corps official website did not 
touch on the issue. In February 2008, ABC NEWS broadcasted that the U.S. Embassy in 
Bolivia told Peace Corps volunteers and Fullbright Scholars to gather information about 
Cubans and Venezuelans in Bolivia. This incident was made public by the Fullbright 
Scholar Alexander Van Schaick through ABC NEWS. Though the agency did not 
denounce the U.S. Embassy in public, a Peace Corps officer complained about the U.S. 
Embassy’s attitude four months prior to the U.S. Embassy’s instructions to volunteers 
and to Van Schaick.73 This public news story likely made the Peace Corps presence 
difficult in Bolivia. Since the early stage of the Peace Corps, volunteers were sometimes 
viewed as U.S. spies or CIA members by Latin Americans, particularly when anti-U.S. 
sentiments arose.  
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Brazil terminated its Peace Corps Program in 1981 because the agency and 
government leaders were unable to come to an agreement regarding the meaning of the 
Peace Corps’ presence in Brazil. Compared to the Bolivian examples, this Brazilian case 
was a mild expulsion because it took approximately three years to completely expel the 
program from the country due to the negotiations. According to Peace Corps annual 
reports, the Brazilian Government demanded that the Peace Corps redefine its 
involvement in the country; that was why the government had withheld permission for 
any new trainees to enter the country since August 1978. Thereby, the Peace Corps 
program in Brazil was phased out, and the last volunteer left in January 1981.74 In the 
words of the Peace Corps, this termination was not due to mutual agreement. The Peace 
Corps stated that “the Peace Corps’ revised 1973 country agreement with Brazil still 
remains in effect and many host country agencies continue to express a need for Peace 
Corps volunteers. The absence of any formal notice from the Government of Brazil 
terminating the Peace Corps program provides the possibility for a return of the Peace 
Corps to Brazil in the future.”75As this official statement shows, the agency was not 
satisfied with the Brazilian decision and hoped for the reentry of Peace Corps volunteers 
in the future.  
Regarding this termination, a former Peace Corps volunteer and the Country 
Director in Brazil at the time of conflict wrote a couple of stories illustrating how the 
Government of Brazil viewed the Peace Corps. First, former volunteer in Brazil John 
Reeder mentioned that, “beginning around 1977-1978, the Brazilian military 
government’s displeasure with the U.S. anti-nuclear proliferation treaty and criticism of 
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Brazil’s human rights policies under President Jimmy Carter’s human rights policy 
contributed to Brazil’s ending of Peace Corps’ presence.”76 Also, Phil Lopes, who served 
as Country Director in Brazil (Sep.1978 to Dec.1980), assumed that another reason for 
Brazil’s denial of Peace Corps volunteers was foreign volunteers’ involvement in 
controversies over the Brazilian Government’s treatment of Native American land and 
human rights in the Amazonian region. As a result, the Brazilian Government removed 
not only Peace Corps volunteers, but also all foreign volunteers from areas where 
“unfavorable foreign news reports” could possibly be released.77 Returned Peace Corps 
volunteers had in fact participated in the American Friends of Brazil, a human-rights 
group based in the San Francisco Bay Area. Along with political exiles, church activists, 
and scholars, the volunteers began publishing the Brazilian Information Bulletin, which 
protested against human right abuses in Brazil.78 
Another case of the expulsion of Peace Corps volunteers occurred in Guyana. 
According to the Final Program Evaluation Report Peace Corps/Guyana, “The Guyana 
program was discontinued in 1971, after the government of Guyana requested all 
overseas voluntary agencies to leave.”79 This expulsion of volunteers was related to 
changes in Guyana’s political structure. After Forbes Burnham became Prime Minister, 
Guyana was declared as a Cooperative Republic in 1970. In the following years, the 
Burnham regime implemented nationalizations, and “by 1976 the Guyana government 
was responsible for more than 80 percent of economic activity in the country, including 
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the bauxite and sugar industries.”80 In addition to nationalizing economies, from 1970 to 
1976 the Government of Guyana emphasized its non-alignment with support from the 
Third World, and reinforced relationships with Communist bloc nations. For instance, in 
1972 Guyana established diplomatic relations with the People of Republic of China and 
with Cuba as well as receiving various forms of aid from Communist bloc nations.81 
These foreign policies cooled U.S.-Guyana relations. Thus, the expulsion of Peace Corps 
volunteers from Guyana was probably a result of changes in Guyana’s foreign policy.   
Finally, the forth reason for the withdrawal of the Peace Corps from Latin 
American countries during the 1970s and the early 1980s was a combination of budget 
cuts and criticism against the Peace Corps during the Richard Nixon presidency (1969-
1974) and the Vietnam War. Nixon had attacked Kennedy’s proposed Peace Corps 
during his 1960 presidential campaign, and during his 1968’s presidential campaign 
Nixon declared that if he were elected he would eliminate the Peace Corps in order to 
seek greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the federal bureaucracy.82 Despite this 
campaign promise, he did not eliminate the Peace Corps during his presidency. However, 
the Peace Corps did experience a severe budget crisis and the agency had to carry out 
massive institutional changes under a limited budget in order to survive.  
Even though I have uncovered no agency declaration listing budget considerations 
as a reason for program withdrawal, four Peace Corps programs (Bolivia, Guyana, 
Panama and Uruguay) were closed down during the Nixon presidency. In the cases of 
Bolivia and Guyana, the Peace Corps stated that their governments requested termination 
of the Peace Corps program. On the other hand, no official reason for closing the 
program in Uruguay was given in any of the Peace Corps annual reports; and it was likely 
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due to the budget crisis. According to Gerard Rice, Uruguay was already advanced in 
terms of social welfare programs and education when the Peace Corps was established in 
1961. Thereby, Peace Corps Program evaluator Dee Jacobs seriously questioned the 
meaning of the agency’s presence in Uruguay in the sphere of development. On the other 
hand, the American ambassador Coerr saw the meaning of Peace Corps presence in 
Uruguay as follows: “The presence and activities of the Volunteers definitely helped to 
weaken the Communists’ “anti-American and anti-democratic stand.”83 That is, in the 
case of Uruguay, the presence of Peace Corps was more likely for political objectives 
than for development of the host country. Actually, the program in Uruguay was small 
compared to other programs in Latin America.84  
CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of this section was to understand why Peace Corps programs in 
some Latin American countries closed, mainly by examining Peace Corps annual reports. 
Since the Peace Corps annual reports are prepared for the U.S. Congress to justify budget 
requests, they tend to exclude information that hurts the image of the agency, such as 
expulsion of Peace Corps programs and security issues for the volunteers, even though 
the Peace Corps has been more open about those problems since being sued by the 
Dayton Daily News.  
The criteria the Peace Corps used for making decisions about withdrawals is not 
clear. In the first example, the Peace Corps program in Chile was closed in 1982 because 
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the agency determined that Chile had become sufficiently developed. At the same time, 
the Peace Corps showed dissatisfaction toward the Brazilian request for terminating its 
Peace Corps program, even though the Peace Corps Annual Report acknowledged the 
development that had occurred there due to Peace Corps activities.85 Also, both Brazil 
and Chile at the time were under the rule of military dictatorships and human rights 
abuses in each country were recognized. In 1982, the Peace Corps willingly closed the 
Chilean program. On the other hand, the Brazilian program was closed in 1981 without 
mutual agreement. These examples show that the agency’s decision-making process is 
multi-faceted and probably related to U.S. foreign policy needs. In the case of Chile, my 
interpretation is that the Reagan Administration needed to represent Chile as a 
“developed” country to justify U.S. foreign policy in Latin America.   
      Regarding political unrest as a justification for closing programs, the Peace Corps 
annual reports present no clear guidelines. Programs in Nicaragua and El Salvador were 
closed for this reason, but not the program in Guatemala even during the height of its 
Civil War, despite the fact that the Peace Corps noted severe political unrest in certain 
areas. Also, former volunteers claimed that Peace Corps volunteers served in more 
dangerous and isolated areas than foreign volunteers with organizations from other 
countries, such as Japan and Germany.86 
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In short, understanding the reasons why Peace Corps programs have closed in 
particular Latin American countries can only be done in light of broader issues in U.S. 
foreign policy and subsequent Latin American responses. In addition, Peace Corps 
volunteers often have had difficulty in separating themselves from these larger issues of 
U.S. foreign policy. The Peace Corps has undoubtedly been influenced by U.S. foreign 
policy, despite the agency’s claims to be apolitical.  
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Chapter 3: JOCV in Latin America 
 
 
Because U.S.-Latin American relations tended to be seen as “imperialistic,” this 
perspective has influenced how Latin American host countries saw the Peace Corps’ 
presence. In order to compare JOCV’s operations in Latin America with those of the 
Peace Corps, it is necessary to explore how Latin American countries have perceived 
Japan. These perspectives toward Japan have changed due to Japan’s economic growth, 
dekasegi boom, Japan’s large ODA budget for Latin American countries, and of course, 
globalization. Nevertheless, the Japanese economic and political presence in Latin 
America has never exceeded that of the United States.   
Under these circumstances, the Peace Corps and JOCV’s operations and their 
focuses in Latin America differed from each other. I will analyze JOCV activities in 
Latin America comparing the JOCV volunteers’ experiences as members of a national 
development agency with those of Peace Corps volunteers. For instance, because of anti-
American movements in Latin America, Peace Corps volunteers experienced expulsion. 
In contrast, JOCV did not have such negative experiences in Latin America. I suggest 
that differences between Peace Corps/JOCV in volunteers’ experiences and relationships 
shaped JOCV’s attitude and expectations of their volunteers’ behavior in the host 
countries. In this chapter, I will discuss the following three points: (1) Japan-Latin  
American relations, (2) JOCV’s programs overview in Latin America from 1968 to 2010, 
and (3) the pattern of withdrawal of JOCV volunteers in Latin America.   
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JAPAN-LATIN AMERICA RELATIONS 
Compared to the enormous literature on U.S.-Latin America relations in 
academia, less has been published on Japanese-Latin American relationships. However, 
the interdisciplinary and inter-regionally studies of Japan-Latin America relations in 
terms of the issue of emigrants/immigrants has grown since the1980s. Unlike the U.S.-
Latin America relations, scholars of Japanese-Latin American relations emphasize that 
Japanese political dominance and interventions have been an invisible part of their 
relations with Latin America compared to the Japan’s presence and its imperialistic past 
in Asian countries. 
Even though the Japan-Latin American political connection has not been regarded 
as strong as that of Japan-Asia or the U.S.-Latin America, Latin America has been in 
support of Japan’s political presence in the international community. Since the late 
nineteenth century, Latin America played an important role in Japan’s participation in the 
international community. In 1858, Japan was forced to sign an unequal treaty, a treaty of 
amity and commerce with the United States; and then, Japan was forced to conclude 
similar unequal treaties with other western countries such as England and France. In 
order to revise those unequal treaties, the Japanese government tried to construct Japan as 
a “westernized” and “modernized” county rapidly. Under this circumstance, Japan 
needed to establish more diversified foreign relations with other countries. Mexico was 
the first country to sign an equal treaty of amity and commerce with Japan in 1888. From 
the Mexican perspective, there were three aims articulated by the treaty with Japan: (1) 
the establishment of a trade relationship with Asia, (2) the diversification of Mexican 
diplomacy and (3) the acquisition of a cheap manual labor force.1 After that, Japan also 
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concluded equal treaties with other Latin American countries.2 The fact that Japan had 
already concluded an ‘equal’ treaty with Mexico, became a supportive factor for the 
Japanese government when Japan negotiated revisions of unequal treaties with other 
Western countries.3  
With the outbreak of the war between Japan and the United States in 1941, the 
U.S. government ordered all Latin American countries to rupture diplomatic relationships 
with Japan and even that they declare war against Japan. According to Eikichi 
Hayashiya’s study, prior to the outbreak of the U.S.-Japan war, Japan was successful in 
making equal treaties with eighteen Latin American countries. However, except for Chile 
and Argentina, all other Latin American countries ruptured diplomatic relations and 
declared war against Japan by 1942. Finally, by 1944 these two countries also followed 
as the U.S. declared war against Japan and demanded that they do likewise; this situation 
lasted until 1952.4  
After diplomatic relations were reestablished between Japan and Latin American 
countries, Latin America also supported Japan’s return to the fold of the international 
community in the post-war period. For instance, in the postwar period, all of the twenty 
Latin American countries, which had already been members of the United Nations, voted 
in favor of Japan’s membership in the United Nations.5 Also, Latin American countries 
and Japan often agreed on resolutions regarding international affairs. Thus, the Japanese 
                                                
2 Similar treaties were signed with Brazil in 1895, Chile in 1879, Argentina 1898 and Colombia in 1909. 
The first diplomatic relation was established with Peru in 1872, but it was not a treaty; it provided equal 
diplomatic status like the one Japan concluded with Mexico.  
3 There is some debate regarding this issue. To support my interpretation see Hayashiya,“Nihon to raten 
amerika no gaikō kankei” [Japanese Foreign Relations with Latin America], 4; Hata, “Nichiboku shūkō 
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government recognized that Latin America was the region with which it could share 
political and economic interests.6 That is, Japanese and Latin American political 
relations today have been “complementarity” rather than “imperialistic,” compared to the 
U.S.-Latin American or Japan-Asian relations. 
“Complementarity” in relationships between Japan and Latin America became 
prominent not only since the post-war, but it had already started at the beginning of the 
twentieth century; the presence of Japanese immigrants—nikkei, built this relationship. 
From the late nineteenth century up until World War II (in 1941) over 244,000 Japanese 
immigrants arrived in Latin America.7 According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan, there are approximately 1.5 million nikkei people living in Latin America today.8 
Eiichiro Azuma argued that this large number of Japanese immigrants was a form of 
Meiji government state-led promotion and is evidence of Japanese expansionism.9 
However, Azuma’s argument about the Japanese motivation to emigrating/immigrating 
as expansionist policy cannot apply to all cases of Japanese immigrants. For instance, 
Daniel M. Masterson and Sayaka Funada-Classen’s The Japanese in Latin America 
describes the frustration of Japanese peasants with the Meiji government’s modernization 
and westernization established after the Edo period,10 and point out the new 
government’s policies as reasons why the Japanese came to Latin America to escape the 
harsh conditions they faced. For instance, in 1895 alone, 108,000 farms went into 
bankruptcy and 400,000 Japanese peasants lost their livelihood because of increased 
                                                
6 Nakamae, “Nihon gaikō no naka no chunanbei [Central and South America in Japanese Foreign Policy],” 
38.  
7 Kunimoto, Gaisetsu raten-america shi [General History of Latin America], 24 
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economic and social burdens imposed by the Japanese government, such as taxes.11 
Thus, is quite possibly to argue that they chose to come to Latin America to search for 
new opportunities and a better life. That is, when some Japanese immigrants decided to 
immigrate to Latin America, they were in a vulnerable position not only in their new 
country, but also in Japan.  
Other examples also show that the relationship is more “complementary” than 
“imperialistic.” In the 1920s Brazil, which was the major destination of Japanese 
emigrants, needed labor to sustain the coffee industry after western immigrants, such as 
Italian immigrants, stopped coming to coffee farms. Making up the shortage of western 
immigrants was how Japanese immigrants started to become the major immigrant group 
in Brazil.12 In the case of Paraguay, the country needed to recover its population by 
inviting foreign immigrants to Paraguay because the country lost the majority of adult 
men due to the Guerra de la Triple Alianza [War of the Triple Alliance]. Inviting white 
immigrants was its original national policy. According to Iyo Kunimoto’s study, the 
Paraguayan government ordered consular offices and contracting companies not to allow 
Asian immigrants to enter Paraguay under any circumstances. However, because of the 
lack of white immigrants to Paraguay, groups of Japanese finally arrived in the 1930s.13 
As these examples show, Japanese immigration to Latin America before World War II, 
helped meet the needs for economic development of each side—Japan and Latin 
America.   
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Stanlaw’s “Japanese Emigration: From Meiji to Modern Times” (paper delivered at American 
Anthropological Association Annual Meeting, New Orleans 21 Nov. 2002).  
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13 Kunimoto, “Boribia to paraguai ni okeru nihon imin to menonaito” [The Japanese Immigrants and 
Mennonites in Bolivia and Paraguay], 96-99.    
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As the Paraguayan case showed, in the early twentieth century Latin American 
governments and intellectuals, in general, preferred to build their country with 
Caucasians. The racial discourse considered Asian immigrants a ‘colored’ race. Even 
Brazil, which received the largest number of Japanese immigrants, was not exception. In 
the case of Brazil, a study about the racial discourse toward Japanese people during the 
1920s shows that Brazilian intellectuals saw Japanese as “racially inferior” and 
categorized Japanese immigrants as “unwelcome” in Brazil for the future of the country 
in terms of race.14 In the early twentieth century, white supremacy and Blanqueamiento 
[Whitening] were still some of the dominant Latin America’s development ideologies. At 
the same time, Japanese economic power in the early twentieth century was relatively 
weak. These ideologies enabled Japan to hold an “imperialistic” stance over Latin 
American countries in comparison with the U.S.-Latin American relations.  
Japanese state-led emigration to Latin America in the post-war period was also  
related to Japan’s defeat in World War II. The case of Japanese immigrants who came 
from Okinawa to Bolivia in the post-war period can serve as an example. According to 
Taku Suzuki’s study, the construction of U.S. military bases in Okinawa after World War 
II spurred many Okinawans to leave Okinawa in order to search for better living 
conditions and escape Okinawa under U.S. occupation. He said that United States Civil 
Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (hereafter, USCAR) also noticed the Okinawans’ 
frustration and were concerned with the possibility of the spread of Communism in 
Okinawa due to the severe situation there. The USCAR strove to find a place to send 
Okinawans and officially mandated and supported the Okinawan settlement program in 
                                                
14 Maeyama, “Senkyūhyaku nijyū nendai buraziru chishikijin no ajia jinshukan.” While the Brazilian 
intellectuals saw Japanese race was not favorable in terms of the color, some of them suggested that 
Japanese characteristics such as “hard worker” and “less-aggressiveness” were viewed as favorable points 
to receive Japanese immigrant into Brazil. For more detail see Maeyama’s work.  
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in the lowlands in Santa Cruz, Bolivia.15 Under this circumstance, “other settlements of 
foreign immigrants, including Italians, North-American Mennonites, and Naichi-jin 
Japanese,16 were also being planned, but the Okinawan immigration and settlement 
program was the first project granted.”17 This case also showed that Japanese immigrants 
(in this case, particularly Okinawans) did not always have the alternative to stay in Japan 
due to economic and political factors. Today JICA, including the JOCV program, still 
cooperate with Japanese immigrants because emigration to Latin America was one of 
Japan’s national projects. JICA has a special program to send volunteers to support 
Japanese immigrant communities. In some cases, JOCV volunteers are also sent to 
Japanese immigrant communities to help mainly in education, health and agriculture 
related-areas.  
Although Japanese immigration to Latin America was a key theme of Japanese-
Latin America relations until the middle of 1960s, this relationship gradually changed 
due to Japan’s rapid economic growth. Since that time, the opportunities provided by 
Latin America’s large market and its capacity as a natural resource supplier encouraged 
close economic relationships between Japan and Latin America. Growth of Japanese 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America represented these close economic 
relationships in the second half of the twentieth century. Between 1951 and 1994, 
Mitsuhiro Kagami shows that there were three peaks in Japan’s FDI to Latin America: 
                                                
15 Suzuki, Embodying Belonging, 29-34. Suzuki’s study presented Japanese Okinawans’s ambivalent 
racial and ethnic position through exploring the background of Okinawan immigration and settlement 
project in Bolivia. According to Suzuki, even during the wartime, some Okinawans lived and worked in 
Japan’s former colonies such as Saipan and Manchuria. However, Japan’s defeat in World War II changed 
the situation and they returned to Okinawa. In addition to this, under U.S. occupation, U.S. bases occupied 
14 percent of the entire main island and 42 percent of the island’s farmland was taken way from the 
Okinawans (Ōshiro cited in Suzuki). Also, Okinawans’s legal position was not fully protected neither by 
the U.S. or the Japanese governments under these circumstances. For more detail see, Suzuki’s Embodying 
Belonging.    
16 “Naichi-jin Japanese” means people of mainland Japan.   
17 Suzuki, Embodying Belonging, 34.   
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1973, 1979, and 1988; and Japan’s FDI to Latin America rose to $55.1 billion in that 
period. In terms of funds distribution per country, Panama accounted for 40 percent, the 
Cayman Islands for 17 percent, Brazil for16 percent, the Bahamas for 7 percent, and 
Bermuda for 6 percent, and these were the top five largest recipients.18 Regarding the 
allocation of Japan’s FDI, Kagami noted, “Japanese FDI to Latin America fully utilized 
tax haven measures, especially, shipping, banking, and insurance companies.”19  
In addition to the development of economic relationships between Japan and 
Latin America, Japanese ODA flows to Latin America steadily expanded during the 
1980s and the 1990s. Strong economic relationships (e.g., trade, FDI, or bank lending) 
and the presence of Japanese immigrants in recipient countries are the principal 
determinants of Japanese ODA to Latin America. However, there are disagreements over 
the weighting of the determinants of Japanese ODA to Latin America.20 For instance, 
scholars differ over whether Japanese aid has been influenced by U.S. political and 
economic interests toward Latin America or not. In addition to that, Japan and the United 
States have common interests. Saori N. Katada pointed out that U.S.-Latin American 
relations also have influenced Japanese aid behavior and there is a “clear division of 
labor” between Japan and the United States. Katada’s “clear division of labor” means that 
Japan provides less aid to the Latin American countries in which the U.S. has strong 
political interests; on the other hand, Japan provides more aid to the Latin American 
countries in which the U.S. has stronger economic interests.21 Moreover, Japan 
                                                
18 Kagami explained the reasons why 1973, 1979 and 1988 were peaks in Japan’s FDI to Latin America in 
his manuscript, “Japan and Latin America,” 32-34.   
19 Ibid., 34.  
20 For example, see Kataga, “Two Aid Hegemons”;Tuman, Emmert and Sterken, “Explaining Japanese 
Aid Policy in Latin America”; Nakamae, “Nihon gaikō no naka no chūnanbei” [Japan’s Foreign Policy in 
Latin America].   	 	  
21 Katada, “Two Aid Hegemons.”   
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supported the Brady Plan, which was a U.S.-led debt strategy toward Latin America. 
Allocation of Japanese aid to Latin America was utilized to maintain good relationships 
between Japan and the U.S. However, the U.S. interests in the region did not have any 
significant impact on Japanese ODA decisions. The study said that Japan and the U.S. 
have different priorities; in terms of U.S. political interests, it did not find a positive 
relationship between Japanese ODA and U.S. security interests such as democracy and 
human rights concerns during the Cold War. Japanese aid flows to Latin America usually 
are increased to protect the interest of Japanese financial institutions and guarantee access 
to Japanese companies.22  
In the twenty-first century, Japan also expects to enhance its relationships with 
Latin America because of future food and energy considerations; however, the Japanese 
position in Latin America, in particular its economic interests, has been replaced by 
China. Takahiro Nakamae noted that it was the reason why Japanese presence in Latin 
America has been shrinking. According to Nakamae, trade between East Asia and Latin 
America increased 3.9 times from 1999 to 2007, but this trend was mainly led by China.23 
Also, Latin America adopted the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under 
structural adjustment policies during the 1990s. However, at the same time, Japan was 
experiencing an economic crisis so Japan could not participate in the wave of large 
investment opportunities in Latin America. The Nakamae’s study asserted this as another 
reason why Japanese presence in Latin America has been shrinking.  
In short, Japan and Latin America are geographically distant from each other, but 
their relationships have been recognized as complementary compared to the U.S.-Latin 
America relations, which have been historically dominated by U.S. hegemonic power. 
                                                
22 Tuman, Emmert, and Sterken, “Explaining Japanese Aid Policy in Latin America.”  
23 Nakamae, “Nihon gaikō no naka no chunanbei,” 42.   
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Diplomatic relations between Japan and Latin American countries started when Japanese 
government eagerly promoted modernization of the country in order to survive in the 
international community. At the same time, Latin American governments needed 
Japanese immigrants in order to promote economic development. Thus, both Japan and 
Latin America were pursuing “development” without major political conflicts; or rather, 
their needs matched each other. In addition, because Latin America was the region where 
the largest number of the Japanese lived outside Japan, the presence of Japanese 
immigrants in Latin America became a prominent characteristic of Japanese-Latin 
American relations. This influenced Japanese ODA aid flow to Latin America. Not only 
the presence of Japanese immigrants in Latin America, but also all the other issues 
described in this section, influenced the development of the JOCV program in Latin 
America as well as the Latin American host countries’ perspectives toward JOCV 
volunteers.    
THE DEVELOPMENT OF JOCV PROGRAM IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
Latin America has been the third largest region that has constantly received JOCV 
volunteers since the establishment of JOCV in 1965. Since then, JOCV dispatched 
approximately 20 % of its volunteers to the Latin America region.24 JOCV has kept 
sending volunteers to Latin American host countries that have high poverty rates. JOCV 
started sending volunteers to Central America rather than South America despite the 
presence in South America of a large number of Japanese immigrants. In fact, Central 
American countries such as Honduras have received larger numbers of volunteers than 
South American countries. Like the Peace Corps, areas such as Community Development 
                                                
24 Wakita,“Seinen kaigai kyōryokutai jigyō saikouchiku ni mukere” [For Re-construction of JOCV], 87.       
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and Environment are becoming popular among JOCV applicants. For instance, at the end 
of the spring of 2003, 761 people applied for only 78 positions in Community 
Development.25 This tendency is also applicable to JOCV in Latin America. In this 
section, I will illustrate the development of JOCV’s activities in Latin America in terms 
of the characteristics of Japan-Latin America relations that I outlined in the previous 
section.  
Japanese Business and JOCV Program 
 
The first two JOCV host countries—El Salvador and Costa Rica, shared the 
common characteristic of Japan having already established business relationships with El 
Salvador and Costa Rica before the JOCV program was founded. JOCV program in Latin 
America started with the dispatch of eight volunteers to El Salvador in 1968.26 Following 
El Salvador, Costa Rica became the second JOCV host country in Latin America and 
they received the first JOCV volunteers in 1974.        
      According to Takashi Tanaka’s in-depth study, Japanese spinning industry needed 
new suppliers who could provide high quality and cheap raw cotton to Japan because the 
industry had been faced with difficulties to obtain raw cotton due to the outbreak of the 
Korean War. Under this circumstance, the Japanese Spinning Industry went into Central 
America, mainly to El Salvador, Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and these countries became 
                                                
25 JICA, JICA Info-Kit (File D-7): A Comprehensive People-to-People Program for Progress [Tokyo: 
JICA, 2003].  
26 During the first two years, all volunteers sent to El Salvador were athletes, and they worked to help 
establish method courses on physical education for high school graduates in normal schools. Walter Béneke 
who had served as Ambassador of Japan and Minister of Education in El Salvador, contributed to the start 
of the JOCV Program in El Salvador. Thanks to his help, JOCV begun its program in El Salvador in the 
educational field and it had a good start. See JICA, Seinen kaigai kyōryokutai 20 seiki no kiseki, 200 
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suppliers of raw cotton and helped the Japanese postwar economic recovery and the 
growth of the textile industry. He stated that in particular, El Salvador had been a primary 
exporter of raw cotton to Japan; for instance, the percentage of exported raw cotton to 
Japan reached its peak in 1969, exporting 96% of the total amount of raw cotton.27 In 
relation to that, according to Tanaka, El Salvador was the first country in which a private 
Japanese company embarked into foreign markets in the post-war period.28 In 1955, the 
Japanese cotton spinning private company, Toyobo Corporation (formerly Kureha-bo) 
founded a joint private corporation, Industrias Unidas, S.A. (hereafter, IUSA) in El 
Salvador. Tanaka stated that IUSA’s establishment in El Salvador was a trigger to 
activate Japan and El Salvador’s relations. Following El Salvador, the same Japanese 
company established another joint private corporation, Textiles Industriales de Centro 
América, S.A. in Costa Rica in 1965.29   
In contrast to El Salvador and Costa Rica, the Japanese textile industry in the 
1960s had negative views on investment in Nicaragua. First, the Japanese textile industry 
was concerned that it was difficult to compete with the Somoza Family-associated 
companies, which had privileged treatment in Nicaragua. Secondly, they predicted that 
                                                
27 Tanaka, Nihon bōsekigyō no chubei shinshutsu [ The Expansion of Japanese Spinning Industry to 
Central America], 246.   
28 Ibid.,133. Kuraha-bo was established as a joint corporation, IUSA, in El Salvador in 1955. In the same 
year, Tokyo-bo was established also as a joint corporation in Brazil. I assume that one of possible reasons 
why JOCV did not start a program in Brazil in the early decades of JOCV was related to Brazil being quite 
advanced in terms of economic development. Therefore, JOCV did not send volunteers to Brazil until the 
middle 1990s.   
29 Tanaka presented the case studies of IUSA and TICA respectively in the book. On IUSA see 170-194 
and on TICA see 195-206. Kureha-bo established these two joint corporations in Central America; 
however, Toyobo merged with Kureha-bo in 1966. After 1966, Toyobo became the largest-scale spinning 
company in Japan.   
 108 
political unrest against the dictatorship of the Somoza Family would happen in the near 
future in Nicaragua.30  
In short, JOCV started programs where Japanese businesses were already 
established. With limited JOCV primary data and literature, I cannot fully establish that 
JOCV programs were related to Japanese economic interests. However, it is clear that the 
presence of Japanese companies made it easier to establish JOCV programs in El 
Salvador and Costa Rica.  
Japanese Immigrants and the JOCV Program 
 
The second group of JOCV’s host countries —Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru, has 
common features in that all three because they all have Japanese immigrants and their 
presence is reflected in the JOCV program. After opening programs in Central America, 
JOCV started investigating possibilities in South America during the middle 1970s. After 
investigating details of the host countries’ requests for dispatching JOCV volunteers, 
JOCV thought that requests from Bolivia and Paraguay were reasonable and feasible 
because both Bolivia and Paraguay had isolated communities in their landlocked 
countries. Consequently, JOCV considered that the situation of both countries was 
suitable for JOCV’s philosophy of “okuchi-zenshin” [heading toward the back regions].31 
                                                
30 Tanaka, Nihon bōsekigyō no chubei shinshutsu,117-118.     
31 JICA, Seinen kaigai kyōryokutai 20 seiki no kiseki, 176 and 230. Also, Hideki Yoshioka’s journalistic 
book Seinen kaigai kyōryokutai no shōtai [Reality of Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers] questioned 
the principle of JOCV’s “okuchi-zenshi.” According to Yoshioka, excessive supervision of JOCV 
volunteers by the JOCV office made it difficult for JOCV to send their volunteers to ‘isolated’ and ‘back 
regions.’ See Yoshioka, Seinen kaigai kyōryokutai no shōtai, 56-57. Compared to the Peace Corps, the 
JOCV has been more concerned with security management and security control of volunteers since it was 
established. However, due to its strict security management and control of volunteers, JOCV volunteers 
were sent in limited numbers to the back regions compared to Peace Corps volunteers; thereby, particularly 
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The first group of JOCV volunteers to South America was sent to Bolivia and Paraguay 
in 1978. The JOCV program was also started in Peru following these two countries.    
The JOCV program in Paraguay emphasized cooperating with Japanese 
immigrant communities. For instance, Japanese immigrants’ contribution in the area of 
agriculture has been recognized in Paraguay; thereby, the principal requests from 
Paraguay were in agriculture, forestry, and fishery. In addition to agricultural and forestry 
industries, JOCV volunteers have been sent to areas of education and hygiene; some 
JOCV nurses were sent to health centers in the Japanese immigrant communities. The 
JOCV program in Paraguay was one of the model cases of the way in which JOCV has 
cooperated “directly and indirectly” with societies of Japanese immigrants in Latin 
America.32 According to the 1982 JICA Annual Report, the dispatching of volunteers to 
teach physical education and music classes to Japanese immigrants was increased.33 
Even though only Paraguay had this tendency at that time, later JOCV started 
establishing special programs to send volunteers to Japanese immigrant’s communities in 
Latin America.34  
JOCV approached the Dominican Republic differently although the country also 
has Japanese immigrants who were sent by a state-led immigration project. The 
Dominican Republic became a JOCV host country in the middle of the 1980s. When 
                                                                                                                                            
in the early years of the JOCV, the agency was criticized for the lack of “frontier spirit” by the host 
countries.  
32 JICA, JICA Annual Report 1980, 359-360.      
33 JICA, JICA Annual Report 1982, 279.     
34 JICA has program of JOCV for Nikkei Society. See JICA, “Nikkei shakai seinen borantia,” [Volunteers 
for Nikkei Community], JICA. http://www.jica.go.jp/volunteer/application/seinen/nikkei/require/ [accessed 
August 16, 2012].   
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JOCV started sending volunteers to the Dominican Republic, it did not send volunteers to 
cooperate with Japanese immigrants in the Dominican Republic unlike Paraguay. Also, at 
that time, Japanese emigrants’ legal proceedings against the Japanese government on the 
basis of recruiting Japanese people under misleading information had not yet started.35 
However, according to Seinen kaigai kyōryokutai 20 seiki no kiseki [JOCV’s Activities in 
the Twentieth Century], which was published in 2001, JOCV praised Japanese 
immigrants in the Dominican Republic for contributing to the development of the country 
and for building relations between the Dominican Republic and Japan.36 One possible 
reason why this JICA published-book touched on the contribution of Japanese 
immigrants in the Dominican Republic relates to the legal proceedings Japanese 
immigrants started against the Japanese government in July 2000. Since JICA was 
created in 1974 through the integration of OTCA with the Japan Emigration Service, 
JICA today also shares responsibility in that issue.  
Japanese immigration to Latin America started as a national project; therefore, 
JOCV also saw contributing to nikkei society in South America as a necessary part of the 
Japanese government development agency programs (expect for the case of the 
                                                
35 Takegama, Seiun no habataki [Blue Cloud Flaps Its Wings], 86-92, 94-95, and 105-108. This is a 
succinct summary of the background of the legal proceedings on the basis of the book referenced. In the 
1950s, the Japanese government recruited emigrants to the Dominican Republic as part of national policy. 
However, the conditions the Japanese government established for emigration to the Dominican such as 
providing 300 tareas (approximately 27 hectares) of free, rich farmland to the emigrants never materialized 
because no formal immigration treaty between Japan and the Dominican Republic was concluded. Upon 
arriving in Dominican Republic, the recruited Japanese immigrants were faced with great difficulties to live 
and some returned to Japan. In order to change this painful situation, Japanese immigrants asked the 
Japanese government to negotiate with the government of Dominican Republic, but the Japanese 
government did not take action on behalf of the Japanese immigrants until they started legal proceedings 
against Japanese government in July 2000.     
36 Ibid.,192.      
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Dominican Republic). Also, Japan-Latin American connections were reinforced by the 
presence of Japanese immigrants and Latin nikkei immigrants in Japan. Not extending 
JOCV projects to Japanese nikkei society in Latin America would have meant ignoring 
the presence of Japanese immigrants, which was one of central axes of Japan-Latin 
America relations.      
The Diversification of JOCV’s Host Countries 
 
JOCV steadily added new host countries, first by responding to the 1983 proposal 
of JICA’s President to increase the number of new JOCV volunteers during JOCV’s third 
decade. Following this, JOCV added new host countries such as those in the Caribbean 
region and the areas of conflict in Central America; even semi-developed (new 
industrialized) countries such as Brazil, Chile and Mexico became JOCV host countries. 
By 2012, JOCV had sent volunteers to twenty-two countries in Latin America.37   
JOCV’s diversification of host countries in Latin America possibly contributed to 
promoting pro-Japanism among Latin America peoples.  
JOCV started sending volunteers to the Caribbean region for the first time by 
opening programs in Dominican Republic in 1985 and Jamaica in 1989. In the decade of 
1980s, the Peace Corps in the Caribbean region increased business-focused projects in 
response to the international debt crisis. However, JOCV was not focused on recruiting or 
                                                
37 JICA, “Jigyō jittuseki haken jittuseki” [Result of (JOCV Program) and Statistics of Dispatch], 
http://www.jica.go.jp/volunteer/outline/publication/results/jocv/index.html#a01[accessed August 16, 2012].  
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training in terms of business-related-skills among volunteers going to the Caribbean 
region.38   
In addition to opening two programs in the Caribbean region, JOCV started 
sending volunteers to four new host countries in Central and South America, which were 
suffering long-term political unrest. JOCV dispatched volunteers to Colombia in 1985, 
Guatemala in 1989, Nicaragua in 1991 and El Salvador in 1993. In addition to 
dispatching the volunteers to two post-civil war-countries—Nicaragua and El Salvador, 
the JOCV sent volunteers to Guatemala in 1989, seven years before the Guatemalan 
Peace Accords of 1996 were signed. It was the first time for the JOCV in Latin America 
to send volunteers to a country in the middle of civil war. In the case of Colombia, the 
JOCV also needed to concentrate on safety management for the volunteers a few years 
after the program was started. Common to these four countries is that when JOCV 
dispatched the volunteers during, and/or after civil war, JOCV sent the volunteers to the 
capital; the JOCV avoided sending volunteers to rural areas until the political situation in 
the host countries became stable.39    
The JOCV program also established relationships with indigenous populations in 
Latin America. Guatemala and Panama together with JOCV have been pioneers in 
providing indigenous development programs in Latin America. The JOCV program in 
Guatemala has prioritized poverty reduction because indigenous peoples in rural 
                                                
38 JOCV, Seinen kaigai kyōryokutai 20 seiki no kiseki, 214-215. In the Dominican Republic, JOCV 
dispatched volunteers to a variety of areas. In Jamaica the government requested volunteers who had high 
technical skill in order to transfer skills from JOCV volunteers to Jamaican technicians. 
39 JOCV in Guatemala was an exception because they did not concentrate in sending volunteers to the 
capital, but to Baja Verapaz Department during the civil war. After the civil war, the JOCV sent the 
volunteers to a greater variety of rural areas.  
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Guatemala have suffered with high poverty rates. Because of that, even during the civil 
war, JOCV volunteers who came from different specialties were dispatched to Baja 
Verapaz District where most residents are indigenous.40 Even though JOCV did not label 
this an indigenous development project, the JOCV quite possibly accumulated experience 
cooperating with indigenous peoples before implementing Project Ngobe-Bugle in 
Panama. Four years after JOCV opened programs in Panama, JOCV volunteers joined in 
Project Ngobe-Bugle, which cooperated with poor indigenous communities to improve 
their lives. This project is an indigenous sustainable development project organized 
through dispatching JOCV volunteers to the same indigenous communities for more than 
ten years. This JOCV project in indigenous communities was investigated by JICA and 
by the JOCV.41 According to the report, the evaluators found the project’s significance to 
be as follows: first, communities in Ngobe-Bugle had not yet received any full-scale 
development project from foreign countries, except for Japan (as of 1999), although the 
area was in the poorest region of Panama and second, the project was meaningful to 
establish a new model of development projects for JICA and JOCV in which they 
cooperated with indigenous peoples in remote areas.42 JICA’s report showed that Project 
Ngobe-Bugle contributed to JICA/JOCV’s experiences in indigenous development and 
documented how the recipient communities recognized that the project was one of 
                                                
40 JOCV, Seinen kaigai kyōryokutai 20 seiki no kiseki, 206.  
41 JICA/JOCV, “Panama seinen kaigai kyōryokutai jyunkai shidō chōsadan chōsa hōkokusho” [Report for 
JOCV Volunteers’ Activities in Panama submitted by Investigation Team], The report aimed to evaluate 
the present situation of the dispatched JOCV volunteers in order to make improvements. Thereby, the 
report neither contained in-depth analysis nor suggestions about the way JOCV volunteers should co-
operate with indigenous peoples.  
42 JICA/JOCV, “Panama seinen kaigai kyōryokutai jyunkai shidō chōsadan chōsa hōkokusho,”11.     
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cooperation with Japan and the Japanese people.43 The report argued that dispatching 
JOCV volunteers to indigenous communities also contributed to promote the 
diversification of pro-Japanese sentiment.   
In addition to cooperating with indigenous communities in Latin America, JOCV 
also started sending volunteers to semi-developed (newly industrialized) Latin American 
countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Mexico since the middle of the 1990s. Even though 
the gross national product (GNP) per capita in these host countries is relatively high 
among Latin American countries, social and economic inequality between classes has 
been widening. Also, after implementing structural adjustment programs, budget cuts in 
social welfare made this gap wider. Under these circumstances, the role of foreign 
assistance, including NGOs, became important to sustain poor peoples’ lives. Sending 
JOCV volunteers to local NGOs also increased during this period.  
Moreover, since the end of 1990s JICA’s initiative on South-South Cooperation 
became active in Latin America, and Japan and the participant semi-developed countries 
have cooperated with developing countries in the region.44 JICA believed that the South-
South Cooperation is a productive method for both developing countries and semi-
                                                
43 JICA, “Chūnanbei chiiki senjū minzoku he no kyōryoku no arikata” [The Way to Cooperate with 
Indigenous Peoples in Central America],106.    
44 According to JICA’s definition, “South-South Cooperation is support provided to development efforts 
by developing countries whose development has advanced in certain fields,” and the South-South 
Cooperation group provides opportunity for a developing country to enhance its capacity to transform itself 
into a donor of assistance in the region. JICA’s role is to participate in the planning and monitoring stages 
of South-South Cooperation as well as to provide them with financial support and Japanese expertise if 
needed. Japan built its own strategy and history of development cooperation on the basis of its own 
experience with the South-South Cooperation. After joining in the Colombo Plan in 1954, Japan started 
providing assistance to other countries; at the same time, Japan was still rebuilding its own economy. The 
concept of South-South Cooperation was built upon Japan’s own history of development cooperation and 
JICA believes it helps to promote self-help efforts in developing countries. See more detail JICA, Support 
for South-South Cooperation, 1-2.   
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developed countries to reach development goals because they have a “better chance to 
find solutions to its development challenges through the experiences of other southern 
countries with similar economic, social and cultural conditions.”45 JOCV also responded 
to the JICA’s South-South Cooperation initiative by sending volunteers to the related 
areas or institutions to serve as intermediaries between local officials and people, and or 
between JICA experts and local people.  
Entering the Millennium, JOCV steadily added new host countries in Latin 
America—Belize, Venezuela and small islands in the Caribbean, such as St. Vincent and 
St. Lucia. The fact that Venezuela became a new JOCV host county in 2000 shows that 
JOCV developed its program in different countries from the Peace Corps.46 In addition 
to Venezuela, JOCV increased the number of volunteers to Bolivia, while the Peace 
Corps terminated its program there in 2011.      
JOCV has steadily added host countries in Latin America. Compared to the Peace 
Corps, JOCV has sent fewer volunteers; however, JOCV sent volunteers to Latin 
American countries where there is no Peace Corps presence, such as Bolivia and 
Venezuela.47 The fact that JOCV has sent volunteers to semi-developed countries such as 
Chile, suggests that one of objectives of the JOCV program might be to promote a 
positive image of Japan in Latin America. Even though JOCV steadily added new host 
countries in Latin America, JOCV’s increase in the number of host countries and 
                                                
45 JICA, JICA’s Support for South-South Cooperation, 1. This is a pamphlet, which I obtained from JICA 
Library of Ichigaya, Tokyo in 2007.     
46 JOCV and the government of Venezuela concluded agreement to dispatch/receive JOCV volunteers. 
But, actual input of JOCV volunteers started four years later since they concluded the agreement.   
47 JOCV has never opened a program in Cuba. However, its parent body, JICA had implemented technical 
cooperation in Cuba.  
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volunteers has brought negative effects, as well. One JOCV former volunteer, Ms. 
Ishibashi, claimed that the agency’s reliance on the number of volunteers possibly created 
various problems such as that JOCV volunteers were busy maintaining good relationships 
with other JOCV fellows rather than with the local people or concentrated their efforts in 
their project simply as JOCV volunteers.48 Also, recent changes in Japan have influenced 
the way in which JOCV operated its programs. JOCV had to reform the way it operated 
due to recent two big events—Japanese government’s budget cuts and the Great East 
Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011.  
JOCV Program and Institutional Reform  
 
Although JOCV in Latin America expanded through adding new host countries, 
the Japanese government’s budget process in 2009-2010 led by the Democratic Party of 
Japan and the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011 prompted the JOCV to 
reform its operations. Even before the Japanese government’s budget cuts’ process in the 
fall of 2009, the amount of Japanese ODA decreased from the 1990s because Japan’s 
economy went downward. The contribution of the JOCV program has been recognized 
within Japanese ODA, not only in the JICA official view but also in debates in the Diet. 
Because of that, JOCV’s programs became seen as doing a Japanese style of outreach by 
empathetically cooperating with host countries to incorporate the cultures and customs of 
the host countries into its ‘face-to face-assistance,’ and the cost of the programs was 
considered relatively small compared to that of technical cooperation. Moreover, former 
                                                
48 Ishibashi, Seinen kaigai kyōryokutai no kyozō. 	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president of JICA, Sadako Ogata, said that the JOCV programs are the nucleus of 
development cooperation in 20 out of the 79 countries receiving JICA assistance.49  
The third budget cutting session by the Democratic Party of Japan in November 
17th 2010 introduced the first budget cuts specifically targeted at JOCV programs in 
history. The budget cuts demanded that JOCV reconsider and define its objectives more 
clearly connecting them to Japan’s economic welfare. Principal criticisms justifying the 
budget cutting process were: (1) mismatch between local needs and dispatch of JOCV 
volunteers’ jobs and skills, (2) the support system in the host country, (3) the way JOCV 
volunteers were trained, and (4) the readjustment allowance for JOCV volunteers was too 
high (e.g., Peace Corps $225-275 monthly, while JOCV volunteers received about U.S. 
$1,000 or 99,700 yen per month as readjustment allowance).50 In order to respond to 
these criticisms, JOCV needed to show how the programs contributed to making a profit 
for Japanese society as well as for the host countries. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 
uploaded a document about JOCV’s role in the future and it said that the JOCV program 
contributed to Japan’s national policy of raising “global human resources.”51 While 
JOCV was in the process of clarifying its objectives and how the agency could contribute 
                                                
49 Wakita, “Seinen kaigai kyōryōkutai jigyō no saikōchiku ni mukete,” 90.    
50 JICA, “Jigyō shiwake ni tsuite” [Japanese Government’s Budget Screening], JICA, 
http://www.jica.go.jp/information/other/2010/20101117_01.html [accessed April 19, 2012].    
51 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (International Cooperation Bureau), “Wagakuni kaigai vorantia 
jigyō no arikata (an)” [Our Country’s Role of Overseas Volunteers Cooperation (Plan)], Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/annai/pdfs/volunteer_arikata.pdf 
[accessed March 27, 2012].     
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to Japanese society, JOCV cut the reserve fund for JOCV volunteers from 2.5 million yen 
to 1.4 million yen (per year per volunteer) as a result of the budget cuts.52    
In addition, the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11th 2011, affected 
JOCV’s operations and the disaster made the Japanese people reconsider their 
participation in international cooperation and its significance. According to the 
Metropolitan Police Department (esp. Tokyo), the number of deaths in the Great East 
Japan Earthquake was 15,881 people and another 2,676 people were still missing (as of 
March 06, 2013).53 The Tohoku and Kanto areas still need to receive substantial help to 
recover from the disaster. This posed the question whether Japan should continue to 
provide massive aid for foreign countries under this situation or not. JOCV argued that 
they re-recognized the importance of international cooperation after the Tohoku 
Earthquakes because many personal networks of former and current JOCV volunteers all 
over the world reconnected in order to help Japan’s current situation.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
52 Sankei shinbun (Sankei Newspaper), “Kokusaikōken, jinzai tarinai, hisaichi ni sattō: seinen kaigai 
kyōryōkutai no ōbo gekigen” [International Cooperation, Shortage of Human Resource, Rush to the 
Affected Areas of the Earthquake: The number of JOCV Applicants Dramatically Reduced], October 10, 
2011, under Yahoo! Japan news, http://ceron.jp/url/headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20111010-00000068-san-
soci [accessed in October 10, 2011].     
53 “Higashi nihon daishinsai: hinan jyōhō & shien jyōhō saito” [The Great East Japan Earthquake: Website 
for Information of Evacuation and Support], http://hinansyameibo.seesaa.net/article/343189286.html 
[accessed March 7, 2013].    
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Table 3.1: The Number of JOCV Volunteers in Latin America from 1968 to 2010 
  1968-­‐1977	   1978-­‐1987	   1988-­‐	  1997	   	   1998-­‐2007	   2008-­‐2010	  
Argentina  -   -   16  5  -  
Belize  -   -   -   87   25  
Bolivia 3	    111   308   336   84  
Brazil   -   -   47   2   -  
Chile  -   -   7   147   32  
Colombia  -   31   103   73   11  
Costa Rica  16   118   159   184   30  
Dom. 
Republic  -   47   203   235   45  
Ecuador  -   -   129   245   78  
El Salvador  71   3   77   228   67  
Guatemala  -   -   188   319   62  
Honduras  13   290   388   323   76  
Jamaica  -   -   103   155   28  
Mexico  -   -   48   160   22  
Nicaragua  -   -   118   313   63  
Panama  4   -   135   187   42  
Paraguay  -   233   380   343   97  
Peru  -   129   81   8   18  
St. Lucia  -   -   9   84   27  
St. Vincent  -   -   -   29   17  
Uruguay  -   -   -   3   -  
Venezuela  -   -   -   64   20  
Total 107    962 2499 3530   844   
Source: JICA Annual Report from FY 1968 to FY 2012. Note: Measurement of JICA’s annual report varied over 
times: (1) JICA Annual Report from FY 1968 to FY1984 showed the number of newly arrived volunteers; (2) from 
JICA Annual FY 1985 to FY 1988 “actual number” (jittusaisu in Japanese) included = JOCV volunteer+ Senior 
volunteers+ JOCV official coordinator +UN volunteers; (3) JICA’s Annual Reports FY 1989 to FY 2012 showed the 
number of volunteers mainly in two different categories: new volunteers (shinki) and continuing volunteers (keizoku). 
Because JICA’s annual reports utilized different measurements by period, the number of JOCV volunteers in the table 
was not consistent as to whom was included and who was not. Table created by the author.  
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WITHDRAWAL OF JOCV PROGRAM FROM LATIN AMERICA 
 
The next section focuses on examining the termination of JOCV programs in 
Latin America. By analyzing JOCV’s way of operating or withdrawing its programs from 
Latin America, I will explore host countries’ perceptions of JOCV programs in the 
country. Also, this section aims to compare Peace Corps’ polices toward Latin America 
with   JOCV’s policies through exploring differences in the patterns of termination of 
their programs.  
In this section, termination means ‘zero presence,’ which is when the number of 
JOCV volunteers in the host country showed zero for an entire year. Since JOCV’s 
system of dispatching volunteers is on a ‘request basis’ from the host country, recruiting 
JOCV volunteers whose skills or areas of expertise are needed to meet what the host 
country requested is at times difficult. When JOCV did not find qualified volunteers, 
volunteers were not dispatched to the country. This probably caused the interruption of 
sending JOCV volunteer without formal notice, in particular in the case of small JOCV 
programs. In contrast to the Peace Corps, the JOCV annual report did not use expression, 
“suspension of program.”   
The JOCV program in Latin America experienced much fewer terminations of its 
operations in Latin America than the Peace Corps did. Six Latin American countries 
stopped receiving JOCV volunteers from 1968 to 2010.54 Unlike the Peace Corps, 
                                                
54 One country terminated receiving volunteers during the 1970s: El Salvador in 1979. Two countries 
terminated receiving JOCV volunteers during the 1990s: Peru in 1991 and Colombia in 1992 (temporary 
termination). In 1999, the number of JOCV volunteers in Brazil indicated zero in JICA’s annual report and 
Argentine in 1999 showed zero, and again in 2005. Uruguay did not show any volunteers in 2003 and 2005.  
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JOCV/Latin America has not experienced terminations or expulsions by host countries. 
An analysis of JOCV’s official documents—mainly JICA annual reports, and scholarly 
writings reveals that there are two factors affecting JOCV’s withdrawal: (1) political 
unrest in the host country and (2) JOCV stopped sending volunteers without official 
notice to semi-developed countries.   
The termination of JOCV program due to political unrest in the host country was 
the most common and clearest factor in contributing to terminations of JOCV programs 
in Latin America. JOCV withdrew its volunteers from three countries—El Salvador, Peru 
and Colombia. Although the length of the hiatus varied, all three countries are now back 
as JOCV host countries.   
The first example of termination caused by political unrest was El Salvador, and 
the program was closed down on March 31, 1979.  El Salvador was the first country to 
become a foreign market after World War II for Japanese private companies. More than 
twenty years later, the first Japanese-El Salvadorian joint venture started its operation. In 
1978, the total number of Japanese residents in El Salvador reached 365 and out of those 
365 Japanese residents, 312 were Japanese businessmen from banks, and manufacturing 
and trading companies.55 However, since the late 1970s, the political situation in El 
Salvador became unstable and the number of violent incidents increased. In May 1978, 
the Japanese President of INSINCA S.A. Fujio Matsumoto was kidnapped and 
assassinated by the guerilla group, Fuerzas Armadas de la Resistencia Nacional 
(hereafter FARN). After this incident, kidnapping targeting foreign businessmen occurred 
                                                
55 Tanaka, “IUSAsha no kiseki” [History of the IUSA], 314.     
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frequently in El Salvador. According to an article by Takakazu Suzuki who was 
kidnapped by FARN and retuned home after 114 days, the kidnapping of foreign 
businessmen started with the kidnaping of INSICA’s President Matsumoto. Suzuki said 
that between May 1978 and December 1978, the branch chief of Ericsson, and the branch 
chief and vice branch chief of British BOLSA, and again Takakazu Suzuki, the INSINCA 
S.A Director were kidnapped by FARN.56 This series of kidnappings of Japanese 
businessmen came as a terrible shock to Japanese businessmen in El Salvador; 
consequently, after Suzuki was kidnapped by FARN, Japanese businessmen left El 
Salvador. Tanaka mentioned that Japanese companies reduced their business activities in 
El Salvador after these incidents. Moreover, even after the peace agreement in El 
Salvador in 1992, Japan was relatively slow to reenter the El Salvadorian market.57  
The termination of the JOCV program also responded to the increased violence in 
El Salvador. According to FY 1979 Annual Report, JOCV said that guerrilla activities 
increased social unrest, and it made the continuation of the program in El Salvador 
extremely difficult. In the report, the JOCV decided on “temporary termination” not only 
to secure volunteers’ life, but also because carrying out effective cooperation with the 
people in the host country was impossible under this situation.”58 JOCV closed its 
program in El Salvador in 1979. JOCV agreed to re-open its program in El Salvador after 
approximately eleven years of hiatus.     
                                                
56 Suzuki, “INSINCA jiken no haikei,” [Backgrounds of kidnapping incidents of the INSINCA 
businessmen], 301.   
57 Tanaka, “IUSA sha no kiseki,” 315.   
58 JICA, JICA Annual Report 1979, 291. 	 	 	  
 123 
The second case of closure of a JOCV program was due to political unrest in the 
host country of Colombia. Compared to the Peace Corps’ termination experiences due to 
political unrest, JOCV showed a different pattern in the case of Colombia. JOCV started 
sending volunteers to Colombia in 1985, unlike the Peace Corps, which terminated its 
programs due to the presence of guerilla activities and drug trafficking four year earlier 
than the first arrival of JOCV volunteers in Colombia. In the early years of 
JOCV/Colombia, the volunteers were able to work actively. However, according to JICA, 
in 1989, JOCV gathered its volunteers working in the Medellin area and moved them to 
Bogóta due to the increase of violence in Medellin. Then, in 1991, an employer from a 
Japanese company was kidnapped so JOCV ordered all JOCV volunteers to stay in 
Bogóta for two months. After the incident, they were sent back to their working sites; 
however, murder and kidnapping targeting Japanese still occurred. In response, in 1991, 
JOCV changed one-third of its volunteers’ host communities/institutions in Colombia.59 
Finally, responding to the unstable conditions in Colombia, JOCV completely stopped 
sending volunteers to the country in March 1992. In 1993, the number of JOCV 
volunteers staying in Colombia dropped to zero. However, the JOCV program came back 
after a one-year hiatus, unlike the Peace Corps, which took much longer to return to 
Colombia (finally the Peace Corps returned to Colombia in September, 2011). 
Colombia’s situation remained unstable after JOCV returned to Colombia.  
In order to run JOCV programs under these unstable circumstances, 
JOCV/Colombia operated under a special security policy. There were five restrictions 
                                                
59 JOCV, Seinen kaigai kyōryokutai 20 seiki no kiseki,185.   
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placed on JOCV volunteers’ activities in Colombia. First of all, JOCV/Colombia 
restricted the areas to which volunteers were sent; JOCV sent the volunteers to Bogóta or 
other big cities where they were relatively safe, compared to rural areas. Secondly, 
JOCV/Colombia prohibited publicity activities in Colombia because the JOCV was afraid 
that JOCV volunteers would become targets of violence. Thirdly, JOCV volunteers were 
prohibited to take intercity buses. Instead, they were required to take an airplane. 
Fourthly, the JOCV did not send volunteers to impoverished regions or towns because the 
JOCV thought that these areas had high crime rates. Fifthly, JOCV prohibited volunteers 
from traveling around rural areas to provide their services because the JOCV was 
concerned with the risk of guerrilla attacks.60 JOCV/Colombia thus set up extra rules for 
the volunteers in order to protect their lives. Because of those rules, JOCV/Colombia’s 
costs per volunteer increased. In addition, since JOCV’s sphere of activity in Colombia 
was limited by prohibiting the volunteers from traveling around rural areas and working 
in impoverished regions, it is an open question as to how much JOCV was able to meet 
local people’s needs during the time of political unrest in Colombia. I could not find any 
possible reasons why the JOCV continued to send volunteers to Colombia even though 
the agency needed to devote extra money to support and maintain volunteer safety under 
such unsafe conditions. One of my hypotheses is that the main reason for the continuation 
of programs was the Japanese companies’ investment in Colombia during that time 
                                                
60 Ibid.,185-186.    
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period. During the 1980s, many Japanese companies invested in, or joined, infrastructure-
related businesses and natural resource development projects in Colombia.61   
The third case of JOCV termination was Peru in 1991. The Peru case was due to 
the result of violence against Japanese. In July 1991, Sendero Luminoso [Shinning Path] 
killed three JICA experts (one of the experts was a former JOCV volunteer) in Peru. As a 
response to this tragic event, the JOCV program/Peru was terminated and all JOCV 
volunteers left Peru as well as all JICA experts and JICA officials by August 1991.62 
Even before the murder case, a series of terrorist attacks targeting Japanese and Japanese 
immigrants were occurring (e.g. shooting targeted at the branch chief of the Tokyo Bank 
and bombing of a Nissan factory).63 According to Shigeo Osonoi, the terrorist attacks 
against three JICA experts in 1991 made the Japanese government recognize that Japan 
was a definite target of terrorist groups in Peru.64 At that time, the Japanese government 
explicitly supported the first nikkei President Alberto Fujimori, who pressed the 
campaign against Peruvian terrorist groups and implemented neoliberal economic 
reforms. JOCV— a part of JICA program, easily became a target of terrorist attacks so 
                                                
61 According to Cronologia de las relaciones entre Japón y América Latina, strong business and economic 
relationships between Japan and Colombia were recognized in the beginning of 1980s. For example, both 
Japanese private companies as well as the Japanese government invested in the fields of hydropower, oil, 
coral, steel, and in communications network. However, compared with Brazil, Colombia’s business 
relations with Japan were much smaller. In the late of 1980s, Japanese and Colombia relationships were 
overwhelmingly about illegal drugs than legal businesses. The evidence for these relations comes from 
several findings. For instance, large amounts of cocaine, which came from Colombia, were founded in 
Japan, the trial of a Colombian drug cartel member in Japan, death threats to the Japanese president from 
Colombian drug cartels, and the case of a Japanese bank in Colombia that laundered funds related to drug 
trafficking.  
62 JOCV, Seinen kaigai kyōryokutai 20 seiki no kiseki, 298.  
63 Osonoi, “Henkyo na minzoku shugi no kokufuku wo mezashite” [Aiming to Overcome Bigotry and 
Nationalism], 257.   
64 Ibid.   
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that JOCV/Peru was closed immediately after the JICA incident. Responding to the tragic 
incident, the JICA Annual Report FY 1993 pointed to the need to reinforce security 
management in Latin America because of the deterioration of security in the region.65    
In 1996, JOCV began preparations to send JOCV volunteers once again to Peru. 
However, the outbreak of the Japanese embassy hostage crisis by Movimiento 
Revolusionario Tupac Amarú [Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement] at the end of 
1996 and the Peruvian government’s execution of members of MRTA aroused Peruvian 
hostility towards the Japanese government, which was providing massive assistance to 
President Fujimori. JOCV consequently postponed opening the JOCV program at that 
time. As a result of these series of guerilla attacks, JOCV volunteers were not sent 
officially to Peru until 2006.66 However, because of the outbreak of the Japanese 
embassy hostage crisis, JOCV/Peru decided not to return Peru at that time.    
Before closing the section on political unrest, the Bolivian case should be 
introduced. JOCV stopped recruiting volunteers for Bolivian posts as well as stopping 
new volunteer input on two occasions; in 1980, and from 1982 to 1983. However, JOCV 
did not order the volunteers who were already in Bolivia to leave the country; thereby, 
they continued working in Bolivia although the JOCV had stopped the recruitment and 
dispatch of new volunteers due to political unrest. Consequently, the number of JOCV 
                                                
65 JICA, JICA Annual Report 1993, 158.   
66 In terms of the JOCV’s preparation to re-enter Peru, JICA Annual Report in the middle of the 1990s 
indicated two volunteers were going to input in 1996. However, according to Seinen kaigai kyōryokutai 20 
seiki no kiseki, the preparation of re-enter of JOCV/Peru did not go through due to the Japanese embassy 
hostage crisis by the MRTA attack and no volunteers appear to have been dispatched.   
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volunteers in Bolivia did not drop to zero although JOCV stopped sending new JOCV 
volunteers to Bolivia twice. 
The first stopping of JOCV volunteers to Bolivia occurred in 1980 and continued 
for several months. In July 1980, General Garcia Mesa launched a military coup d’état. 
The Japanese government delayed approving the military regime that was established by 
that coup because the regime oppressed opposing groups and established close 
relationships with drug cartels. The military regime became isolated from the 
international community, which led to the deterioration of the Bolivian economy. 
According to JOCV, suspension of new volunteer inputs in 1980 was due to the 
establishment of the rightwing military regime in Bolivia.67 However, JOCV section in 
JICA Annual Report in FY 1980 did not mention this temporary termination.   
The second stopping of volunteer input into Bolivia occurred between 1982 and 
1983. After shifting from a military to a civil government, Bolivia’s economy 
deteriorated further through hyperinflation (26000% per year) and the increase of 
external debt. Under these circumstances, JOCV transferred the volunteers to cities such 
as La Paz and Santa Cruz for their security. At the same time, the JOCV stopped posting 
new positions in Bolivia for one year and four months. Although JOCV/Bolivia stopped 
new inputs of volunteers twice, JOCV volunteers who had already started working there 
continued to work in Bolivia during that time. Unlike the expulsion of Peace Corps 
volunteers that occurred in Bolivia in 1971, JOCV was not seen as a spy agency for the 
Japanese government or a symbol of Japanese imperialism, and no great protest against 
                                                
67 JOCV, Seinen kaigai kyōryokutai 20 seiki no kiseki,177-178.   
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the presence of the JOCV occurred in Bolivia.      
 Other major cases of termination of JOCV programs occurred in semi-developed 
countries in Latin America, such as Argentine, Brazil, and Uruguay; this group’s 
terminations were different from the previous group because these countries had received 
JOCV volunteers without concluding a ‘JOCV dispatch agreement’ (Seinen kaigai 
kyōryōkutai haken torikime in Japanese) (see Table 3.2). There are two different ways of 
starting JOCV programs in the host country. The first way of dispatching JOCV 
volunteers is to conclude a ‘JOCV dispatch agreement’ between the Japanese government 
and the host country (e.g., Colombia, El Salvador and Peru concluded their agreements 
before receiving JOCV volunteers). The second possible way to send JOCV volunteers is 
if the host countries have already concluded a JICA’s technical cooperation agreement 
(e.g., Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay). These three countries received JOCV volunteers 
on a project basis.    
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Table 3.2: JOCV’s Host Countries in Latin America 
Country	  
The	  Year	  of	  Concluding	  
Agreement	   	  
The	  First	  Year	  of	  
Dispatching	  
JOCVs	  
Termination	  
or	  Temporary	  
Termination 
Argentina 2007/No	  official	  agreement	   	   1996	   	   Yes	   	  
Belize 1999	   2000	   No	   	  
Bolivia	   1977	   1977	  /1978	   No	   	  
Brazil No	  official	  agreement	   1996	   Yes	  
Chile	   1996	   1997	   No	  
Colombia	   1985	   1985	   Yes	   	  
Costa	  Rica	   	   1973	   1974	   No	  
Dominican	  R.	   	   1985	   1985	   No	  
Ecuador	   1990	   1991	   No	  
El	  Salvador	   1968	   1968	   Yes	  
Guatemala	   1987	   1988	   No	  
Honduras	   1975	   1975	   No	  
Jamaica	   1987	   1989	   No	  
Mexico	   1993	   1993	   No	  
Nicaragua	   1991	   1991	   No	  
Panama	   1986	   1991	   No	  
Paraguay	   1978	   1977	  /1978	   	   No	  
Peru	   1979	   1979	  /1980	   	   Yes	  
St.	  Lucia	   1994	   1995	   No	  
St.	  Vincent	   2000	   2003	   No	  
Uruguay	   No	  official	  agreement	   	   2002	   Yes	  
Venezuela	   2000	   2002	  /2003	   	   No	  
Source: JICA Annual Report from FY 1968 to FY 2012 and JICA website, “haken torikime teiketsu jyōkyō,” 
http://www.jica.go.jp/volunteer/outline/publication/results/contracts/ [accessed Nov.1, 2012]. The author made the 
table. Note: Regarding the first year of dispatching JOCV volunteers to Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela, data 
from JICA Annual Reports and JICA’s official webpage do not agreeing. Thereby, I included two dates from the 
annual reports and JICA website. In the case of Argentina, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan’s information about 
JOCV dispatch and JOCV official website posted about the dispatch agreement differently. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Japan said that between Argentine government and JICA/JOCV concluded the dispatch agreement; however, 
JICA/JOCV official website had not included Argentina as JOCV host country.   
  
 
One possible reason why JOCV volunteers were no longer dispatched is related to 
the completion of JICA projects in which JOCV volunteers had participated. In this case, 
the countries received JOCV volunteers as a part of a technological cooperation 
agreement sponsored by JICA instead of officially becoming JOCV host countries. 	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Both Brazil and Uruguay received JOCV volunteers for only three years and 
Argentina received the volunteers a little bit longer than the first two countries. 
According to the JICA’s Annual Report, Brazil received volunteers from 1996 to 1998. 
Uruguay received volunteers in 2002, 2004 and 2005. Of these three countries, Brazil 
received the largest number of volunteers. Unlike the Peace Corps, which dispatched a 
large number of volunteers to Brazil, the dispatch of JOCV volunteers lasted only three 
years. However, in addition to JOCV volunteers, Brazil requested nikkei volunteers, 
which is one of JICA’s volunteer programs that specializes in the development of nikkei 
communities in Latin America. Argentina received JOCV volunteers for five years in 
total (from 1996 to 1998, and in 2003 and 2004). However, the JICA official website did 
not include Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay on the list of JOCV host countries that 
concluded dispatch agreements.68 In terms of Chile, the termination of the Peace Corps 
program in Chile is explained as due to Chile’s achievement of economic development. 
However, in the case of JOCV, Chile has been a JOCV host country without interruption. 
Since Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay did not conclude official agreements to receive 
JOCV volunteers according to JICA/JOCV, the JICA annual report did not mention the 
termination of JOCV’s programs in these countries. 
That is, the situation of these countries is ambiguous and it is difficult to say it 
terminations occurred or even whether these countries were JOCV host countries or not. 
One thing is clear, however: JOCV volunteers had been working there in order to support 
                                                
68 JICA, “haken torikime teiketsu jyōkyô” [List of countries which concluded agreement of being JOCV 
host countries], JICA http://www.jica.go.jp/volunteer/outline/publication/results/contracts [accessed August 
20, 2012].  
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JICA’s technical cooperation programs. Consequently, these cases might not be counted 
as cases of JOCV termination.   
CONCLUSION 
 
The literature on the JOCV is not extensive because studying JOCV programs has 
not been an attractive topic in Japanese academia, in contrast to the literature on the 
Peace Corps in U.S. academia. Also, Japanese government did not inspect the JOCV 
budget and its management in public until 2009. Also, the JOCV office had not been the 
target of budget screening in public until 2009 because, for a long time, ODA matters and 
budgets in Japan were considered as “untouchable.” 
In terms of JOCV and Latin America, stable relations between Japan and Latin 
America have made JOCV’s presence easier in Latin America, compared to that of the 
Peace Corps. The JOCV’s allocation of volunteers was, however, more or less related to 
Japanese companies’ economic interests in host countries (e.g., El Salvador, Costa Rica 
and Colombia). The Peruvian case is more complex. Because of having a nikkei President 
in Peru, Japan became a target of terrorist attacks in the 1990s. Since both the JOCV and 
the Peace Corps are government organizations, Japan/U.S. relations with host countries 
affect local views on their presence. In addition, both the Peace Corps and JOCV 
volunteers are rarely treated as ‘individuals’ in the host countries; instead they are 
associated with the image of their own country by their agencies as well as their host 
county. The relations between Japan and Latin American countries influenced the way in 
which the JOCV program operates in terms of the countries chosen.  
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Chapter 4: Indigenous Peoples and Development in Ecuador 
 
 
In terms of development in Latin America, the issue of indigenous development is 
significant, particularly in countries that have a large number of indigenous populations 
such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru. Also, indigenous peoples in both 
Bolivia and Ecuador have been highly organized and politically active since the last three 
decades. Indigenous peoples, particularly those who were colonial subjects, are 
accustomed to be treated as passive subjects in terms of development projects; however, 
they have become apparently ‘active’ in terms of the path chosen for their own 
“development.”    
While indigenous groups have gradually gained political power in Latin America, 
Ecuador is recognized as having one of the most organized indigenous movements in 
Latin America because indigenous peoples still confront issues of economic and social 
exclusion. The high correlation between poverty and ethnicity among indigenous versus 
non-indigenous populations was pointed out by two World Bank economists and a 
correlation of poverty with “a striking lack of access to essential social services,” was 
reported in the study.1 An indigenous leader in the highland of Ecuador complained 
about the inequalities of access to infrastructures. The leader complained that their 
villages were the last to receive electricity, water, sewers and telephones.2  
                                                
1 Davis, “Indigenous Peoples, Poverty and Participatory Development,” 228.  Davis was the former 
World Bank Sector Manager for the Social Development Unit, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable 
Development, for Latin America and the Caribbean regions.   
2 Larry Rohter, New York Times, “Bitter Indians Let Ecuador Know Fight Isn’t Over,” January 27, 2000, 
under “World,” http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/27/world/bitter-indians-let-ecuador-know-fight-isn-t-
over.html [accessed in February 14, 2013].    
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According to the latest census by the National Institute of Statistic and Census in 
Ecuador (INEC) in 2010, the indigenous population consists of only 7 percent of the 
entire population.3 However, the size of indigenous population varies widely as Kenneth 
J. Mijeski and Scott H. Beck noted. Their study showed that the reported number of 
indigenous people was politicized; they said that politicians who identified with left or 
populist parties provided higher estimates, around 35 %, while politicians associated with 
conservative parties provided lower estimates, like 10%.4 Also, the largest indigenous 
organization, La Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador 
(Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador-hereafter, CONAIE) claimed in 
2006 that the indigenous population of Ecuador consisted of approximately 33.3% of the 
entire population.5  
Although there is a wide gap between the size of indigenous and non-indigenous 
population, the number of indigenous peoples in Ecuador is relatively large and they are 
politically active in the country. Still, today they continue to experience social and 
economic exclusion. Under these circumstances, international development agencies, 
both governmental and non-governmental, have been involved in development projects 
for indigenous peoples in Latin America. The Peace Corps and JOCV, which are also 
                                                
3According to the census taken in 2001, the size of the indigenous population was 6.8 %. Some scholars 
such as Carlos de La Torre as well as the INEC report published in 2006, said that some indigenous peoples 
are reluctant to reveal themselves to non-indigenous populations such as mestizo census takers or 
government officials. This is one reason why the size of indigenous population according to INEC’s census 
data may be underestimated. For more details see Mijeski and Beck, Pachakutik and the Rise and Decline 
of the Ecuadorian Indigenous Movement, 45.  
4 Mijeski and Beck, Pachakutik and the Rise and Decline of the Ecuadorian Indigenous Movement, 42.  
5 Unicef, “Los pueblos indígenas en América Latina,” http://www.unicef.org/lac/pueblos_indigenas.pdf 
[accessed February 17, 2013].    
 134 
governmental organizations, have sent some of their volunteers to indigenous 
communities or to work in indigenous related projects. For the Peace Corps and JOCV, 
Ecuador is a country to which they have sent volunteers without interruption even during 
the Cold War period and other events. Therefore, Ecuador is a good case study to 
consider the challenges posed by indigenous development initiatives through these 
agencies’ volunteers’ experiences.   
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Figure 4.1: Map of Ecuador (Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The    
          University of Texas at Austin).  
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INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN ECUADOR AFTER INDEPENDENCE  
 
Indigenous peoples in Ecuador went through a complex process of ethnogenesis 
with European Christianization, civilization, and colonization due to the conquest of the 
Americas. Not only during the colonial period, but also even after the independence of 
Ecuador in 1830, indigenous peoples have been stigmatized as “uncivilized” and they 
were considered as obstacles to national development. Although South American 
liberators and intellectuals utilized Indian ethnic icons to appeal to the legitimacy of 
independence from Spain, “Indians” were objectified as symbols to show the patriotism 
of liberators who backed independence movements rather than being considered as 
“Indians,” and as one of the ethnic groups in the newly established republics.6     
  After achieving independence, the elites of new countries in South America 
started to articulate what they saw as the “Indian problem.” Ecuador was no exception. 
Similarly to other South American countries, the government of Ecuador considered that 
the existence of indigenous elements in their new country (e.g., language, worldviews 
customary laws, dress, and foods) were impediments to achieve economic and social 
development. While the government of Ecuador adopted a mestizaje policy, the 
government did not provide adequate development programs to the country’s indigenous 
population.7 Moreover, not only were indigenous peoples forced to assimilate to mestizo 
culture, but they were also excluded from national politics because the majority of 
                                                
6 Earle, The Return of the Native.   
7 Mestizaje is an ideology that aims to integrate indigenous peoples into mainstream mestizo culture in 
order to achieve economic and social development because in some Latin American countries, including in 
Ecuador, politicians believed that indigenous elements in countries were signs of backwardness and 
indigenous peoples and their culture were obstacles to achieve national development.     
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indigenous people did not have Spanish writing and reading skills. Illiterate indigenous 
peoples did not have voting rights until the abolishment of the literacy requirement in 
1979. This means that indigenous people could not participate in the political future of 
the new republics.  
THE BIRTH OF INDIGENOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND LEVANTAMIENTO INDÍGENA 
 
In addition to the abolition of the literary requirement, the 1964 land reform was a 
considerable motivation for the indigenous peoples in the Ecuadorian highlands to get 
involved in national politics and the internationalization of indigenous development. In 
the case of the Chimborazo province, many indigenous farmers thought the 1964 land 
reform was an “economic defeat” because the government only transferred 3% of 
Chimborazo land to the peasants. Seven years after the land reform was enacted, 
indigenous peoples had lost access to hacienda pastures and other resources such as 
firewood and water to which they had been entitled beforehand.8 On the other hand, due 
to this “economic defeat,” and in terms of indigenous political and organizational 
perspectives, the 1964 land reform meant “the collapse of the semifeudal hacienda 
order,” and it invited the rapid growth of indigenous organizations in Chimborazo 
supported mainly by a progressive Catholic Church; that is, the 1964 land reform was, 
“an impressive victory in political and organizational terms” for the indigenous peasants 
despite it being “an economic defeat.”9   
                                                
8 Korovkin, “Indigenous Peasant Struggles and the Capitalist Modernization of Agriculture,” 28.   
9 Ibid., 29 and 32.     
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The Catholic Church actively supported the development of provincial and 
regional indigenous organizations and placed value on the collective issues they fought 
for, such as the struggle for land rights. For instance, progressive Catholic clergy 
supported indigenous organizations such as Ecuador Runacuna Riccharimui (Awakening 
of the Ecuadorian Indigenous People-ECUARUNARI) and the Movimiento Indígena de 
Chimborazo (Indigenous Movement of Chimborazo-MICH). Some active members of 
CONAIE, which is a national umbrella of indigenous organizations in Ecuador, came 
from those organizations.10          
 Since the middle of twentieth century both the Catholic Church and the Protestant 
Church became active in community development among indigenous communities. 
However, the Protestant Church has different viewpoints from the Catholic Church 
regarding indigenous collective actions. For instance, the Catholic Church has been very 
positive about organizing indigenous peasantry and has supported indigenous collective 
actions by providing legal advice to indigenous peasants.11 On the other hand, the 
Protestant Church encouraged indigenous communities to pursue “individual or family 
economic achievement.” The Protestant Church insisted that, “thrift and hard work were 
the only legitimate way to prosperity.” The Protestants minimized the importance of 
indigenous collective action such as the struggle for land or religious festivals.12 In 
addition, contrary to Catholic Church, the Protestant Church introduced western style 
gender roles and practices to the indigenous communities emphasizing women’s 
                                                
10 Ibid., 30.  
11 Ibid.    
12 Ibid., 30-31.      
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reproductive rights.13 That is, both the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church have 
been actively involved with indigenous development in the highlands of Ecuador but 
while the Catholic Church has supported indigenous communities in their efforts to 
organize politically, the Protestant Church has encouraged indigenous people to seek 
individual and household economic prosperity. Consequently, their focuses and goals are 
different in terms of indigenous development and so is their interaction with indigenous 
groups.           
 CONAIE was founded in 1986 with a membership of approximately five hundred 
indigenous representatives across the country during the time when regional-based 
indigenous organizations developed. CONAIE became the largest Ecuadorian indigenous 
organization, with nation-wide indigenous networks in the highlands, coastal area and 
among Amazonian indigenous groups. CONAIE has become also one of leading actors in 
the indigenous development of Ecuador.       
 In addition to the establishment of CONAIE, alliances between Western 
environmental NGOs and Amazonian indigenous groups are one of the relevant events 
that illustrate the current situation of indigenous development in Ecuador. Since the 
beginning of the 1990s, many environmental NGOs from Western countries, have 
become interested in the issue of oil contamination in the Ecuadorian Amazonian region 
because the preservation of the tropical rainforest was, and is, one of the hottest 
environmental issues among Western countries. The destruction of the environment and 
                                                
13 For the issue of new gender roles the Protestant Church introduced in indigenous communities in 
Ecuador, see DeTemple, “(Re)Production Zones.”      
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the effects of oil exploration on the indigenous people’s health were quite clear in the 
case of Ecuador.14 Western environmental NGOs started to work for environmental 
preservation and for indigenous peoples’ human rights. This alliance between Western 
environmental NGOs and indigenous peoples brought great advantages (e.g., 
communication technology and networks, access to important decision makers, 
substantial funds) to the development of indigenous movements.15 For instance, the 
Rainforest Action Network supported the 1994 protest march from Ecuador’s Amazon to 
Quito. The Rainforest Action Network is a U.S. based environmental NGO that provided 
most of the funds needed for the march.16    
Besides the support from Western NGOs, there were other internal and external 
conditions that resulted in the support of a successive series of Levantamiento Indígena 
[Indigenous Uprising] movements during the 1990s. The indigenous peoples’ 
organization and their communication networks in Ecuador were well developed and 
these internal conditions became potent factors related to why the indigenous movement 
of Ecuador in the 1990s was more successful than those in other Latin American 
countries.17 The major external factors which impacted development were, firstly, the 
generous financial support of international NGOs and their awareness of environmental 
and human rights concerns; secondly, the collapse of communism; thirdly, the 
                                                
14 Egan, “Forging New Alliances in Ecuador’s Amazon,” 135-136.    
15 Ibid., 136 and 137.    
16 Ibid., 136.   
17 Christian Steinert, “Ethnic Communities and Ethno-Political Strategies.” 
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consequent decline of class-based organizing, and fourthly, the democratization and 
neoliberal agendas implemented in Latin America.18       
As a result of the indigenous movement in Ecuador, a statement was inserted in 
the Constitution of 1998 (Art. 1) declaring Ecuador to be a pluri-cultural and multiethnic 
state. The government promised to ensure indigenous collective rights such as bilingual 
education programs and collective property rights. However, as one indigenous mayor 
stated, “the Constitution of 1998 had been an important symbolic victory, but the political 
gains had not followed.”19 This statement describes some of indigenous peoples’ feelings 
toward the results of the indigenous movements in the 1990s. It is true that indigenous 
peoples gained cultural and political recognition in the 1998 Constitution; however, some 
of the promises the government made were not taken into consideration seriously. 
Racism and the lack of respect toward indigenous peoples are still visible in political and 
daily occurrences within the mainstream of Ecuadorian society. According to Raúl 
Madrid, the Ethnopoulist party, the Movimiento Unidad Pulrinacional Pachakutik’s 
(hereafter, Pachakutik) inclusive approach, allied with non-indigenous group, used to 
attract white and mestizo voters for the party. However, Madrid said that Pachakutik 
shifted in 2006 to a more “ethnonationationalist direction” such as putting “forth fewer 
mestizo candidates,” and “the growing dominance of indigenista faction” within the 
party. This shift had negative consequences in the 2006 presidential elections—winning 
                                                
18 Mijeski and Beck, Pachakutik and the Rise and Decline of the Ecuadorian Indigenous Movement, 3.   
19 Christian Steinert, “Ethnic Communities and Ethno-Political Strategies,” 113.  
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much fewer votes than in previous elections.20 One of the reasons for the Pachakutik’s 
shift might have been to respond to indigenous frustration with their “symbolic victory” 
in the Ecuadorian politics.  
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES 
 
During the same period when the indigenous uprisings were occurring in Ecuador, 
the World Bank prepared to launch a program of ‘ethnodevelopment’ targeting 
exclusively indigenous groups and Afro-Ecuadorian populations. The project, called the 
Project for the Development of the indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian people of Ecuador 
(PRODEPINE), was the first mega ethnodevelopment project in the Americas.21 Since 
this was the first major ethnodevelopment project for the World Bank, and since 
CONAIE was a “tough negotiator,” as Nieuwkoop and Uquillas showed, the project 
implementation took longer than most World Bank projects.22 PRODEPINE declared 
that reaching consensus with the various actors (e.g., indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian 
groups, the government of Ecuador, and the World Bank) was one of the hardest issues 
for this participatory ethnodevelopment project. However, the objective of 
ethnodevelopment is to strengthen the participatory process among the different partners 
                                                
20 Madrid, “The Rise of Ethnopopulism in Latin America,” 506-507.   
21 De la Torre,“Ethnic Movements and Citizenship in Ecuador,” 248. 
22 Nieuwkoop and Uquillas, “Defining Ethnodevelopment in Operational Terms,”10 and 15-16. The 
World Bank entered into negotiations for the preparation of PRODEPINE with the Ecuadorian government 
and with the representatives of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorians groups early in 1995 and the project 
finally gained approval in early 1998. Finally, the project became effective in September 1998. See its 
Annex 1 for the timeline of key events.    
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by creating a space to promote transnational and multicultural dialogue with the local 
authorities and the targeted populations.  
The experience of PRODEPINE left challenging issues for indigenous 
development, or ethnodevelopement, as the World Bank labeled the project. Firstly, there 
is the contested issue regarding the methodology used to identify indigenous peoples as 
beneficiaries. PRODEPINE identified parishes where there were indigenous populations 
using mostly census data to select “indigenous” individuals by indigenous language use. 
Then, in order to generate priority areas for the project, geographic data were combined 
with social capital (the number of local indigenous associations as a marker of social 
capital) and with the poverty rate (national surveys were utilized to identify unmet 
needs).23 Besides the method of selecting the sites, PRODEPINE project stipulated that 
“indigenousness” was to be recognized through “self-identification, membership in a 
specific indigenous community or grassroots organization, and recognition as indigenous 
by other members of that sociocultural unit.”24 However, PRODEPINE decided to 
include the mestizo population who lived in the same parishes that PRODEPINE selected 
as indigenous beneficiaries’ sites.25           
Identifying who is “indigenous” or not is the most challenging issue. However, 
before the PRODEPINE project started, indigenous development programs led by foreign 
donors had already begun in the 1980s and became the popular approach since the middle 
of the 1990s among multilateral and bilateral development agencies. The definition of 
                                                
23 Nieuwkoop and Uquillas, “Defining Ethnodevelopment in Operational Terms,” 17. Also see Adolina, 
Laurie, and Radcliffe, Indigenous Development in the Andes, 63 and 70.     
24 Nieuwkoop and Uquillas, “Defining Ethnodevelopment in Operational Terms,” 17.   
25 Ibid.   
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indigenous peoples has been debated for a long time by international organizations, but 
no consensus has been reached. As a result of this ambiguity, there is a large gap in 
Ecuador between the numbers of indigenous peoples provided in official figures and 
those from other sources. 
Further, it is difficult to maintain a good and appropriate balance between 
indigenous cultural norms and a project’s objectives. Kate Bedford discussed the 
criticisms raised about PRODEPINE’s project relative to gender. One of criticisms was 
that the development discourse about gender was constructed on the basis of feminist 
tendencies rather than focusing on “reconstructing gender discourse from an authentic 
indigenous world view.”26 For instance, PRODEPINE staff told Bedford repeatedly that 
gender relations in the Amazonian region were complex and it was difficult to develop 
“the theme of gender” due to polygamy. While the PRODEPINE staff members 
considered polygamy problematic to the implementation of gender work, indigenous 
males also claimed that the representation of gender differences in Ecuador at a gender 
workshop contained “urban, mestiza, feminist bias”; that is, the indigenous males said 
that the model did not take into account the Amazonian reality.27 Bedford’s work 
demonstrated the difficulty of keeping a balance between the Western development 
discourse and practices and the indigenous worldviews. These PRODEPINE experiences 
provided important lessons to multilateral and bilateral agencies involved with 
indigenous development in Ecuador.  
                                                
26 Bedford, Developing Partnerships, 154.      
27 Ibid.    
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  Not only multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank, but also 
bilateral development agencies have been key sponsors of indigenous development in 
Ecuador. The majority of development agencies involved in indigenous development 
come from western governments such as Belgium, Germany, Norway, Spain, and the 
United States. They have been significant sponsors of indigenous development in the 
areas of agriculture (including irrigation), education, as well as in local governance.28  
In terms of education programs for indigenous peoples, Western bilateral agencies 
have contributed to educational development for indigenous peoples in Ecuador. Since 
the early 1980s, the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), which is the 
German equivalent of USAID, has been deeply involved in the establishment of 
intercultural bilingual education in Ecuador.29 GTZ’s contribution to develop 
intercultural education was presented through a large number of GTZ’s published (or co-
published) books, articles, and bilingual textbooks relating to Ecuador’s intercultural 
education during 1980s and 1990s. Besides GTZ, some bilateral agencies have helped 
indigenous people to get into higher education. In 1997, there were only 68 indigenous 
persons in Ecuador who pursued higher education.30 This shortage of indigenous 
professionals led to the exclusion of indigenous participation from developmental 
                                                
28 Adolina, Laurie, and Radcliffe, Indigenous Development in the Andes, 249-250. Also see JICA, 
“Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia kunibetsu jyūten bunya ni taisuru JICA no torikumi hōshin sakutei ni kakawaru 
kiso chōsa (senjyūmin hinkon taisaku hōkokusho)” [Report for JICA’s Policy-making in the Andes: Poverty 
Reduction on Indigenous Populations in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru], 23 and 26-28. According to the 
researchers, the Dutch Embassy, the Swiss Development Cooperation (COSUDE), and the Spanish 
government have supported water and irrigation projects. The Norwegian government as well as a 
Norwegian NGO funded women development and governance of indigenous peoples projects. USAID 
provided funds through U.S. NGOs for the improvement of governance infrastructures as well as 
supporting development of governance in rural communities.  
29 Abram, Lengua, Cultura e Identidad, 85-127 (see Chapter 4).      
30 Macas, Belote, and Belote, “Indigenous Destiny in Indigenous Hands”, 234.   
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discussions and programs. The Belgian government through its embassy financed the 
Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Latin American Faculty of Social 
Science, FLACSO, Ecuador) to educate indigenous students and to earn Master degrees. 
The students are expected to become indigenous leaders in the area of development.31 
Even though development of intercultural education in Ecuador was not due solely to 
bilateral agencies’ efforts, their involvement and contributions are important.  
CONCLUSION  
 
       Extensive and lengthy discussions and negotiations between indigenous peoples, 
the government, multilateral and bilateral agencies, non-governmental and religiously 
affiliated organizations contributed to indigenous development projects in Ecuador. The 
projects are inevitably affected by various cultural, economic, political, and even 
religious values, depending on the types of projects and the transnational development 
agencies involved. The U.S. and Japanese bilateral agencies also have been involved with 
this wave of indigenous development in Ecuador. Since the indigenous issue is a 
significant part of development projects in Latin America, exploring the experiences of 
the Peace Corps and of JOCV as case studies will bring greater insight to the issues 
involved in indigenous development, its limitations and possibilities in the sphere of 
international cooperation. Before focusing on the experiences of the two agencies with 
indigenous development in Ecuador, I will discuss the concepts of development of the 
                                                
31 Adolina, Laurie, and Radcliffe, Indigenous Development in the Andes, 164 and 249.     
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two agencies and follow that with a discussion on the cross-cultural issues related to their 
development projects by analyzing the case of Ecuador.   
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Chapter 5: JOCV and the Peace Corps in Ecuador 
 
JOCV and the Peace Corps are both government agencies that recruit ‘ordinary’ 
citizens and train them to become JOCV or Peace Corps volunteers. Although these 
agencies have some similar procedural systems, the ideologies and the background of the 
societies where these programs were established are different. Moreover, as illustrated in 
Chapters Two and Three, the JOCV and the Peace Corps have had different experiences 
in Latin America because the United States and Japan have had different political 
relationships with their host countries. Even if the agencies claim they were ‘apolitical,’ 
some host countries in Latin America viewed the Peace Corps and JOCV as 
representatives of the U.S. and of Japan. Also, the agencies more or less expected their 
volunteers to act like representatives of America or Japan.     
In this chapter, I focus on JOCV and Peace Corps experiences’ in a multiethnic 
Andean country, Ecuador. After a short introduction to the history of the JOCV and the 
Peace Corps in Ecuador, I discuss the concepts of development of these two agencies and 
follow that with a discussion on cross-cultural issues related to their development projects 
by analyzing the case of Ecuador and by following specific themes. The latter discussion 
aims to illustrate how the Peace Corps and JOCV’s cross-cultural policies reflect the 
distinct ways the U.S. and Japanese societies think and act. To exemplify those 
differences I will use the case of volunteers’ participation in public demonstrations to 
analyze the conceptual gap between the agencies’ and their volunteers’ perceptions of the 
Peace Corps or the JOCV volunteers’ roles. This case study exemplifies well the 
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contradiction between the ideal role of international cooperation, which the volunteers 
were trained to uphold and embody, and the realities experienced after they started 
working at a particular site.     
OVERVIEW OF JOCV IN ECUADOR  
 
JOCV started sending their volunteers to Ecuador in 1991. According to Boletín 
Informativo Sexta Edición [Sixth Edition Newsletter] provided by the JICA Ecuador 
office, from FY 1991 to 2010, the number of JOCV volunteers who served in Ecuador 
reached approximately 500 volunteers, including senior volunteers and short-term 
volunteers (e.g., one month to one year).1 JOCV sent their volunteers mainly to the 
Sierra (Andean mountain region) and to the Oriente (Amazonian rainforest). They did 
not send volunteers to the northern coastal province (Esmeraldas province) and to the 
area located close to northern Colombian border in the province of Carchí due to security 
reasons.2 Even though the Peace Corps and JOCV work in the same country, the areas 
prohibited to JOCV volunteers or to Peace Corps volunteers are different.3  
In terms of political obstacles, unlike the Peace Corps, JOCV has not experienced 
acrimonious conflicts or the expulsion of JOCV volunteers from any Latin American 
country even during the Cold War. In addition, the Japanese presence in Ecuador has 
                                                
1 JICA Ecuador, Boletín Informativo Sexta Edición [Sixth Edition Newsletter],19.      
2 Peace Corps volunteers are dispatched to northern costal province, Esmeraldas. However, the JOCV 
office says that Esmeraldas is not a safe place for volunteers. On the other hand, Peace Corps volunteers are 
prohibited to visit Baños where many JOCV volunteers go for vacation. Because Baños is a famous place 
for foreign tourists to take a hot bath and to drink, some Ecuadorians consider that Baños is a dangerous 
place for foreign tourists.  
3 Interview, Anonymous, July 12, 2012.   
 150 
been much less visible compared to the U.S. presence. This means that Ecuadorians tend 
not to have a critical perspective toward the JOCV presence. This point is beneficial for 
JOCV and helps their volunteers work smoothly in their development projects. 
One of JOCV’s development philosophies emphasizes ‘technology transfer’ since 
the JOCV program was established. When a Japanese applicant applies to the JOCV 
program, he or she first checks the ‘JOCV Volunteer Request Sheet’ (the official name of 
this sheet in Japanese is boshū borantia yōbō chōsa hyō, hereafter ‘JOCV Volunteer 
Request Sheet’) in order to find a suitable position for his or her skills. The JOCV 
Volunteer Request Sheet includes (1) job description, required license and years of 
working experience in the field, and (2) the reason why the host institution requested a 
JOCV volunteer including what knowledge they want the volunteer to have to overcome 
the current difficulty the host institution faces.  
Because of this procedure, JOCV volunteers get the impression that the people at 
their host institution are willing to learn outright from the volunteer a new technique or 
technology. However, in some cases, there are inconsistences between what the JOCV 
Volunteer Request Sheet states and the reality in the host institution. JOCV volunteers 
frequently mention this problem and they write about these issues in the JOCV Working 
Report. For JOCV volunteers the idea of ‘technology transfer’ quite possibly makes them 
feel frustrated when they started working with the host institution.    
 According to the data provided by a JOCV official, there are approximately 37 
JOCV volunteers including senior volunteers, working from June 2010 to January 2012. 
Unlike the Peace Corps, JOCV generally sends their volunteers on the basis of a posted 
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job from the host country; thereby, the volunteers are pre-selected as to where they will 
work (country and institution) when they apply to JOCV. They know where they will be 
assigned (name of institution or school, job details, etc.) when they get their letter of 
acceptance in Japan. The most common areas for placement of JOCV volunteers in 
Ecuador are as nurses, primary school teachers, and volunteers for community 
development.       
Since the Japanese notion of development focus on ‘technology transfer,’ JOCV 
has constantly dispatched JOCV volunteers who have sufficient teaching experience in 
Japan to educational institutions such as primary and middle schools, as well as to 
universities. Their goal is usually to help improve Ecuadorian teachers’ pedagogy to 
improve curricula in art, math and physical education, particularly in primary schools.  
      Also, JICA in Ecuador emphasizes poverty reduction (social and economic 
inequalities in Ecuadorian society) and disaster prevention. Since JOCV/Ecuador is also 
under the operation of JICA Ecuador, JOCV volunteers are aware of the cooperation in 
the area of social and economic inequalities. However, in their working reports, JOCV 
volunteers expressed their dissatisfaction with JICA/JOCV regarding the way they 
cooperated in poverty reduction in Ecuadorian society.       
Some JOCV volunteers complained about the way JOCV volunteers were 
distributed. For instance, JOCV dispatched many volunteers to governmental 
professional training institutions, Servicio Ecuatoriano de Capacitación Profesional 
(hereafter SECAP, Professional Training Service of Ecuador in English). A JOCV male 
showed dissatisfaction with JICA/JOCV’s ongoing dispatch of many volunteers to 
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SECAP because he claimed that SECAP has funds to send the SECAP principal to a 
company recreation trip. In the report, he humbly continued entreating JICA/JOCV to 
consider volunteers’ comments by asking, “Does the JICA office read JOCV working 
reports? Please reflect on [what I wrote in] my working report. The incorrect things 
should be set straight. Please consider appropriate countermeasures about the dispatch of 
volunteers to SECAP in Ecuador.”4 His questions in the working report relate to those of 
other volunteers who worked in SECAP a few years before him, and who also made 
similar complains and suggestions.5 For instance, a male volunteer who worked as 
automobile maintenance engineer wrote, “JICA’s aid [he meant JOCV’s program] was 
strongly inclined to dispatch volunteers to SECAP.”6 Another male volunteer wrote 
about many problems related to the placement of JOCV volunteers with SECAP 
including the fact that JOCV volunteers were regarded as just cheap labor by SECAP.7
 Aside from JOCV volunteers assigned to SECAP, other JOCV volunteers also 
expressed similar thoughts regarding other placements. A male volunteer in the field of 
computer engineering questioned the assignment of a JOCV volunteer to a university - a 
high technological facility. He raised the issue because he perceived JICA [JOCV]’s goal 
as a contribution to poverty eradication; he felt that if JICA/JOCV’s goals are to help 
decrease poverty and inequality then it does not make sense to dispatch volunteers to 
                                                
4 JOCV volunteer # 84, JOCV working report.  
5 Among the JOCV volunteers who were dispatched to Ecuador from June 2010 to January 2012, five 
volunteers worked in five different SECAP locations in both the highlands and lowlands in Ecuador. 
Information obtained from handout provided by JOCV official in Ecuador office and from interview.    
6 JOCV volunteer #144, JOCV working report.  
7 JOCV volunteer # 134, JOCV working report.  
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well-equipped universities.8 A female JOCV volunteer who worked in a primary school 
commented in her JOCV working report that, “It seemed that JOCV volunteers tended to 
be dispatched to local primary, middle and high schools, which actually do not need 
international assistance.”9              
 Two JOCV volunteers criticized not only JOCV’s selection of host organizations 
or schools, but they commented that JOCV volunteers have not cooperated enough with 
people who are economically and socially excluded from the Ecuadorian society. They 
pointed out issues of class and ethnicity as well. A male volunteer pointed out that 
economic and social inequalities among different classes and ethnic groups existed in 
Ecuador. Then, he criticized the fact that many JOCV volunteers are dispatched to work 
at middle or upper class institutions or organizations although there are many places in 
Ecuador lacking basic infrastructures in education, health, social services, and public 
transportation.10 In addition, a female volunteer also commented, “I personally got the 
impression that the living standard of the majority of native peoples in Ecuador is very 
low. Nonetheless, the majority of JOCV volunteers only work with mestizo people; this 
fact laid heavy on my mind.”11 These comments in the JOCV working reports exemplify 
a gap between JOCV volunteers’ perception and conception of what a ‘development 
project should be’ and the local reality. In terms of the gap between the agency’s way of 
cooperating with aid beneficiaries and that of JOCV volunteers who worked with 
                                                
8 JOCV volunteer # 145, JOCV working report.  
9 JOCV volunteer # 156, JOCV working report.  
10 JOCV volunteer # 155, JOCV working report.  
11 JOCV volunteer #159, JOCV working report.  
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indigenous issues on a daily basis, the case of Mika, a female JOCV volunteer, 
characterizes it well.12 Mika’s criticism in her JOCV working report exemplifies what 
the volunteers see as JICA’s approach, which results in the exclusion of illiterate 
indigenous farmers from their development projects. According to Mika’s report, JICA 
held an event to introduce Japan and JICA’s development project in Chimborazo, 
Ecuador, and indigenous farmers with whom the volunteer worked were invited to the 
event because they were beneficiaries of JICA’s ongoing project. A JICA official 
explained the project only in Spanish using a power point slide presentation. Obviously 
the audience had to be literate to follow the power point, but the majority of indigenous 
famers present was only able to understand Kichwa or was illiterate. In addition to this, 
she wrote about her disappointment because the overview of the project, particularly that 
dealing with the eligibility of applicants to the JICA’s scholarship was far from the reality 
of indigenous farmers’ lives, as it required a bachelor’s degree and job experience in the 
public sector.13 
Presenting a power point in Spanish to their indigenous beneficiaries and the 
scholarship eligibility conditions are far from the reality of the majority of indigenous 
farmers in the organization. In 2007, I visited the agricultural organization in Riobamba, 
Chimborazo province, in which the JOCV volunteer, Mika worked. I attended a cabecilla 
meeting, which indigenous community leaders heard the explanation about what an 
organic certificate was and how each community needed to maintain their quinoa 
                                                
12 All JOCV and Peace Corps volunteers’ first names that appeared in the dissertation are pseudonyms.   
13 JOCV volunteer # 184, JOCV working report. 
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production to get the organic certificate. The meeting was held on a bilingual basis 
involving some Spanish-Kichwa translators. Participating community leaders needed to 
report on the meeting when they returned to their community. So, at the end of the 
meeting there was a long line of illiterate indigenous community leaders holding 
notebooks who asked the members who could write to note the important points, which 
they discussed in the meeting.14 
Mika’s observation as well as what I observed in my field work exemplified well 
post-development thinkers’ critique that development contains the dangerous possibility 
to reinforce unequal relations between aid practitioners (which embody Western 
knowledge production) and the beneficiaries (in this case, indigenous farmers). This case 
shows a contradiction between development rhetoric and development practice because 
the qualifications for involvement in the development project presupposes that 
beneficiaries are able to understand and read Spanish and had access to higher education 
in order to be selected to receive the scholarship, conditions that contradict the reality of 
indigenous famers’ lives. In addition, this case exemplifies well how language, as an 
essential aspect of the identity of people and their communities, is key to deliver 
development and enable people’s participation, or to exclude the participants from 
discussion for their own development projects.      
Regarding the volunteers’ experiences and observations, some of JOCV 
volunteers realized how difficult it is to define ‘what development should be’ after they 
actually started participating in development projects. On the other hand, the problem of 
                                                
14 For more detail about the agricultural organization, see Kawachi, “My Culture and Your Response.”  
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the way JOCV volunteers are distributed results from JICA/JOCV’s notion of 
development. That is, since Japan started participating in development projects in the 
middle 1950s, Japanese ODA style was created under the notion of ‘technology transfer’ 
and on a ‘request-basis system.’ The analysis of the patterns of JOCV volunteers’ 
distribution revealed that problematic side of the system, as brought up by some of JOCV 
volunteers in their working reports (e.g., the case of SECAP exemplified the problem of 
assignments determined on a ‘request basis system’). Although JICA/JOCV Ecuador’s 
goals are the eradication of poverty and social inequality, in some cases JOCV does not 
send volunteers where poverty occurs. Depending on how you look at it, the assignment 
of JOCV volunteers to government authorities or to relatively wealthy universities has 
some possibility of encouraging national development, including poverty eradication. In 
addition, as Mika’s case demonstrated, some of JOCV volunteers were disappointed 
when they faced the realities in the field and understood the existence of contradictions 
between development rhetoric and actual development practices.  
OVERVIEW OF THE PEACE CORPS IN ECUADOR 
 
The Peace Corps opened its program in Ecuador in August 1962. Unlike its 
neighboring countries Colombia and Bolivia, the Peace Corps in Ecuador continued to 
send volunteers without any interruptions. The Peace Corps in Ecuador did not 
experience the expulsion of Peace Corps volunteers, and the Peace Corps Ecuador office 
emphasizes that the Peace Corps is an “apolitical” agency. For instance, in the summer of 
2012, I visited the Peace Corps office and asked the Peace Corps official some questions 
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regarding the relationship between the volunteers and political issues in Ecuador such as 
its indigenous movements. Replying to my questions, the Peace Corps official 
emphasized that the Peace Corps is an apolitical agency so that the agency gave Peace 
Corps volunteers only some introductory information on indigenous movements in 
Ecuador. They felt it was not necessary to provide any more details because indigenous 
movements are a political issue. This position was not seen in the interview sessions with 
JOCV officials. The Peace Corps has incorporated more of the past experiences of the 
Peace Corps in Latin America into their development philosophy and being apolitical is 
one of the most important points when they work in development projects.   
According to the Annual Informe Ecuador 2011 [Annual Report Ecuador 2011], 
more than 5,000 Peace Corps volunteers have worked at the community level helping in 
development projects.15 In the report, during 2011, more than 200 volunteers between 21 
and 71 years old served in four different working areas: (1) English as Foreign Language, 
(2) Conservation and Natural Resources, (3) Youth and Family Development, and (4) 
Community Health and Food Security.16 The Peace Corps volunteers are notified in 
which country they will be assigned only when they get a letter of acceptance, and even 
after arriving in Ecuador they do not know where they will work. Only at the very end of 
the training in Ecuador, are the volunteers finally notified in which provinces or villages 
                                                
15 There is gap between the number that I traced every year by using Peace Corps annual reports and the 
number presented by Peace Corps. In Ecuador this gap may be due to the Peace Corps high early 
termination rate (approximately 30%) and the Peace Corps numbers during in-site training, a part of the 
selection process. Therefore, their numbers are not rigid. As I discussed in the research problem, the Peace 
Corps’ annual statistics are ambiguous in terms of who is included or excluded. Also, the statistic methods 
the Peace Corps used for their annual reports have changed over time.  
16 Peace Corps, Informe Annual Ecuador 2011 [Peace Corps Annual Report 2011]. The Peace 
Corps/Ecuador office provided this report that is written in Spanish.    
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they will work.17 After the Peace Corps volunteers finished training, they are required to 
move to their working site using only public transportation. Upon arriving at the working 
site in Ecuador and during the first four months, the volunteers are expected to take 50-
100 surveys to research local needs by asking locals on the street or by visiting homes or 
schools. The Peace Corps office requires their volunteers to create their own projects on 
the basis of their research.18   
Peace Corps/Ecuador has four different areas of concentration and the Peace 
Corps volunteers are required to implement their own development project on the basis of 
the Peace Corps’ three missions. According to a Peace Corps official in Quito, the Peace 
Corps summarized their volunteers’ contributions to the host communities/organizations 
on the basis of their reports in Informe Annual Ecuador 2011. For instance, the report 
lists Peace Corps’ achievements as: “3184 jóvenes mejoraron su autoestima y 1200 
jóvenes demostraron un mejoramiento en sus destrezas de liderazgo” (3184 young 
people improved their self-esteem and 1200 young people showed improvement in their 
leadership skills), (See Figure 5.1) and “4387 personas se capacitaron en temas de salud 
sexual y reproductiva y prevención de VIH/Sida…” (4387 people understood what sexual 
health is in terms of reproductive rights and prevention of HIV) (See Figure 5.2).  
                                                
17 Interview, Anonymous, July 12, 2012.   
18 Interview, Anonymous, June 8, 2012.           
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Figure 5.1: List of Peace Corps Volunteers’ Contributions 1 
 
 
 
       Figure 5.2: List of Peace Corps Volunteers Contributions 219 
                                                
19 See Informe Annual Ecuador 2011. These lists in Figure 5.1 and 5.2 came from the section called 
“Programa Desarrollo de Jóvenes y Familias” [Development Program of Juveniles and Families], and 
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The presentation of Peace Corps’ achievements exemplifies how the agencies’ 
notion of development differs regarding cultural and social contexts as well as how the 
Peace Corps assesses the achievements of its volunteers. Firstly, the Peace Corps 
considers an ‘increase’ in personal self-esteem as a principal priority and accomplishment 
while in the case of JOCV volunteers, the issue of ‘self-esteem’ was rarely brought up in 
the JOCV working reports and none of JOCV volunteers I interviewed brought it up. The 
difference might relate to how U.S. society perceives the concept of ‘self-esteem’ and 
how Japanese society perceives the value of ‘self-esteem.’20 While U.S. society sees a 
person with high ‘self-esteem’ positively, the Japanese equivalent word for ‘self-esteem,’ 
jisonshin is sometimes used to describe a person with problematic social characteristics.21 
Japanese volunteers seem neither to focus on improving Ecuadorians’ ‘self-esteem’ nor 
do they regard the issue of ‘self-esteem’ as an ideal form of development or as a 
contribution to Ecuadorian society.  
According to article “Is There a Universal Need for Positive Self-Regard?” 
written by Steven J. Heine, Darrin R. Lehman, Hazel Rose Markus, and Shinobu 
Kitayama, many self-esteem researches have been conducted and developed by North 
American researchers in North American universities using North American 
methodology and with North American participants. On the other hand, self-esteem 
                                                                                                                                            
“Programa de Salud Comunitaria y Seguridad Alimentaria” [Programs of Community Health and Food 
Security].  
20 Heine, Lehman, Markus, and Kitayama, “Is There a Universal Need for Positive Self-Regard?”  
21 For instance, the Japanese expression, ‘Jishonshin no katamari’ [A lamp of self-esteem] is used to 
describe a person who has too much pride and who will not listen to others’ advices. That is, like the 
example, ‘jisonshin no katamari,’ Japanese people, in some cases or occasions, use the word, ‘Jisonshin’ to 
describe negative characteristics. 	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research in Asia has been less popular compared with that of North America. According 
to the authors, the concept of self-esteem is not universal across the world; thereby, they 
said, “Understanding contemporary Japanese-style self-esteem requires a comprehensive 
grasp of another set of core cultural concepts, some of which are also known and can be 
experienced in North American contexts but typically are not emphasized or given the 
same pervasive societal expression as they are in Japan.”22 This example of ‘what 
development should be’ or entails, quite possibly results from the donor’s society 
ethnocentric cultural and social concepts, perceptions and contexts. 
Secondly, even though both JOCV and Peace Corps in Ecuador published annual 
reports in Spanish with the same aim—demonstrating their achievements in Ecuadorian 
society, they present their achievements in a different manner. The Peace Corps presented 
their achievements quantitatively (Figures 5.1 and 5.2); for example, how many 
workshops were held and how many Ecuadorians received positive impacts through 
attending Peace Corps’ initiative workshops (e.g., improving self-esteem and leadership 
skills).  
On the other hand, the JICA/JOCV annual reports, mainly introduced the contents 
of a project in detail with a few examples. The report did not present quantitative data 
such as how many workshops were held by JOCV volunteers. While the Peace Corps 
does not present the profile of each volunteer in the annual report, the JOCV/Ecuador 
annual report added each volunteers’ profile including profession, period of work, and the 
host Ecuadorian institution (see Figure 5.3).  
                                                
22 Heine, Lehman, Markus, and Kitayama, “Is There a Universal Need for Positive Self-Regard?,” 769.   
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                   Source: Boletín Informativo Séptima Edición Enero 2012, page13 
 
Figure 5.3: JOCV Chart Volunteers’ Profiles 
 
As this chart and the previous one show (Figure. 5.1 and 5.2), the JOCV and the 
Peace Corps’ presentations of their “development” practices and assessment of their 
achievements are different. The Peace Corps office shows how the aid recipients and the 
Peace Corps volunteers are changed due to the Peace Corps development projects and 
their office presents their development “results” quantitatively. The Peace Corps focus 
more on Ecuadorian recipients’ enthusiasm toward education, environment, conservation, 
and family planning than JOCV does. On the other hand, the JOCV office shows what 
their volunteers did and how they did it. It focuses less on the changes the recipient 
experienced.    
An overall analysis of the contents of Peace Corps and JICA/JOCV’s annual 
reports in Ecuador shows that the Peace Corps focuses more on presenting the large 
number of Ecuadorians and the variety of the citizens the volunteers have reached, and on 
indicating to the readers the impact Peace Corps’ volunteers had on Ecuadorian 
beneficiaries. On the other hand, JOCV focuses more on showing that their volunteers are 
‘skilled.’ Since their reports present a list of host institutions, the reports also indicated to 
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what entities JOCV volunteers transferred “technology.” The JOCV working report also 
revealed one of the possible reasons why some of JOCV volunteers placed too much 
importance on the idea of ‘technology transfer’ and on their expectations that Ecuadorian 
recipients would act as the Japanese do particularly regarding working and studying 
behaviors.   
WORKING IN ECUADOR: CROSS-CULTURAL EXPERIENCES  
 
Some scholars have warned that many Japanese have tended to simply believe 
that Japan is an ethnically homogenous country.23 This Japanese tendency is also 
reflected in JOCV office’s representation of its volunteers. For instance, unlike the Peace 
Corps, the JOCV office does not aim to introduce the diversity of Japanese society to the 
host country as one goal of its programs. This “belief” is reflected in JOCV’s 
management of volunteers’ cross-cultural issues and in the volunteers’ reactions 
regarding ethnicity in Ecuadorian society. Although JOCV does not mention Japan as a 
“homogenous” country, I propose that JOCV implicitly subscribes to this idea so that 
JOCV does not address or get involved in minority and multiethnic issues within 
Japanese society. This is in stark contrast to the Peace Corps’ recognition of America’s 
diversity which the Peace Corps emphasizes by sending various different ‘Americans’ in 
terms of race, culture, age, and even sexual orientation.24    
                                                
23 Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity; Lie, “The discourse of Japaneseness”; Murphy-Shigematsu, 
“Identities of Multiethnic People in Japan”; Siddle, “Limits to Citizenship in Japan.” These works discuss 
the issue that Japanese people tend to believe Japan to be an ethnically homogenous country.     
24 Peace Corps, “Who Volunteers?,” Peace Corps, http://www.peacecorps.gov/learn/whovol/ [accessed in 
September 07, 2012]. In this online page, Peace Corps says: “The agency actively recruits people with a 
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This different stance of the Peace Corps and the JOCV created distinct emphases 
in training volunteers on cross-cultural issues and in their management of volunteers in 
Ecuador. The Peace Corps puts more value on cross-cultural training in order to integrate 
Peace Corps volunteers into Ecuadorian society. Therefore, instead of receiving training 
in the United States, Peace Corps volunteers only undergo on-site training (eleven weeks) 
in Ecuador.25 Moreover, recently the Peace Corps office in Ecuador extended the period 
of volunteers’ obligation to live with an Ecuadorian host family from several weeks to six 
months of their service in order that they will learn the local culture and have time to 
culturally adapt.26According to a Peace Corps official, the Peace Corps in Ecuador started 
the new requirement for volunteers in order that they would observe and write essays 
about their cross-cultural experiences through interaction with their host families and 
communities. An analysis of the instructional paper of the project shows that the 
objective of this exercise is to fulfill goals such as cross-cultural sharing and cultural 
adaptation in order to achieve the Peace Corps primary goal of technical assistance.27  
                                                                                                                                            
variety of backgrounds and experiences to best share our nation's greatest resource–its people–with the 
communities where Volunteers serve around the globe.”  
25 Peace Corps volunteers, who arrived in Ecuador in Summer 2011, had one to two days of training in the 
United States before leaving for Ecuador.   
26 When I did fieldwork in Ecuador in 2007, a Peace Corps official told me that living with a local family   
was not mandatory; thereby, approximately 60% of Peace Corps volunteers chose to live in apartments 
alone or with other Peace Corps volunteers rather than live with Ecuadorian families. See, Kawachi, “My 
Culture and Your Response,”53.   
27 “Host Family Living Competencies” This is a two-page document provided by Peace Corps Ecuador 
office, June 8, 2012. This is an unpublished document. Submission of the essay is mandatory for all Peace 
Corps volunteers in Ecuador. There are more than thirty questions required for example, “identify at least 
20 benefits of sharing with a host family,” “Describe some things (norms or behaviors) about your family 
and family life that annoy you?,” “Why do these thing annoy you?,” “Name at least three things about 
yourself or our behaviors that people have asked questions about.” I picked the above questions randomly.   
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Since the beginning of the JOCV program in Ecuador, living with a host family 
during the two years of service is mandatory for all participants except for senior 
volunteers and volunteers for whom the JOCV office could not find a host family near 
their working site. JOCV expects their volunteers to learn Ecuadorian culture through 
living with their host family. Since JOCV provides lectures on cross-cultural adaptation 
during the 70 days training in Japan, JOCV training (about one month) in Ecuador 
concentrates on language training.       
 However, Wakako Horie’s study suggests that cross-cultural training in the host 
country is more effective. The study showed that JOCV volunteers who developed good 
cross-cultural skills tended to be more satisfied with their international cooperative 
activities than JOCV volunteers who acquire good language skills or those who acquire 
professional skills, technical knowledge and working experience. Consequently, Horie 
suggested that JOCV should put more value on training to enhance a volunteer’s ability 
to adapt cross-culturally. Horie recommended that cross-cultural training should be 
longer in the host country instead of providing longer training in Japan.28 In the case of 
the Peace Corps, they provide training only in Ecuador and they put emphasis on cross-
cultural adaptation skills.  
Another Peace Corps’ cross-cultural strategy is to consider possible issues of 
differences in gender, color and sexual orientation when volunteers work in Ecuador. For 
instance, The Peace Corps Welcome You to Ecuador (hereafter Peace Corps welcome 
                                                
28 Horie, “Kokusai kyōryoku to ibunka tekiō” [A Study of International Cooperate Activities and Cross-
cultural Adaptation].   
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book) has a section for African American, Asian American and gay, lesbians, or bisexual 
volunteers explaining how to handle situations if volunteers are subject to negative 
attitudes or discrimination in Ecuador. For the Asian American volunteers, the Peace 
Corps welcome book states that, “Volunteers of color may encounter verbal harassment 
on the street—especially when away from their sites in larger towns or cities. Asian 
Americans may be called chino or china even if they are not of Chinese descent.”29As 
this quote shows, the Peace Corps perceives this as possible verbal harassment or racial 
discrimination. On the other hand, the welcome book also added a message to Peace 
Corps volunteers: “comments or jokes regarding race or ethnicity are more likely to be 
used in a descriptive sense than in a derogatory sense.”30  	  
In the case of JOCV, as I stated earlier, the JOCV office does not provide in-depth 
guidance on racial relations in Ecuador; however, the number of JOCV volunteers who 
wrote about being the target of negative attitudes in their JOCV working reports is 
significant.31 Approximately one in five JOCV volunteers (28 volunteers out of 166 
volunteers) wrote about their “uncomfortable” experiences relating to racial issues. As 
the following female JOCV volunteer’s case exemplifies, some of the JOCV volunteers 
were shocked when they encountered these problems for the first time: “I was shouted 
                                                
29 Peace Corps, “The Peace Corps Welcome You to Ecuador (Peace Corps Publication For New 
Volunteers June 2011),” 49, http://files.peacecorps.gov/manuals/welcomebooks/ecwb518.pdf [accessed 
June 10 2011].   
30 Ibid., 49-50.     
31 I analyzed the reports written by JOCV volunteers who worked in Ecuador more than one year between 
2002 and 2010. I obtained 192 JOCV working reports at the JOCV Library in Hiroo, Tokyo. The JOCV 
working reports that I obtained included JOCV volunteers who were dispatched only for short-terms (e.g., 
one month) to teach sports. So I excluded from the analysis JOCV volunteers who worked for only one 
month and when there was no data about their serving period. That is why the number is 28 volunteers out 
of 166 volunteers.  
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‘china!’ [by a stranger] at the airport [ the very first time I arrived in Ecuador] so that I 
could not fall asleep that night because I was so worried about my next two years of 
service in Ecuador.”32 In addition, some JOCV volunteers wrote about being the target of 
verbal harassments such as being shouted “chaorafán!” (fried rice),33 “zapato[s] 
barato[s]!”(cheap shoes),34 “china feisima!” (ugliest Chinese woman).35   
In addition, JOCV volunteers wrote in their working reports they felt that some 
Ecuadorians have anti-Chinese sentiment or hold disrespectful feelings toward Chinese 
people. For example, a JOCV volunteer stated that teachers in his primary school said, 
“Don't do like Chinese people do,” and he felt uncomfortable when he heard that.36 
Also,  another JOCV volunteer reported there were a few anti-Chinese demonstrations in 
Ecuador. Around that time, when she entered a shop, the shop owner said to her, “No 
puede seguir” (You are not be allowed to shop here).37 That is, she was not allowed to 
shop in his place because of her East Asian looks. This probably related to the increase in 
the number of cheap imported Chinese merchandise, which threatened Ecuadorian small 
shop owners. From 2003 to 2004, the number of Chinese immigrants coming to Ecuador 
surged and Chinese owned businesses such as restaurants and stores increased 
remarkably downtown in Quito and in Cuenca.38 Moreover, under the present Correa 
                                                
32 JOCV working report, JOCV volunteer # 114.    
33 JOCV working report, JOCV volunteer # 46.  
34 JOCV working report, JOCV volunteer # 128. According to JOCV volunteer #128’s working report, 
Chinese women who sell shoes in Ecuadorian market used the words “zapato[s] barato[s] [cheap shoes]” 
to sell their shoes.  
35 JOCV working report, JOCV volunteer # 24.  
36 JOCV working report, JOCV volunteer # 176.  
37 JOCV working report, JOCV volunteer # 119.     
38 Araki, “Imin” [The Immigrants], 354.   
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presidency, Chinese influence on Ecuador has been enormous. China already holds 50 % 
of the total amount of crude oil produced yearly in Ecuador as part of a security loan 
agreement; besides that, President Correa continues to accept funds from China.39 
When JOCV volunteers were in Japan, they probably were not sensitive to racism 
in Japanese society; however, their experiences in Ecuador provided an opportunity for 
JOCV volunteers to reconsider racism in Japanese society. JOCV volunteer, Takeshi 
commented that one of possible reasons why some of JOCV volunteers do not like to be 
called china/chino in Ecuador could be related to Japanese racist feelings toward the 
Chinese.40      
Whereas JOCV volunteers thought about race and ethnicity issues in Japan 
because of their own experiences as targets of negative attitudes while abroad, none of 
them discussed sexual orientation in Ecuador in their working reports. In contrast to the 
JOCV volunteers, the Peace Corps welcome book mentioned possible issues gay, lesbian 
and bisexual volunteers might encounter during their two years of service. Also, the 
Peace Corps considered that homosexual or bisexual volunteers in Ecuador might be 
more likely to experience severe discrimination. The following quote from a Peace Corps 
volunteer exemplifies this problem, “Volunteers in Ecuador come face to face with a 
macho and, at times, racist society. Getting accustomed to this is a challenge for many, 
but more so for gays, lesbians, or bisexuals.”41 Also, the Peace Corps welcome book 
                                                
39 Hayashi and Kinoshita, “Ecuador no doruka seisaku” [Policy of dollarization in Ecuador],154-156.  
40 Interview, JOCV Volunteer Takeshi, Ecuador, Jun 22, 2012.        
41 Peace Corps, “The Peace Corps Welcome You to Ecuador (Peace Corps Publication For New 
Volunteers),” 51.  
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stated that many gay, lesbian and bisexual Peace Corps volunteers never come out about 
their sexual orientation during their 27 months of service in Ecuador.42  
According to the website, “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender Peace Corps 
Alumni,” a former Peace Corps volunteer discussed his experience as a gay volunteer in 
Ecuador. He wrote that he was not able to be open about his relationship with his partner 
because his Ecuadorian partner could possibly lose his job if their relationship became 
public. He was distressed about this because he had never worried about this matter when 
he was in the United States.43   
In short, even though JOCV and Peace Corps dispatch their volunteers to Ecuador 
under a similar system, their approaches toward cross-cultural issues for their volunteers 
are different. These differences reflect the current cultural views toward ethnicity as well 
as toward a variety of sexual orientations in Japanese and U.S. societies. For instance, the 
support system and public understanding of homosexuality in Japan is less developed 
than it is in the United States. Consequently, there is likely to be a lack of support for 
homosexual people within JOCV.44 
                                                
42 Peace Corps, “The Peace Corps Welcome You to Ecuador” (Peace Corps Publication For New 
Volunteers), 51.  
43 Brad Mattan, “Without Borders: The story of a Bi-national Same-Sex Couple,” under Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Transgender Peace Corps Alumni: Promoting Peace Corps and the Rights of Gay, Lesbian, 
Bisexual and Transgender People around the World, http://lgbrpcv.org/category/countries-of-
service/ecuador/[accessed September 14, 2012].    
44 According to a JOCV volunteer who arrived in Ecuador in early 2012, they did not get information 
about gay issues either in the JOCV manual or during the orientation sessions held in Ecuador, (personal 
communication, email), October 6, 2012. 	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NEED TO BE APOLITICAL: MAINTAINING THE BALANCE WHILE BEING A FOREIGN 
VOLUNTEER  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, what activities should be considered as ‘political’ or 
‘apolitical’ is sometimes difficult for volunteers to determine. This is not only a problem 
for the Peace Corps volunteers, as JOCV volunteers also encountered this problem. For 
instance, a male Peace Corps volunteer shared the case of the early termination of his 
friend due to his participation in gay rights activities. This case exemplifies the Peace 
Corps volunteer’s dilemma as to how a volunteer should act regarding gay rights in 
Ecuador. According to his story, Mary, a female Peace Corps volunteer, was working 
with an NGO in support of gay people in Ecuador. Mary heard that her co-workers had 
joined in a gay pride parade and she decided to join. She felt like it was necessary to 
participate in the parade because she was working to support gay people, although she 
was not gay. When the Peace Corps office found out that she participated in the parade, 
the agency ordered her to leave the Peace Corps and return to the United States because 
the agency considered that participating in the gay pride parade was a ‘political’ action 
taken by a Peace Corps volunteer.45 
Young, liberal Americans, like the majority of Peace Corps volunteers, might 
perceive a gay pride parade as a form of freedom of expression of their ‘identity’ rather 
than a ‘political’ manifestation. Moreover, the Peace Corps official webpage introduces 
                                                
45 Interview, Anonymous. July 12, 2012.  
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the story of the gay volunteer as an example of the diversity of Peace Corps volunteers.46 
During their placement and training, Peace Corps volunteers feel they are expected to 
serve as models of the diversified American society. Also, they are trained to become 
pioneers and, as such, make a difference in host country’s society. However, the reality is 
that Mary was deported due to her participation in the gay pride parade. After they start 
their service in host country, Peace Corps volunteers feel that the Peace Corps limits their 
freedom of speech or expression.47 Thereby, Peace Corps volunteers are faced with the 
contradiction between the Peace Corps’ ideal development and local engagement 
philosophies and the reality of the volunteers’ practices on the ground.   
This contradiction is complicated. The Peace Corps office needs to control the 
volunteers’ political expressions in order to prevent conflicts and the expulsion of the 
Peace Corps. Still, foreign relations between the United States and the host country have 
generally been more relevant to the termination of programs than any Peace Corps 
individual’s actions. Nevertheless, the Peace Corps/Ecuador’s decision regarding the gay 
pride parade respected Ecuadorian’s cultural values, which are strongly influenced by the 
Roman Catholic Church. On the other hand, debates of gay rights in Ecuador have 
gradually received attention; even the conservative newspaper, El Comercio had a long 
report about gay rights in Ecuador.48 However, the older generation is generally opposed 
                                                
46 Peace Corps, “Who Volunteers?,” Peace Corps, http://www.peacecorps.gov/learn/whovol/ [accessed in 
September 29, 2012].   
47 Interview, Peace Corps Volunteer, Confidential, July 12, 2012.    
48 There are many articles about gay rights relative to the Church in online version of el comercio, 
elcomercio.com. For example see, Diego Cevallos Rojas, “Inglesias y homophobia,” El Comercio.Com, 
June 16, 2012, under “Opinión,” 
http://www.elcomercio.com/diego_cevallos_rojas/Iglesiashomofobia_0_719328281.html [accessed 
 172 
to gay rights and they considered the participation of Peace Corps volunteers in a gay 
pride parade as a ‘political’ action.49      
Like the Peace Corps, the JOCV also prohibits volunteers from participating in 
politically related activities in Ecuador during their two years of service, but their actions 
are somewhat different. According to a JOCV official, their volunteers are not allowed to 
participate in political demonstrations, such as in a marcha (political demonstration) in 
order to avoid injuries or other possible problems; that is, JOCV officials state that the 
purpose of the prohibition is to protect JOCV’s volunteers’ and guarantee their safety.50   
In March 2012, JOCV volunteer Jiro, who works with an indigenous organization 
in the highlands, joined a marcha held in Quito because his organization is under the 
umbrella of FENOCINE (National Federation of Peasant, Indigenous and Black 
Organizations), which joined in the marcha. Jiro came to Quito with his co-workers by 
charter bus. When he joined the marcha, Jiro said that he neither understood the context 
of the marcha nor why his indigenous organization joined the marcha because he could 
not understand enough Spanish at the time. During the marcha, many participants around 
him chatted in a very relaxed mood so that he did not perceive that the marcha was very 
political. When he was passing in front of the JICA/JOCV office, a JOCV official saw 
                                                                                                                                            
November 15, 2012]. In addition, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos [National Institute of 
Statistics and Census] started investigating gay people’s situation in Ecuadorian society. See more detail, 
“INEC realizará primer studio GLBTI del Ecuador,” El Comercio.Com, November 14, 2012, under 
“Sociedad,” http://www.elcomercio.com/sociedad/INEC-estudio-GLBTI-Ecuador-gay-lesbiana-bisexual-
trans_0_810518978.html [accessed November 15, 2012].  
49 Interviews, Anonymous (two mestizo Ecuadorian nationals living in Quito both in the late 50s), July 15, 
2012. Unlike them. their mid-20s daughter did not consider the participation of Peace Corps volunteer in 
gay rights parade as a ‘political’ action.    
50 Interview, Anonymous (two JOCV officials), July 16, 2012.      
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that Jiro had joined the marcha with his co-workers. The official talked to him and stated 
that participating in the marcha was considered a political act and that was against JOCV 
rules.51 Unlike the previous Peace Corps’ case, JOCV did not deport Jiro to Japan. The 
JOCV official stated that one of JOCV’s objectives is human resource development and 
she expected that Jiro would learn from this experience. Also, JOCV officials said that 
ordering a volunteer’s early termination due to only one mistake was too harsh.52  
The Peace Corps and JOCV officials reached different resolutions, although Mary 
and Jiro’s cases have several commonalities. Both Mary and Jiro joined the 
demonstrations with their co-workers. In both cases they felt the need to accompany their 
coworkers as part of their work and community building. However, while the Peace 
Corps deported Mary, JOCV did not deport Jiro. As discussed in Chapter 4, JOCV has 
not experienced being expelled from a Latin American host country. I suggest that the 
Peace Corps and JOCV’s different experiences in Latin America have affected the 
agencies’ approaches regarding volunteers’ participation in political demonstrations.  
As long as Peace Corps and JOCV continue to send their volunteers to help 
marginalized populations in Ecuador it is always possible that their assigned 
organizations will participate in public demonstrations to call attention to their situation 
and promote change. That being the case, the Peace Corps and the JOCV offices need to 
explain clearly what volunteers’ activities will be considered political by their agencies or 
by the host country to reduce the risk of early termination due to the volunteer’s activity 
                                                
51 Interview, JOCV Volunteer Jiro, June 15, 2012.    
52 Interview, Anonymous (two JOCV officials), July 16, 2012.    
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and to avoid the stigma and frustration of being deported. Because, the majority of 
volunteers are sent to work with marginalized populations and communities it is likely 
that Peace Corps and JOCV volunteers will be faced with similar situations. Moreover, 
the activities that may be considered ‘political’ there are often not considered as such in 
the volunteer’s home country as in Mary’s case. Also, a volunteer’s background affects 
how he or she perceives an activity as political or not, which means that a volunteer’s 
perception of a political activity may not match that of the agency.  
 Jiro experienced a problem and could have been expelled from the program in 
part because he could not understand Spanish well. But Jiro’s case also showed that 
language is key to plan and deliver development projects and understand communities, 
their culture and even ongoing-indigenous politics. These matters are all deeply related to 
engaging and enabling corporation with the beneficiaries of development projects, 
although it is tough for foreign volunteers like Jiro to understand Spanish at the beginning 
of their service. It is even more difficult for Peace Corps’ volunteers to assess the needs 
of their assigned community and design a project that will benefit the community if they 
are not proficient in Spanish (or Kichwa) and before they have time to get to know the 
community and its leaders. Moreover, in some communities/organizations, Spanish is not 
the native language for both the foreign volunteers and the local indigenous people. 
Language is one of the biggest challenging points for foreign volunteers to engage with a 
community as they prepare and deliver development projects. Actually, some JOCV 
volunteers were critical of their own low Spanish language skills as they worked in the 
field and faced these challenges. On the other hand, Horie’s study showed that JOCV 
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volunteers who developed good cross-cultural skills tended to be more satisfied with their 
international cooperative activities than JOCV volunteers who acquire good language 
skills only or those who acquired professional skills, technical knowledge and working 
experience.53 Still, some JOCV volunteers felt that language was the biggest obstacle to 
deliver their development practices to Ecuadorian people.54  
CONCLUSION 
 
Since the JOCV/Ecuador’s notion of development was built on the basis of 
‘technology transfer’ and on a ‘request basis system,’ some of the JOCV volunteers 
poured their efforts into realizing the ideals of the agency. However, some of them faced 
the reality of Ecuadorian society and expressed their opinions in the JOCV working 
reports about what development practices should like be in the case of Ecuador. Some of 
volunteers’ ‘ideal’ notion of development, which they constructed during the training, 
was, and is, different from their working situations in Ecuador. A comparison between 
Peace Corps/Ecuador and JOCV shows that the Peace Corps focus more on Ecuadorian  
                                                
53 Horie, “Kokusai kyōryoku to ibunka tekiō.” Accoring to the study, although having good language 
skills is important and necesarry, JOCV volunteer individuals who have creativity and flexibility to adjust 
themselve into new culture tended to work with satisfacation toward their international cooperative 
activities. And, they tended to have supportive persons for their project due to their good cross-cultural 
skills. So, she suggested that long-term onsite langauge training for JOCV volunteers are more effective 
than current long-term languge training in Japan in order to both acquring good langage skills and cross-
cultural skills.  
54 In chapter 6, I will present four different volunteers’ case in indigenous development. Takeshi who 
worked as elementary school teacher, he spent his all afternoon to study Spanish to improve his Spanish 
skills, and he did not give Arithmetic class in the beginning of his service due to his language 
barrier(according to Takeshi). And, other senior female volunteer whose name Ayako, she traveled to 
Cuenca from Chunchi province to have private Spanish lesson every Saturday with her own money because 
she blamed herself becaue of lack of sufficient Spanish skills. She mentioned her Spanish skills again and 
again when I talked to her. And, in Ayako’s case, a Peace Corps volunteer who speak Spanish well always 
traveled together indigenous communities when I took fieldwork. They are like a team.   
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recipients’ motivations toward education, environment conservation, and family planning 
than JOCV does, while JOCV focus on technology or skills transfer to entities such as 
institutions or schools. In fact, while the Peace Corps focus on the social individual, 
JOCV focus on the society’s group. Also, the difference in the ways Peace Corps and 
JOCV address cultural and social contexts is quite possibly related to how they present 
and represent their agency’s notion of development in Ecuador.  
The Peace Corps and the JOCV have supported and dealt with cross-cultural 
experiences in different ways. These differences probably reflect how Japanese and U.S. 
societies understand their own societies’ views in terms of ethnicity as well as sexual 
orientation. In the case of the Peace Corps, the agency followed multiethnic United 
States’ cultural values in order to guide Peace Corps’ volunteers who work in Ecuador. 
As a result, the Peace Corps was alert to possible issues of racism in Ecuador caused by 
different ethnic groups living together in the country, as well as to possible discrimination 
against homosexual and bisexual volunteers in the Peace Corps.   
On the other hand, the JOCV office does not provide in-depth guidance on racial 
relations in Ecuador. Instead, JOCV has required their volunteers to live with Ecuadorian 
families since JOCV was established. JOCV expects that their volunteers learn and find a 
way of overcoming racial prejudice through their experiences in Ecuador. However, the 
fact that one in three to four JOCV volunteers disclosed their uncomfortable experiences 
regarding racism cannot be overlooked. The Peace Corps, in contrast, officially 
recognized the possibility of racism, likely helping volunteers to perceive this negative 
experience more objectively.  
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In terms of early termination because of a volunteer’s political activity, this matter 
also reflected Peace Corps and JOCV’s past experiences with local politics. Since the 
Peace Corps was established, it has recruited and trained American citizens who want to 
experience adventurous life and help marginalized people around the world. After 
starting service as Peace Corps volunteers, some reached the conclusion that improving 
the situation they encountered in the host country necessitated political change. But, their 
understanding of “politics” did not always coincide with their host countries’ politics. 
Peace Corps volunteers turned their eyes toward their own country. As a result, Peace 
Corps returnees protested against U.S. foreign policy in the U.S. as well as in their host 
country.55 On the other hand, I found no case of JOCV returnees organizing or leading 
protests against their own country either in Japan or in the host country. In addition, as 
described in Chapter 2, the Peace Corps experienced the expulsion of its volunteers as a 
result of suspicions leveled at the United States’ objectives in sending Peace Corps 
volunteers, as was the case of Bolivia. Moreover, Peace Corps volunteers in Ecuador 
experienced being asked whether they were CIA agents by Ecuadorians. Even today the 
Peace Corps faces the image of being an agent or something worse like a spy for the U.S. 
Consequently, the Peace Corps is preoccupied with controlling their volunteers to make 
sure they do not compromise the image of the agency. Conversely, the JOCV in Ecuador 
was able to handle Jiro’s problem as a human resource development case rather than 
                                                
55 According to Lawrence F. Lihosit’s Peace Corps Chronology, there are cases of Peace Corps returnees 
organizing protests against U.S. led wars. For instance, in the case of Peace Corps returnees’ protest against 
the war in Iraq, former Peace Corps volunteers raised money and put a half page advertisement protesting 
the war twice in The New York Times. In another reported case groups of 60 to 80 Peace Corps volunteers 
in the Dominican Republic planned an anti-war protest in Santo Domingo. For more details see, Lawrence, 
Peace Corps Chronology, 52-53.    
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deporting Jiro to Japan in order to prove that the JOCV is an apolitical agency. The 
JOCV is more relaxed in the management of their volunteers in Ecuador with regard to 
their actions and their impact on Japan’s political relations with the host country.  
In short, although both agencies made efforts to respect Ecuador’s cultural values 
in the management of volunteers serving in Ecuador, their cross-cultural policies for their 
volunteers reflect each country’s cultural standards. On the other hand, the volunteers 
work with the realities of Ecuadorian society show that there are some gaps between the 
agency’s development ideals and the development practices of volunteers. 
Also, in terms of relationship between aid practitoners and aid recipients, one 
must keep in mind the donor’s society ethnocentric cultural and social concepts, 
perceptions and contexts of ‘what development should be’ as these are often constructed 
on the basis of the donor’s development disourse, whether or not they are framed taking 
into account the recipient society’s values and practical contexts. Even among the donors, 
the emphases they placed on certain aspects of their programs are quite different in some 
cases. For instance, between the United States and Japan the different perception and 
value they place on self-esteem depends on the donor’s cultural and social values as this 
affects how agencies assess the results of the programs on their volunteers, and more 
importantly how recipients are seen as benefiting from “development”. Also, as post 
development thinkers have argued, development contains the perilous possibility to 
reinforce unequal relations between aid practitioners and beneficiaries.   
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Chapter 6: JOCV and Peace Corps Volunteers in Indigenous 
Development of Ecuador 
 
The previous chapter compared and contrasted the Ecuadorian JOCV and Peace 
Corps in term of their respective notions of development and approaches toward Ecuador 
as well as the management of their volunteers working in that country. The different 
degree of political presence of the United States and Japan in Ecuador influenced the 
differences to their development approaches. As showed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the 
Peace Corps has had more difficulties operating its program in Latin America than JOCV 
has. The degree of political and historical presence in Latin America, their way of 
introducing volunteers to the program and the way they teach about cross-cultural issues 
in Ecuador reflect how Japanese and U.S. societies view and understand ethnicity as well 
as sexual orientation.  
This chapter extends the discussion of these program’ cross-cultural approaches 
and notions of development, because indigenous development makes a good case to 
compare the JOCV development practices with those of the Peace Corps. Indigenous 
development is a significant part of the development projects in Latin America; exploring 
the experiences of the Peace Corps and the JOCV’s volunteers as case studies will clarify 
the issues involved in indigenous development, and its limitations and possibilities in the 
sphere of international cooperation.  
This chapter discusses almost exclusively the JOCV volunteers’ development 
practices, although I include those of Peace Corps volunteers for comparative purposes, if 
they were available. I focus on JOCV and Peace Corps volunteers’ development practices 
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in terms of indigenous development in Ecuador, particularly their experiences in the 
highlands indigenous communities. This chapter demonstrates how volunteers are 
involved in indigenous development at the grass-roots-level. To begin, this chapter 
analyzes how the volunteers perceived indigenous peoples, and then discusses JOCV’s 
volunteers’ development practices in terms of two areas in which they are involved: 
bilingual education and health.      
DEFINITION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES BY JOCV VOLUNTEERS IN ECUADOR 
 
In this section, I explore JOCV volunteers’ image of indigenous people on the basis of 
the results of a small survey and of JOCV working reports. Before starting an interview 
with a JOCV volunteer who currently works with indigenous peoples in the Highlands of 
Ecuador (as of July 2012), I asked the interviewee to complete the survey, which listed 
28 items describing certain characteristics associated with indigenous peoples (See Table 
6.1). In the survey, I asked 6 JOCV volunteers to select up to 10 items out of 28 items, 
that matched his or her image or perception of indigenous people in Ecuador. Although 
JOCV volunteers’ image of indigenous peoples in Highland Ecuador varied according to 
where the JOCV volunteers had been assigned, all six JOCV informants who work with 
indigenous people selected “wearing hat and dress such as poncho and anacu” and 
“living in rural areas” as characteristics of indigenous peoples.  
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Table 6.1: Descriptions of Indigenous Peoples in the Ecuadorian Highlands by JOCVs 
Note: The table created by the author on the basis of the result of the survey 
Defining indigenous people on the basis of their outfits is not unique among 
JOCV volunteers; this way of defining indigenous people is frequent among foreigners or 
outsiders of indigenous circles. For instance, Maria Elena García in the Introduction of 
Description 
The Number of JOCV Volunteers Selected 
(6/6) 
Long hair 3 
Single braid 3 
Wearing hat and traditional dress such as poncho and 
anacu 6 
Wearing Western clothes such as blue jeans and T-
shirts  2 
Hard-worker 3 
Educated 0 
Politically organized/political 1 
Bilingual (Spanish and Kichwa)  1 
Speaking excellent Spanish 1 
Mono lingual (e.g., Kichwa only or Spanish only)  0 
Living in urban area 0 
Living in rural area 6 
Agricultural 3 
Religious 0 
Having "cultura propia/cultura distinta" 5 
Strong attachment to land, nature, and high 
knowledge of medicinal plants 3 
Habit to bow 0 
Excellent musician  0 
Rich (economically) 0 
Having pride in their culture 3 
Quiet 2 
Superstitious 1 
Likes to drink 1 
Practicing traditional medicine  1 
Decision making process takes long or not black and 
white type of decision making  0 
Skeptical about new thing  0 
Male-dominant society  4 
Native born in Ecuadorian land 3 
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her book Making Indigenous Citizens demonstrates how stereotypes affect the way 
indigenous peoples are perceived. She begins by showing how her younger brother, who 
was visiting from the United States, thought that indigenous people in Peru were 
supposed to dress in indigenous clothing to be indigenous. At a local bust stop at the 
well-known Sacred Valley of the Incas, her brother said that he did not think that a man, 
who was riding a bike, and his indigenous male son, who was wearing a “Ninja-Turtles 
T-shirt, a Chicago Bulls jacket, and Levis jeans” were indigenous because he thought that 
“the man was riding a bike, and his son is (was) wearing a Chicago Bulls jacket.”1 
Garcia’s younger brother questions their indigenousness on the basis of clothing and the 
possession of a bicycle. As the younger brother stated, “How could they be Indian?” 
These comments exemplify well the way in which foreigners tend to define who is 
indigenous or who is not by they way they dress and by their belongings, particularly if 
those belongings are seen as ‘modern’ and not traditional. 
Also, 5 out of 6 volunteers observed that their image of indigenous peoples in 
Ecuador was associated with the observed having their specific indigenous culture. In 
addition to the answers of the informants, many JOCV volunteers pointed out in the 
JOCV working reports the distinct colorful outfits and cultural values of indigenous 
people as different from “westernized” mestizo society and as signs of being indigenous. 
On the other hand, none of JOCV survey takers selected for the following items: 
“educated,” “living in urban area,” “having a habit to bow,” “excellent musician,” “rich 
                                                
1 García, Making Indigenous Citiznes, 1-2.  
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(economically),” “religious,” “skeptical about new thing” and “decision making process 
takes long or not black/white type of decision making.”   
The pattern of the selected descriptions indicates that JOCV volunteers 
conceptualize indigenous people as culturally rich and still living according to their 
traditional way in rural areas, but they regarded indigenous people as groups 
economically and socially excluded from access to public benefits. For instance, some 
JOCV volunteers who worked both in the Highlands and Lowlands brought up the issue 
of the late arrival of primary school textbooks to the rural communities as an example of 
indigenous peoples’ exclusion to public access. This criticism often appeared in the 
JOCV working reports. In addition, JOCV volunteers, who worked or are working with 
indigenous peoples, often pointed out the lack of maintenance of water and sewer 
services and unstableness of electricity and water supply in rural communities.  
Also, examination of the comments in JOCV working reports shows that JOCV 
volunteers, whether they have been involved in indigenous development or not, shared 
the image that indigenous peoples are a economically and socially excluded group in 
Ecuadorian society. For instance, a JOCV female volunteer who worked as a social 
worker commented on the existence of wage inequality between indigenous people and 
groups of mestizo and whites and they also noted that employment opportunities are 
fewer for indigenous groups if they compete with mestizo groups.2 Another female 
volunteer served as a music teacher and said that many of domestic workers were 
indigenous women and almost everyday she saw them washing large loads of clothing; 
                                                
2 JOCV volunteer # 7, JOCV working report.  
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she felt racial discrimination against indigenous peoples existed in Ecuador.3 Another 
volunteer, who worked as a Jūdo teacher, wrote in his working report that he heard his 
colleagues making fun of (joking about) indigenous people. So he perceived that racial 
discrimination against indigenous people was still presented.”4  
  Although some of JOCV volunteers brought up the issue of racial discrimination 
against indigenous peoples, JOCV volunteers who worked within indigenous 
communities in bilingual schools, or who lived in towns of “prestigious” indigenous 
groups such as the Otavalo and the Saraguro said that they rarely observed offensive 
actions or jokes against indigenous people in their assigned town. The reason why these 
JOCV volunteers working in Otavalo and Saraguro mentioned that they did not feel there 
is racial discrimination against indigenous people is that indigenous people are in the 
majority in these areas and many are economically secure compared with indigenous 
peoples who live in remote communities or who migrated into large urban areas. In the 
survey mentioned earlier, JOCV female volunteers who lived in Otavalo circled “having 
pride in their culture” as one of their perceptions of the indigenous people of Ecuador.  
Also, depending on which organization JOCV volunteers were assigned to, the 
volunteers defined indigenous people differently. For instance, in terms of the survey 
item of “politically organized, ” only one JOCV volunteer selected the item, although 
indigenous peoples in Ecuador have been well known for having one of the best-
organized political groups. The volunteer who selected the item as a description of 
                                                
3 JOCV volunteer# 153, JOCV working report  
4 JOCV volunteer # 181, JOCV working report.  
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indigenous people is working with an indigenous organization which emerged in the 
1980s in the region and that organization today is politically active and affiliated with 
National Federation of Indigenous, Peasant, and Black Organizations (hereafter, 
FENOCIN). That JOCV volunteer was not assigned to support that organization’s 
political goals. However, he perceived indigenous people as ‘politically organized’ 
through interaction with indigenous people in his assigned organization. The JOCV 
volunteer had a different image of indigenous peoples before coming to Ecuador. He was 
interested in indigenous civilization in the Americas. The books and TV programs he had 
read and seen in Japan helped constructing his image of indigenous people. However, 
after he started working in Ecuador, he said that he no longer could define indigenous 
people simply as he did before.  
Another male volunteer who served in the area of community development in the 
Imbabra province is an interesting case. He realized that his racist views were 
continuously growing while he was working with indigenous people; not against 
indigenous people but toward mestizo people (he had never had this anti-mestizo 
sentiment in Japan). His views changed once he stared working with indigenous people 
and witnessed many distrustful acts and comments from mestizos against indigenous 
people. However, at the end of his service he mentioned his distrustful feeling toward 
mestizos as one of his weakness and as a critical issue in his life and during his service as 
JOCV volunteer in Ecuador.5     
                                                
5 JOCV volunteer # 160, JOCV working report.  
 186 
Regarding the language usage as ethnic marker for indigenous people, none of the 
JOCV volunteers circled the item indigenous people as “monolingual” Kichwa only or 
Spanish only. However, a JOCV volunteer, Takeshi who works in primary schools in 
Saraguro circled “speaking excellent Spanish,” but he did not choose the item 
‘monolingual.’ In this case, he did not treat indigenous language as one of his 
determinants to select who is indigenous or not, unlike some aid practitioners such as 
some NGOs and state officials who believe and emphasize that learning the indigenous 
language through the bilingual education system is crucial to their cultural survival and to 
the cultural identity of the people.6  
The issue of the language usage is a very complicated one. As García discussed 
the NGOs’ discourse and their work for bilingual education in Peruvian highlands, those 
NGOs believed indigenous language and bilingual education were crucial for indigenous 
cultural survival and as a means to help raising indigenous kids’ self-esteem. However, 
Garcia’s study noted that there has been opposition from indigenous parents to the 
NGOs’ belief in bilingual education.7  
When I visited a primary school in the Saraguro region where JOCV volunteer 
Takeshi works, all teachers and all girls, and some of boys were wearing traditional 
outfits (see Figure 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3). The female teacher who has worked in the primary 
school for over fifteen years told me that she was struggling to teach Kichwa to the 
students. She said that she tried to speak in Kichwa to her students most of time. 
                                                
6 Garca, Making Indigenous Citizens, 113 and 131-132.  
7 Ibid., 132.  
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However, when she and I found out that some of the youngest students opened the 
emergency medical box and were playing with medicine bottles, she suddenly switched 
from Kichwa to Spanish. She scolded the students not in Kichwa, but in Spanish. After 
the incident, I did not ask her the reason why she switched from Kichwa to Spanish but I 
assumed that it was due to emergency situation; she judged the students would 
immediately react to Spanish and she wanted to prevent the children from being injured. 
This event demonstrates a considerable level of language loss among indigenous people 
in the area.  
  
           Figure 6.1: Saraguro Teacher and Students 
                
Figure 6.2: Girls in Spinning Class Figure 6.3: Girl and Boy in front of Student Work 
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In terms of use of indigenous language, the situation of the communities around 
Otavalo was different when I went to observe a primary school located from 30 to 40 
minutes away from the city of Otavalo. In the primary school almost all children spoke 
fluently Kichwa, and many students talked to me in Kichwa, but I could not communicate 
well so they translated from Kichwa to Spanish for me. While I was there I heard that 
JOCV volunteer say to the students, “You need to practice more conjugations in Spanish 
because you guys need to speak beautiful Spanish!” As descriptive of indigenous people 
that JOCV volunteer selected “bilingual” rather than “monolingual” or “speaking 
excellent Spanish.” The analysis of the JOCV working reports, as well as my 
observations of JOCV volunteers who are working in indigenous bilingual schools in 
Ecuador, show that the majority of JOCV volunteers commented on indigenous peoples’ 
outfits as ethnic markers, but they rarely used their native language as one of those 
markers.  
In terms of the perception of indigenous people as “quiet,” there are different 
reactions between JOCV volunteers and Peace Corps volunteers. Two JOCV survey 
takers selected “quiet” as characteristic of indigenous people in Ecuador. They did not 
see “quietness” of indigenous students as difficulty in terms of their JOCV work.8 On the 
other hand, a female Peace Corps volunteer who had served both in the Highlands and in 
the costal region, noted that there was a different attitude between highland indigenous 
children and costal children. She said:    
                                                
8 Interviewed by the author, and I also put more info about it. Some of JOCV volunteers interviewed noted 
the similarity between Japanese and indigenous people and chose “quiet” or “shy” as characteristics (work 
in progress) 
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The juxtaposition of coastal children and indigenous sierra children was quite 
extreme. It was very difficult to get the indigenous children to speak and when 
they did speak, it was often too soft to be able to hear. It will definitely take a 
great deal of trust-building to work with an indigenous community, in the future.9  
 
Unlike the block quote above, two JOCV survey takers including a JOCV 
volunteer who taught at an elementary school in Japan said that she was familiar with this 
tendency among some Japanese children (e.g., children speak too soft to hear and avoid 
speaking actively in class). The female JOCV volunteer said that indigenous children in 
class behave similarly to Japanese children in Japan.10 The perception of a “quiet” or 
“shy” student and of a “quiet” class environment varied by teachers, so one cannot 
generalize to all Japanese educational environments. But, Japanese students usually tend 
to be disciplined and be quiet in class during their school.11 The Peace Corps volunteer’s 
lesson is that to use the U.S. participatory type of class discussion at the beginning of 
their work and assume it would be successful should not be expected in indigenous 
communities. Compared to the Peace Corps volunteer’s culture surprise about this matter, 
the JOCV volunteers were more familiar with this type of class environment, particularly 
in the initial period of their assignment.  
 
                                                
9 Julia Schreiber, “Welcome to Ecuador,” 100 spf: Julia’s Peace Corps Ecuador Blog, entry posted June 
29, 2012, http://100spf.blogspot.com/2012_06_01_archive.html [accessed February10, 2013].  
10 Yuka, interviewed by the author, June 13, 2013.   
11 See figure 18 and 19 in the Appendix, there are two examples of illustrations that are used for Japanese 
students and for class environment in Japan. When I was an elementary school student in Japan, we had 
usually had a poster in classroom or corridor, which says “shizukani!” (Be quiet!).  
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OVERVIEW OF JOCV AND PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS IN THE FIELD OF INDIGENOUS 
DEVELOPMENT  
 
The current JOCV/Ecuador office insisted that the JOCV/Ecuador program has 
neither target ethnic population nor indigenous development projects in Ecuador, while, 
in fact, JOCV/Ecuador actively increased the number of JOCV volunteers who worked 
with indigenous people, particularly in the field of education, when I conducted research 
in summer 2007.12 That is, even though JOCV/Ecuador does not express the intention to 
participate in indigenous development projects, currently, 10 JOCV volunteers out of 39 
are assigned to work projects related to indigenous affairs in Ecuador (as of July 2012).13   
Similar to JOCV, Peace Corps/Ecuador also sent Peace Corps volunteers to work 
with indigenous related organizations or municipalities that are connected with 
indigenous affairs.14Although a Peace Corps official said the agency does not have a 
concept of indigenous development, the official also told me the Peace Corps/Ecuador 
plans to increase the number of volunteers sent to indigenous communities in the 
highlands. He added that the Peace Corps office recognized that sending volunteers to 
indigenous communities in the highlands is more challenging for the Peace Corps 
because of their past experiences in terms of difficulties of cultural adaptation for Peace 
                                                
12 Kawachi, “My Culture and Your Response” 75-77.    
13 There were more than 39 JOCV volunteers in Ecuador in July 2012. However, a new group of JOCV 
volunteers arrived at the end of June and they were taking 6 weeks training in Cuenca so I omitted them 
form the total number.10 JOCV volunteers are assigned to the Board of Education of bilingual schools, 
provincial councils (assigned as nutritionists, specialists for pest control and tree planting, and as 
coordinators), to public health care centers, and to indigenous organizations.     
14 In the Peace Corps’ Informe Annual Ecuador 2011, the Peace Corps office listed organizations that 
receive or cooperate with Peace Corps volunteers in 2011. There are some obviously indigenous 
organizations such as Unión de Organizaciones Campesinas de Indígenas de Cotacachi [Union of Farmers’ 
Organizations of indigenous People in Cotacachi] and Fundación Centro de Desarrollo Indígena 
[Foundation of Center of Development for Indigenous People].  
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Corps volunteers and for indigenous peoples.15 That is, one difference between Peace 
Corps/Ecuador and JOCV Ecuador is that the Peace Corps perceived indigenous 
development to be a challenging area for a foreign agency to be involved in. However, 
there is a commonality between the two agencies: both recognized that indigenous 
peoples in Ecuador are vulnerable groups, and the need to send volunteers to improve the 
situation. Also, both offices said that their agencies do not have a concept of indigenous 
development in their development agenda in Ecuador.  
The Peace Corps/Ecuador requires their volunteers to conduct surveys and 
identify a project for their assigned community, but the Peace Corps volunteers might be 
faced with difficulties as they are working a totally new place. Following there are some 
examples of the different perspectives held by the agency and the volunteers about the 
system. When I conducted the interview with a Peace Corps official in 2012, the Peace 
Corps office was very positive that they would continue to send more Peace Corps 
volunteers to highland indigenous communities although an informant had said that 
sending them to that region was more challenging than sending them to the lowland 
indigenous communities. According to the agency’s experience, “cultural adaptation” is 
difficult for volunteers in terms of gender roles, behavior, and language. Also, compared 
with the highland indigenous peoples, I assume that the lowland indigenous peoples and 
the foreign workers would more easily share a mutual goal, such as protecting forests, 
than delve into complicated cultural issues such as family planning and gender roles. The 
                                                
15 Anonymous, interviewed by author, Ecuador, June 2, 2012.        
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Peace Corps office believes that conducting surveys helps the Peace Corps volunteers 
overcome the difficulty of “cultural adaptation” to indigenous communities.  
On the other hand, a Peace Corps volunteer commented it is difficult for 
foreigners to conduct surveys about their community’s needs or problems in such closed 
indigenous communities because during the initial period they have not yet established 
trust relationships with people in the communities.16 In terms of this, Terry West, a 
former Peace Corps anthropologist who served in the Bolivian highlands, wrote how 
difficult it was to get acceptance from indigenous people in the rural communities. West 
described his experience: “The Aymara tend to cope with strangers by social isolation.”17 
West said that it was not only a language problem. However, finally, Aymara children 
broke down the barriers and gradually the children helped him to establish trust 
relationships with the adults, and the elderly indigenous people gradually accepted him as 
they drank together at social gatherings.18     
Unlike the Peace Corps volunteers who are expected to face the challenge and 
create their own project through participatory research in indigenous communities, 
JOCV’s way of assigning their volunteers is more fixed and predetermined. At least, the 
JOCV volunteers know beforehand their expected area of development and can plan to 
some extent what practices they will employ before going to Ecuador. On the other hand, 
there might, or might not be, a big gap between what they have heard and the reality they 
encounter regarding the content of activities JOCV volunteers will be asked to perform.  
                                                
16 Anonymous, interviewed by author, Ecuador, July 12, 2012.           
17 West, “Anthropology,” 200.   
18 Ibid.      
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JOCV VOLUNTEERS AND BILINGUAL EDUCATION IN INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES 
 
According to JOCV/Ecuador, JOCV approached the Ministry of Education to 
access the intercultural bilingual education network in the middle of the 2000s. In 2006, 
JOCV/Ecuador received a request to dispatch JOCV volunteers to work with the 
intercultural bilingual education network. After receiving the request, JOCV uploaded 
information to recruit volunteers, who wanted to work in the field of bilingual education. 
In 2006 and 2007 they posted recruitments for 11 bilingual schools in indigenous 
communities.19 In the following years JOCV/Ecuador registered the highest number of 
volunteers to work in the field of bilingual education. 
The recent tendency to assign JOCV volunteers to bilingual primary schools in 
indigenous communities, results from the fact that JOCV volunteers are assigned to a 
Board of Bilingual Education (e.g., Red Escolar Autonoma Rural “Maca Grande”- 
Education Network of Autonomous Rural School "Maca Grande") instead of being 
assigning to one fixed primary school for all their two years of the service.20 In the 
middle of 2000s, JOCV intensively recruited JOCV volunteers to work on bilingual 
education in the highlands and lowlands.  
Due to the fact that JOCV volunteers are assigned to the Education Department, 
they are required to teach in different primary schools in the region during their two years 
                                                
19 Kawachi, “My Culture and Your Response,” 75-76.    
20 The official name of each Broad of Bilingual Education in Ecuador varies by region or community.    
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assignment.21 One JOCV volunteer, who was assigned to community development in the 
Imbabra province, left a suggestion in his 2007 working report regarding JOCV 
volunteers in the educational field. He believed that JOCV volunteers should contribute 
by transferring teaching methodologies to local teachers rather than working as 
manpower in primary schools and he suggested that JOCV volunteers should be assigned 
to a supervising organization such as the Board of Education.22 I am not sure whether the 
suggestion influenced the JOCV office/Ecuador; however, the JOCV office tends to send 
JOCV volunteers to bilingual primary schools in indigenous communities through the 
Board of Bilingual Education.   
An analysis of the Volunteer Request Sheets to determine why the Board of 
Bilingual Education requested JOCV volunteers as primary school teachers for the 
highland indigenous communities, indicates that the main reasons are serious labor and 
budget shortages in the primary schools located in isolated mountainous indigenous 
communities. Also, because of the isolated location, teachers from other areas do not 
wish to move there.23 These circumstances result in poor arithmetic education in the 
                                                
21 For instance, Red Escolar Autónoma de Centros Educativos Interculturales Bilingües Quichinche  
(Board of Autonomous Intercultural Bilingual Education in Quichinche) has 22 primary schools in the 
selected area; on the other hand, Red de Centro Educativos “INKA RIMAY” (Board of Education “INKA 
RIMAY”) has only six primary schools in the area.   
22 JOCV volunteer # 160, JOCV working report.   
23 In the case of rural Andean highlands in Peru, “rural teachers” tend to be perceived or stigmatized as 
“less prepared,” or “less competent than those working in urban areas” (e.g., some rural teachers from 
outside the community, only give classes three times a week due to commuting difficulties and the isolated 
location of the school). Also, school management is also perceived as less organized than that in the urban 
areas. In addition to this stigma, the government does not pay teachers appropriately (e.g., unpaid bonus). 
Under these circumstances, some of rural teachers want to transfer from rural schools to schools located in 
more urban settings. See more detail in, Garcia, Making Indigenous Citizens, 115-118. Garcia’s 
ethnographic work was conducted in the Peruvian highlands. However, similar prejudices against rural 
schools and teachers and even similar situations occur in the Ecuadorian rural highlands.    
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region. According to the Volunteer Request Sheet, JOCV volunteers were expected to 
travel to several different primary schools in the indigenous communities and teach 
arithmetic together with local teachers, (2) to give instruction and advice to the local 
teachers on arithmetic education, and (3) to give advice about the overall school 
administration. 
In the following sections, I incorporate other JOCV volunteers’ experiences to 
illustrate JOCV volunteers’ practices in indigenous development projects through 
exploring two cases of JOCV volunteers dispatched to the Board of Bilingual Education 
in the northern Ecuadorian Highlands—Imbabra province, and to the southern 
Ecuadorian Highlands— Loja province.    
JOCVs in Bilingual Education in the Quichinche Area of Imbabura Province 
 
The female JOCV volunteer, whose name is Yuka, is a woman in her mid-
twenties who has experience teaching in primary schools in Japan. When I met her for the 
first time at the bus terminal of Otavalo city, I could not recognize her as a Japanese 
volunteer because she looked different from what I imagined a female Japanese volunteer 
would look. Yuka’s hair was single braided and she was wearing an Otavalo indigenous 
woman’s full traditional dress, but she wore a sport jacket over the traditional dress. 
Instead of wearing a pair of sneakers, she was wearing sandals (they are called 
alpargatas). Yuka is always wearing the traditional Otavalos dress when she works and 
she learned how to embroider small flowers and other motifs on a shirt and how to get 
traditional outfits from her indigenous colleague. Although Yuka told me that collecting 
folk dresses is one of her hobbies, her effort at trying to learn Otavalo’s culture helps her 
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to get along with her colleagues. For instance, her indigenous colleague said in the 
meeting, “I have learned many things from Yuka, but the thing I most appreciate is that 
Yuka has always accepted our culture and customs. She practiced how to put on the 
Otavalos’ dress with us and now she is able to get dressed by herself. I appreciate her 
attitude trying on our culture.”24 
Yuka is the second JOCV volunteer who was dispatched to Red Escolar 
Autónoma de Centros Educativos Interculturales Bilingües Quichinche (Board of 
Autonomous Intercultural Bilingual Education in Quichinche). According to the 
Volunteer Request Sheet, the reason why the Board of Education requested a JOCV 
volunteer is the same as that made by another Board of Bilingual Education earlier; that 
is, to improve the quality of arithmetic education in bilingual primary schools in the 
region. Since she read the Volunteer Request Sheet and understood what the host 
institution needed, Yuka perceived that one of her roles as JOCV volunteer was to 
transfer her teaching math skills to the local teachers in the region and she planned a 
study group with local teachers. However, the reality was different from what Yuka 
envisioned. During her first year she worked at four primary schools in indigenous 
communities.25In general, classes of indigenous bilingual primary schools in Ecuador are 
conducted as combined classes. Generally, students of two different grades take the same 
class together with one teacher. For instance, she usually teaches arithmetic to children of 
all grades in the primary school by herself.  
                                                
24 Personal notes, Ecuador, June 12, 2012.      
25 Yuka’s teaching schedule for the first year was teaching at Bear School on every Monday, Rabbit 
School every Tuesday, Tiger School every Wednesday, Cat School every Thursday, and she works at office 
of Board of Autonomous Intercultural Bilingual Education in Quichinche every Friday. For her second 
year, she added three new schools and she continues to teach at Tiger school. Also, on some Fridays, she 
visited and taught at primary schools not listed on her schedule. In total, she taught twelve different primary 
schools in indigenous communities (as of December 2012).   
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Figure 6.4: Students in Rabbit School in Quichinche and Author 
Rabbit School’s case is better in terms of the number of teachers.26 There are 
three teachers: two indigenous teachers (one of them is the School Principal) and one 
mestizo teacher. Yuka was asked to teach the English class with her colleague so that she 
supplementary teaches English with other teacher. Yuka joined in arithmetic class taught 
by the Principal and she attends to students by walking around in the class. In this case, 
Yuka can show how to teach the class and introduce new teaching methods to her 
colleagues.  
On the other hand, Tiger School is obviously short of teachers. There are only two 
teachers (the Principal and one teacher) so Yuka is generally alone teaching. The worst 
situation happened when the Principal needed to attend a board meeting in Otavalo for 
almost the entire week. There was only one teacher available to teach around fifty 
children of several grades. In addition to the problem of teacher shortage in the 
indigenous communities, teachers were busy submitting school evaluations to the 
Ecuadorian government when I was in Ecuador.27 Yuka said that they obviously did not 
                                                
26 Every school’s names in this chapter are pseudonyms. The number of Rabbit School’s students is 
approximately 70.  
27According to the Director of Board of Autonomous Intercultural Bilingual Education in Quichinche, 
teachers in the region were ordered in January 2012 to submit school evaluation for each unit from 2007 to 
 198 
have time to learn new teaching methods and experiment with enriching teaching 
materials. Although Yuka perceived one of her roles as being instrumental in transferring 
some arithmetic teaching techniques to the local teachers, Yuka told me that she had not 
had a chance to hold an arithmetic pedagogy seminar for a year, especially in the 
situation like that experienced at the Tiger School.  
Yuka’s school teaching style includes elements of Japanese school discipline. For 
instance, before class started, she had the indigenous students clean their classroom with 
her because there were fallen leaves and some garbage in the classroom. She encouraged 
students to keep a neat and tidy study environment. In Japan, when students enter to a 
primary school, they are required to clean their own classroom and other school facilities 
everyday, so Yuka follows the same discipline and practice with her indigenous students.  
 
              
Figure 6.5: Girls at Tiger School         Figure 6.6: Yuka’s Arithmetic Class 
 
                                                                                                                                            
2012 (for five years) to the government by the middle of July 2012. Yuka said that Tiger School did not 
have the record of students’ grade for each unit for the past five years. So teachers were very confused how 
to calculate and provide school evaluations. I saw one teacher asked children to ask their mothers whether 
they have the grade report card at home since 2007. According to Yuka’s email that I received January 2, 
2013, all primary schools in Ecuador, including her assigned region, were ordered to start over school 
evaluations by the government of Ecuador.   
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Yuka understands that the “ideal student image” for Japanese teachers (“kodomo 
no risōzō” in Yuka’s words) is different from that of the local teachers in indigenous 
communities in Ecuador. However, Yuka wants to give the same opportunity to 
indigenous children to learn arithmetic as Japanese children have because she believes 
every child should have the right to receive basic education wherever they are. However, 
as discussed in the Tiger School case, external problems (e.g, shortage of teachers) to 
support primary bilingual education in indigenous communities did not let her 
development ideas and practices work smoothly. 
In regard to external factors, Yuka’s predecessor, a male JOCV volunteer also 
wrote in his JOCV working report about external problems that hampered him from 
improving the quality of arithmetic education in the indigenous communities. First, he 
pointed out the issue of the late arrival of the textbook from the government to the 
bilingual primary schools in the region. For instance, textbooks had not arrived in his 
assigned communities until three months after the start of the semester.28 
Secondly, he discussed the problems of the organization of the arithmetic 
textbook provided by the government for bilingual Kichwa/Spanish students. As figure 
6.7 and 6.8 shows, the government made an effort to use both languages equally in the 
textbook. However, this caused the inconsistency of learning arithmetic vocabularies 
because the arithmetic textbook is written alternately in Spanish and Kichwa for each 
unit, like Chapter 1 in Spanish, Chapter 2 in Kichwa…). He added “using this textbook 
ruined the indigenous students’ ability to learn arithmetic...”29 Regarding the late arrival 
of the textbook and its “disorganization,” Yuka’s JOCV predecessor made a workbook 
                                                
28 According to Yuka’s email, the year of 2012 (fall) arrived textbook on time; however, the number of 
textbook is far fewer than the number of children in primary school. Personal Communication, January 2, 
2013.   
29 JOCV volunteer #66, JOCV volunteer working report.   
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for arithmetic for every grade and distributed it to all twenty primary schools located in 
the Board of Bilingual Education.30 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Arithmetic Textbook for Bilingual School 1 (Ch.3 written in Spanish) 
 
Figure 6.8: Arithmetic Textbook for Bilingual School 2 (Ch.4 written in Kichwa) 
 
      When I visited the Tiger School in Quichinche, countless brand-new bilingual 
arithmetic textbooks lay in a heap on the bookshelves in the teacher’s room. According to 
Yuka and her indigenous colleagues, the reason why Tiger School did not use the 
                                                
30 Ibid.  
 201 
bilingual arithmetic textbook is the same reason Yuka’s JOCV’s predecessor brought up.  
I asked Yuka about the utilization of arithmetic workbook made by the JOCV volunteer. 
Yuka said that she had seen that some of primary schools use the arithmetic workbook, 
especially primary schools that have a copy machine. In addition, she said that she knew 
of a primary school where teachers ordered each student to make a copy of the workbook 
and bring it to class.31According to Yuka, in some cases, this workbook makes it possible 
to start teaching arithmetic as soon as the semester begins, even when the official 
textbook has not yet arrived. 
      In addition, in the case of the primary schools in the Quichinche region, school 
facilities are poorly built and maintained. Some classrooms’ windows remain broken, and 
at the time of my visit all toilets did not flush. There are hand-washing areas in the 
primary schools, but water does not flow constantly, and sometimes there is no water. 
The government assists by providing breakfast to primary schools and bilingual primary 
schools in the Board of Bilingual Education in the region also receive school breakfast 
assistance. However, because primary schools in indigenous communities lack a constant 
water supply of water it is not guaranteed that students can wash their hands before 
eating.  
                                                
31 In Ecuador, there are many copy stores everywhere. And students go to copy store and order to make 
copy whole book, textbook or document instead of buying textbook.    
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Figure 6.9: Broken Classroom Window 
 
      At the time of my visit, approximately twenty university students from the United 
States affiliated with a religious organization came to the primary school every afternoon. 
They taught English, physical education and sometimes they gave lessons in hygiene to 
the children at Tiger School. Because of the lack of a constant supply of water, during the 
hygiene lesson the university students had to use water from a bucket instead of running 
water. Indigenous children had a lot of fun learning with the young American students 
but the indigenous students cannot practice what they learned in this class in their real 
school life because of the lack of constant supply of running water.  
       Both Yuka and another JOCV volunteer, who had worked in the region before 
Yuka came, believe the indigenous primary schools are economically and socially 
excluded in terms of securing the right of children to access basic public benefits. In 
terms of this problem, a Peace Corps volunteer who worked in the highland of the 
Cotopaxi province expressed the same concerns, as did the JOCV volunteers. The Peace 
Corps volunteer said: 
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        Recently we’ve had some discipline and class cutting issues. The problem is    
  that the director and the other teachers don’t care. When the kids don’t show up    
  to class, great! That means a free hour of not having to work for them. There is   
  no kind of accountability by either the teachers or the students. If they learn,  
  they learn; if they don’t, oh well. This attitude is really hard to fight. I almost  
  understand where the teachers are coming from. They travel 6 hours everyday  
  to and from work. It’s freezing cold and rainy. The road to get to the school  
  makes everyone car sick (including me) it’s so curvy—worse when it’s covered    
  in mud and landslides.32  
 
        The Peace Corp volunteer claimed that the lack “of any kind of accountability 
by either the teachers and the students” was due to the difficulty of commuting to the 
school. On the other hand, the perceptions of these volunteers highlights the problem that 
local conditions, such as inadequate staff, transportation and difficulty of access affect 
delivery and implementation of development projects.   
JOCVs in Bilingual Education in Saraguro Area in Loja Province 
 
A male JOCV volunteer, whose name is Takeshi and is in his late-thirties and 
married, was one of the informants. Takeshi has about ten years of teaching experience in 
primary schools in Japan. Thanks to the kind understanding of his family, he left his wife 
and children in Japan and came to Ecuador to serve in the JOCV program. This is not the 
first time that Takeshi serves as a JOCV volunteer. He had worked for two years as an 
agriculturalist in the Philippines approximately fifteen years ago. The experience gave 
him a motivation to become a primary school teacher. When I met him for the first time 
in the town of Saraguro, he appeared like an ordinary Japanese man in casual style 
clothing, wearing blue jeans and carrying a backpack. During his JOCV service, he lives 
with a Saraguro family in the indigenous community.  
                                                
32 Krista, “¡Que Viva Alausi!” Krista Goes to Ecuador, entry posted November 16, 2011, 
http://kristagoestoecuador.blogspot.com/2011/11/que-viva-alausi.html [accessed Feb 14, 2013].   
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Takeshi is the second JOCV volunteer who was dispatched to Red de Centro 
Educativos “INKA RIMAY” (Board of Education “INKA RIMAY”). The reason why the 
Board of Education requested JOCV volunteer is the same as in Yuka’s case; that is, it 
aims to improve the quality of the arithmetic education in bilingual primary schools in the 
region. There are six primary schools in his assigned Broad of Education. During his first 
three months, he visited primary schools to observe and learn how the local teachers 
taught and how the school system operated. While he was observing the school, some 
local teachers asked him to give a class for their students, so he gradually started teaching 
an Origami class because he did not have enough confidence to teach Arithmetic in 
Spanish, which he imagined required good Spanish speaking skills. Even after one year 
in Ecuador, Takeshi studies Spanish every afternoon by himself. This was the way he 
tried to adjusting to the primary schools in Saraguro.  
Regarding his private life, Takeshi lives comfortably with his Saraguro host 
family and he respects his host father, who is a community leader. Since Takeshi and his 
host father are about the same age and both of them have children, Takeshi shares a 
similar situation and this helps them to understand each other more easily. At the 
beginning of his life in the Saraguro community, Takeshi had participated in minga 
(traditional communal work practiced in the Andes since pre-colonial period) in his living 
community. Since he was physically very tired because of working outside for a long 
time under the strong sunlight, he stopped participating in minga after a while. However, 
he said that participating in minga was a good opportunity for him to learn how every 
Saraguro in the community cooperates with each other every Saturday in the form of 
minga.    
After three months of his arrival, Takeshi started teaching Arithmetic in primary 
schools. He stays one to two weeks in each primary school and teaches Arithmetic 
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everyday. On the final day of his teaching phase, he handed in the result of students’ test 
to the school to show how the students had improved their Arithmetic skills by repeated 
practice, which is encouraged in Japanese primary school. He said to me that he did not 
always succeed in improving students’ test results, but sometimes he did.   
 Like Yuka’s teaching style, Takeshi also follows the Japanese teaching style in 
the classroom. For example, before beginning class, he guides students to clean up their 
desk and to create a neat and tidy study environment. When he begins class, the students 
greet him in Japanese and bow. According to Takeshi, the reason why he let his students 
do this is that teaching children using the Japanese style creates a sense of ‘particularity’ 
in his classroom. He came from a different country so he wants to give a little different 
class experience to students from their ordinary class experience by using his foreignness. 
Although Takeshi stressed that he teaches the class using his Japanese teaching method, 
he said, “I do not want to refute local teachers’ teaching method because I think that the 
local teachers have their own best way to teach so I don't want to interfere with it.”33
 Takeshi’s approach does not put much emphasis on transferring Japanese 
pedagogy of Arithmetic education to the local Board of Education’s teachers; in other 
words, he is not obsessed with the idea, that ‘technology transfer’ is the most important 
task for JOCV volunteers. Regarding his role as a JOCV volunteer in the bilingual 
primary schools in Saraguro, Takeshi said, “I teach Arithmetic to children [students] in 
classroom, and if their teachers agree with or have interest in learning my teaching 
method, I would be glad to have them use my teaching method, but how to use a JOCV 
volunteer is up to the local teachers; they can use the JOCV volunteer’s knowledge and 
expertise effectively for their own educational benefits, if they want.”34 Takeshi’s ideal 
                                                
33 Takeshi, interview by the author, Ecuador, June 22, 2013. 
34 Ibid.  
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role for a JOCV volunteer is more as a passive agent than an active one. His position is a 
bit different from that of Yuka as well as from that of Yuka’s predecessor, who was 
struggling to find ways of implement ‘technology transfer’ to the local primary schools.   
 
 
Figure 6.10: Saraguro Teacher and Students in Kichwa Class 
             
Figure 6.11: Takeshi Teaching Arithmetic 
Takeshi is not sure that, as a Japanese schoolteacher, he contributes to the 
Saraguro communities as a schoolteacher teaching Arithmetic. Takeshi observes and 
experiences Saraguro and the local’s life style by living in the indigenous community. He 
told me that he wonders if Saraguro’s students in his assigned region who improve their 
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arithmetic skills can expect any benefit from that knowledge in the future. Takeshi does 
not think the Saraguro people suffer economic and social exclusion because of ethnic 
inequality and he never felt that the Saraguro were subject to racial discrimination in the 
region. In reality, even in the 1980s, according to anthropologists Linda Belote and Jim 
Belote, the Saraguro have owned most of the Saraguro land and they have a stronger 
economic position than the white or mestizo groups in the region; that is, the pattern of 
ethnic relations between indigenous and white/mestizo in Saraguro is “unusual for 
Ecuador.”35 In the case of Takeshi, since he knows the Saraguro’s economic success and 
their successful operation of minga (see above) in his living community, he dose not 
perceive the Saraguro as a socially and economically excluded group. Because of relative 
success and economic achievement of the Saraguro, Takeshi’s view toward his role as a 
JOCV volunteer is not as representative as that of Yuka’s. Also this was the second time 
Takeshi participated in a JOCV program so that his own previous experience quite 
possibly influences his way of thinking on what development is or should be.  
Peace Corps had not had the assignment and placement system that JOCV has, so 
the Peace Corps office tended not to assign their volunteers to a fixed Broad of Bilingual 
Education for teaching or for instruction of teaching method to local teachers in 
indigenous communities. Instead, Peace Corps was scheduled to establish a TEFL 
program in Ecuador since the summer 2011. The new project was established to support 
the Ecuadorian government’s goal to help Ecuadorian teachers to improve their skills and 
resources to teach English.36 According to a JOCV volunteer who had visited several 
different indigenous communities in the Imbabara province, indigenous people especially 
want to receive elementary school teachers who are able to teach English because 
                                                
35 Belote and Belote, “Drain from the Bottom,” 26-27.   
36 Peace Corps, “The Peace Corps Welcome You to Ecuador (Peace Corps Publication For New 
Volunteers June 2011),” 5-6.  
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indigenous communities feel they are facing a lack of English teachers in their local 
schools.37 Because of that, Peace Corps participation in this area would be ideal and 
more effective because the Peace Corps/Ecuador has good human resources in terms of 
teaching English and they would contribute to improving the level of English for 
indigenous children studying in indigenous bilingual schools.  
 
JOCV AND PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS IN HEALTH AND NUTRITION PROGRAMS IN 
INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT 
   
In terms of indigenous-related development in the area of health, JOCV has 
dispatched nutritionists, nurses, and hygienists to Ecuador. Unlike JOCV’s tendency to 
dispatch volunteers to the area of bilingual education in the decade of 2000, JOCV did 
not intensively sent groups of volunteers to work with indigenous communities in the 
area of health. On the basis of Volunteer Request Sheets, requests for JOCV volunteers in 
the area of health were made because of a variety of needs, unlike the requests for 
bilingual education volunteers, which were based on a single major goal, —the 
improvement of arithmetic education in bilingual primary schools.38 The majority of 
requests for JOCV nurse volunteers are for applicants (1) to work with local nurses and 
guide fellow workers for better patient management and treatment, (2) to provide 
suggestions on how to care for and for control of medications in the hospital. Besides 
that, JOCV nurses and hygienists are expected to travel to indigenous communities to 
give health related advice including advice on dental health, care for pregnant woman, 
                                                
37
 JOCV volunteer # 160, JOCV working report.   
38 For example, Hospital Enrique Sotomayor [Enrique Sotomayor Hospital] in Guayaquil requested a 
JOCV nurse volunteer, specifically for infection control measures and appliance sterilization methods. 
Acción Social de Municipio de Azogues [Social Action of Municipal of Azogues]in Azogues, Cañar 
province, requested a JOCV nurse volunteer to guide local nurses on how to care drug/alcohol addicts.   
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and family planning. With regard to JOCV nutritionist volunteers, they are expected to 
guide or build up nutritious menus and provide sanitary supervision. However, similarly 
to the situations of JOCV volunteers in bilingual primary schools, some of the JOCV 
volunteers in the health care area also feel that there are some inconsistencies between the 
content of requested activities for JOCV volunteers in the Volunteer Request Sheet and 
the reality they encounter when they start working with their host institutions. That is, 
JOCV volunteers in the health area modify their activities depending on resources or 
opportunities available to JOCV volunteers and by considering how they match local 
needs.            
 The Peace Corps also has dispatched volunteers to the area of health. The Peace 
Corps/Ecuador has four main components in the area: (1) child maternal health, (2) 
reproductive health and rights, (3) prevention of tropical diseases, and (4) reduce the 
spread of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases.39 Workshops and other 
activities relating to HIV/AIDS prevention and care for the patients of HIV/AIDS are the 
most popular projects in which the Peace Corps volunteers are involved in the area of the 
health. For instance, 200 workshops about HIV/AIDS were held by Peace Corps 
volunteers during 2011 in Ecuador, and approximately eighty volunteers out of two 
hundred, have experience in holding this type of workshop.40 The annual report that 
presented the data mentioned above did not specify in which towns, cities or communities 
these workshops were held. However, some of Peace Corps volunteers wrote in their 
blogs about their experiences holding workshops in indigenous communities. Unlike the 
Peace Corps in Ecuador, prevention of HIV/AIDS has not been a popular theme in the 
                                                
39 Peace Corps, “The Peace Corps Welcome You to Ecuador (Peace Corps Publication For New 
Volunteers June 2011),” 5.  
40 Peace Corps/Ecuador, Peace Corps Annual Informe 2011, n.p.  
 210 
area of health with JOCV in Ecuador.       
 Since the majority of Peace Corps volunteers do not have working experience as 
medical professionals, the Peace Corps office provided in-depth HIV/AIDS training 
resource kits. For instance, one of the kits entitled “Assessment Analysis & Prioritizing 
Activities: HIV/AID Training Resource Kit” provides information on analytical skills to 
gather information on the awareness of HIV/AID in the host country or in the 
community. In addition, the Peace Corps has other training resource kits with such titles 
as “Behavior Change,” “Biology,” and “Capacity Development” providing knowledge 
about HIV/AIDS and giving tips of how Peace Corps volunteers will be able to hold 
workshops and how the volunteers can deal with cultural matters in the host country in 
terms of HIV/AID and other sexually transmitted illnesses. These resource kits also 
explain how the volunteers can help marginalized or stigmatized groups in terms of these 
sensitive health issues.41 
In the following paragraphs, I illustrate health-related JOCV and Peace Corps 
volunteers’ practices of development with indigenous people in the highlands through 
exploring mainly the statements and experiences of a female JOCV nutritionist, Ayako, 
and a JOCV nurse, Keiko. I will also incorporate other JOCV volunteers’ experiences, as 
well as available data on those of Peace Corps volunteers who worked in the health area 
with indigenous peoples in Ecuador.  
Ayako is a female, about sixty years old, who joined the JOCV senior program as 
a nutritionist volunteer. She has worked for almost three decades, as a nutritionist in 
Japan and this is the second time that she joins a JOCV program. She was dispatched to 
the Philippines in 1974 where she worked for three years and eight months as a young 
                                                
41 Peace Corps, “Behavior Change: HIV/AIDS Training Resource Kit,” 25-44.   
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JOCV volunteer. Since she was JOCV first decade’ volunteer, she told me that the 
training in the 1970s was very strict compared to the recent JOCV training. During the 
training, she felt pressured because the JOCV officials reminded her and her JOCV 
colleagues again and again that JOCV volunteers were carrying the future of Japan.  
After arriving at her assigned site, she worked in comedor (kitchen) serving meals 
to children whose parents had migrated abroad or to big cities in Ecuador. Unlike the 
information contained in the Volunteer Request Sheet, the comedor has a nutritionist and 
a sufficient number of cooks. They have their own menu and served relatively good 
meals to children. So when Ayako brought a menu for the comedor, sometimes her menu 
choices were not used. On the other hand, Ayako and the JOCV nurse heard that remote 
communities outside of their assigned town did not receive enough assistance compared 
to the communities near the town. Because of difficulty of traveling to communities (lack 
of means of transportation and road conditions), even aid workers hired by the World 
Bank, an organization that has a big budget and large projects, cannot travel to remote 
indigenous communities. Even though there are many NGOs and governmental aid 
agencies in the area where Ayako worked, these tend to provide assistance to indigenous 
communities relatively near the town where there is easier access to means of 
transportation. On the other hand, other remote indigenous communities are neglected or 
on a few occasions receive temporary relief such as food.  
Ayako and JOCV nurse started to travel to remote communities to check up 
children’s body weight and height and talked to indigenous people there. During 2011, 
they visited 33 different remote communities and during 2012, they visited 36 
communities. This experience brought up the idea of holding a workshop about the 
‘importance of life’ which includes issues of health, nutrition and sex education (family 
planning) to target adolescent schoolgirls and indigenous mothers who have had a baby 
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or have small children. The central theme of their workshop is lecturing on the 
‘importance of life’ by talking about balanced nutrition and family and life planning to 
protect girls and pregnant women’ s health.    
 
 
                         
Figure 6.12: Ayako and Indigenous Mother     Figure 6.13: Measuring Body Weight  
  
They set up two different types of workshops. In the beginning of 2012, Ayako 
and the JOCV nurse held a sex education workshop. Then, since the middle of July 2012, 
Ayako held a workshop in indigenous communities specifically about nutrition for 
indigenous mothers who have babies and small children.  
The first type of workshop was on sex education and targeted adolescent 
schoolgirls. Ayako and the JOCV nurse held the workshop at 11 different junior high 
schools in the town (3,669 students attended) and at 13 different indigenous communities 
(437 people attended). Ayako and JOCV nurse also held a workshop on life planning. 
One of their principal aims is to give a chance to young indigenous girls or schoolgirls to 
think about their future life (see Figure 6.14). In the workshop, they explained to 
participated girls how a woman’s body works and about pregnancy on the basis of the 
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following different scenarios: if you want to have a baby or if you do not want to have a 
baby. During the workshop, they showed a video about being in labor and having a baby, 
which contains a latent message that life is a miracle and precious. The participants loved 
the video and Ayako and the nurse got a request to show it on another occasion. In 
addition to the video, they gave a lecture using colorful posters (e.g., see Figure 6.15). In 
every workshop, they strongly recommended that schoolgirls not have sexual 
relationships until after they graduated from high school emphasizing that participants 
should consider their study opportunities and the importance of their future life. In the 
sex education workshop, they did not recommend the use of contraceptives to the 
younger generation. They neither demonstrated how to use contraceptive devices nor did 
they provide contraceptive devices to the participants, unlike Peace Corps volunteers who 
prefer to introduce the use of contraceptive devices at the workshops for prevention of 
pregnancy, HIV/AID and other sexually transmitted diseases. In the case of Peace Corps, 
the “Biology: HIV/AID Training Resource Kit,” which is used for workshops or for 
consultation, explained how to use a male condom correctly as well as the usage of 
female condom. Moreover, the training resource kit explains how to refuse to have sexual 
relations with a male partner who refuses to wear a condom: it listed ten suggested 
phrases to persuade the male partner to wear a condom.42  
 
                                                
42 Peace Corps, “Biology: HIV/AIDS Training Resource Kit,” 39-44.  
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Figure 6.14: Poster about Human Life       Figure 6.15: Poster, Pregnant Women 
  
Ayako held the second type of workshop and she gave a lecture about nutrition 
for babies. Her target population was indigenous women who have had a baby and had 
small children. She handed out an official letter to make an appointment to hold a 
workshop in the community. One by one she visited indigenous communities and she 
gave the official letter to 40 indigenous communities in total. However, when Ayako’s 
team arrived at the indigenous communities on the day of the workshop, in some cases 
the community people did not show up at all because the indigenous people in the 
community did not know there was a workshop on that day.43 Under this circumstance, 
many workshops that Ayako planed were unfortunately cancelled. On the other hand, 
they managed to hold 10 successful workshops and more than forty people (including 
babies and children) participated in some of them. At the workshop, Ayako explained 
about nutrition for babies and toddlers, and demonstrated how to make nutritious meals 
                                                
43 Japanese people usually prefer to make appointments earlier, but in Latin America, if we make 
reservations for hotels or tour guides too earlier, it probably causes problems. When making reservations of 
any type, ne needs to check many times before the actual date of the reservation. Maybe this was one of 
reasons for the cancellation of the workshops. Another reason likely was that some of the official letters 
that Ayako brought to the community did not reach to community leader and he was not aware of the 
meeting. Also, to obtain the community leader’s cell phone number is difficult. Since the community 
leaders change frequently, phone numbers of community leaders obtained from the municipal government 
officials are often wrong.   
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for babies and children using vegetables available in Ecuador. Finally, the participants ate 
the foods that Ayako prepared.   
 
    
  Figure 6.16: Participants of Ayako’s Workshop   Figure 6.17: Child Participants  
  
According to Ayako’s experience, she had difficulty to gather people to attend 
their workshop. When Ayako held a workshop with the JOCV nurse volunteer, they 
asked teachers of each community to inform others about the workshop and gather 
participants. Even though the teachers were able to gather a certain number of people in 
the community, sometimes their target population—young females, attended in fewer 
numbers. In one case, for example, instead of young females, the majority of participants 
were males whose ages were between forty and fifty years old, and elderly people.  
In addition, arranging a good time to hold the workshop for both indigenous 
participants and JOCV volunteers is difficult. When I accompanied Ayako’s party to give 
an official letter to make an appointment to hold a workshop in the community, a 
community leader said that the ideal time for indigenous women to participate in Ayako’s 
workshop would be early evening because during the daytime they would be farming. So, 
according to the indigenous community leader, everyone is busy during daytime. Also, 
when I visited the rural indigenous communities, I saw that every family member from 
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the young children to the elderly people were working on the farm, caring for animals, or 
attending to the small children and siblings until sundown. Under these circumstances, it 
seems difficult to gather people for workshops during the time of cultivation because they 
would need to stop working. On the other hand, visiting remote communities during the 
evening seems to be difficult for JOCV volunteers due to transportation and security 
reasons; this is particularly relevant for female volunteers.  
However, as mentioned earlier, the inconvenience to commute to remote 
indigenous communities caused the neglect of indigenous communities that need the 
most help. In the case of Ayako, she is in the senior JOCV program so that she can use a 
small budget amount to support her JOCV activities. With this budget provided by 
JOCV, she could hire a car with driver to travel to the communities in order to hold the 
workshops. Except for those in the senior program, JOCV volunteers cannot request a 
budget for transportation or to hire a driver, which means they have to walk from 
community to community like Takeshi, or share a ride with other colleagues like Yuka.  
Still, even in Ayako’s case, it is tough to travel from community to community in 
the dark or in bad weather because the roads to rural communities are rough and 
unpaved; for instance, when I accompanied Ayako and traveled to three distant 
indigenous communities, we took approximately two hours to travel to three communities 
by car (see figure 6.18 and 6.19). There was no lighting or guardrails on the roads, so that 
traveling on rainy days and nights was very dangerous. Besides, the supply of electricity 
is not reliable in the mountainous communities and JOCV volunteers cannot expect to 
have light while they hold workshops in the evenings. Because of that, having a 
workshop in the evening seems to be quite difficult. Ayako’s case exemplifies JOCV 
volunteers’ activities in the form of workshop and how that type of activities faces 
difficulties to schedule and gather participants. 
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In terms of commuting to remote indigenous communities, Peace Corps 
volunteers pointed out the same problem as the JOCV volunteer, Ayako. For instance, the 
Peace Corps volunteers are neither allowed to drive a vehicle nor to ask for transportation 
fees from Peace Corps/Ecuador, and this has become the biggest obstacle to implement 
their development projects in rural communities. For instance, a female Peace Corps 
volunteer assigned to highland Ecuador pointed out that she needed to walk three hours to 
get to the nearest bus stop when she traveled to rural communities.44 Another Peace 
Corps female volunteer assigned to the highlands also said:  
 
        I have 8 schools and visit each of them once a month. Getting transportation      
        out to these communities is tough. Most often, if there is a bus going to the     
        community, there is only one and it leaves the community in the morning to     
        take the kids to the high schools and comes back to the town in the afternoon to  
        bring the kids back. Therefore, it is really tough to visit the schools more than  
        once a month because we have to pay to get a driver to take us out there.45 
 
 
 
Figure 6.18: Landscape Around Indigenous Communities 
                                                
44 Krista, “Coming to a close,” Krista Goes to Ecuador, entry posted April 30, 2012, 
http://kristagoestoecuador.blogspot.com/2012_04_01_archive.html [accessed February 10, 2013].   
45 Julia Schreiber, “Friday, January 25. 2013,” 100 spf: Julia’s Peace Corps Ecuador Blog, entry posted 
January 25, 2013, http://100spf.blogspot.com/2013_01_01_archive.html [accessed February 10, 2013].  
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Figure 6.19: Road to Indigenous Community 
In terms of the lack of the means of transportation, the female JOCV hygienist 
volunteer who was supposed to travel to indigenous communities to improve indigenous 
children’s dental health, had to change her original mission in the middle of her JOCV 
program because of lack of means to travel to the communities after her assigned clinic 
withdrew the project the JOCV volunteer had joined.46 JOCV volunteers who are 
assigned activities such as holding workshops by traveling to indigenous communities, 
ideally need a local assistant who knows not only how to get to the indigenous 
communities, but is well informed about local indigenous affairs. It is my opinion that the 
‘community visit’ type of activity is one of the most difficult types of JOCV activities (it 
can apply to Peace Corps volunteers, as well) as I described above.   
 Before I started conducting field-research and archival research, I assumed that 
health-related JOCV volunteers might encounter difficulties handling the cultural 
differences between indigenous people’s cultural values and their own, because the area 
                                                
46 JOCV volunteer # 175, JOCV working report.      
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of health quite likely involves indigenous people’s ‘private life’ such as marital relations, 
reproduction, child rearing, and even what they eat. However, after reading JOCV 
working reports, interviewing volunteers, and visiting indigenous communities, I found 
that JOCV volunteers have greater concern about the lack of sufficient and appropriate 
infrastructures and other public services for indigenous communities in Ecuador than 
concerns about the practice of traditional medicine or other customs.   
 Some JOCV volunteers have witnessed the practice of traditional medicine in the 
indigenous communities. Ayako and her fellow JOCV nurse witnessed “limpia” (a 
cleaning procedure typical of Andean medicine and performed by indigenous medicine 
men; usually egg, guinea pig, and medicinal plants are utilized in this treatment). JOCV 
volunteers regarded the practice of traditional medicine as one of the important elements 
of indigenous culture, so they are afraid of opining or providing health advice regarding 
those practices. In the case of the JOCV nurse, Keiko, who works in a clinic (patients of 
the clinic are almost all indigenous) in the Cotopaxi province accepts that indigenous 
mothers continue the tradition of wrapping tightly the newborn baby with cloth in order 
to protect the infant from bad spirits that can enter the newborn baby’s heart. Keiko knew 
that this practice is not recommendable for newborn babies in Japan because it is 
considered that it might cause problems to the baby’s joints. Regarding this, Keiko 
explained to me that according to local nurses, there is no report that this ‘baby wrapping’ 
tradition has caused serious problems for the baby’s growth process in the region. Keiko 
believed what local nurses said and she did not intervene in this issue.  
 Regarding the issue of traditional medicine practices among indigenous people, 
Keiko had a different image before coming to Ecuador. Since Keiko is a foreign and 
outsider, she had thought that it must be very difficult for indigenous people in the 
highlands to open their heart and talk to Keiko about their problems. Also, she considered 
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that indigenous people relied more on traditional medicine. However, after spending 
three months in Ecuador, she found that indigenous people who visited the clinic talked 
to her more openly than Keiko imagined. Also, she realized that medicinal plants were 
used widely among Ecuadorian mestizos. Keiko said that her preconceived ideas 
prevented her from knowing what the local people needed and how she could cooperate 
with indigenous people; now she believes that talking to each other is the most important 
of her JOCV activities.         
 As Keiko mentioned prejudice is an obstacle to JOCV activities in indigenous 
development and volunteers’ general ideas regarding family planning in indigenous 
communities are also problematic. In other words, as far as I know, each family and 
individual have different opinions regarding issues of birth control and early marriage of 
indigenous females. In terms of early marriage among indigenous girls, Yuka who works 
in bilingual primary schools, knows that some indigenous teachers expressed their 
problems regarding indigenous girl students’ tendency to marry early due to the fact that 
those young woman drop out school. In contrast to those indigenous teachers, Yuka 
wrote to me about one case in which the girl’s parents were happy because they expected 
that her husband would let their daughter attend high school in the town.47  
 In terms of sex education, Yuka told me that her primary school received posters 
provided by an NGO to use in sexual education, but they were just hanging on the wall of 
the classroom. Local indigenous teachers said that they did not want to give sex 
education in the classroom because female teachers do not want to talk about sexuality to 
their students. When I was in class, I saw only once three boys (about 8 to 9 years old) 
pointing to the sex education poster hanging on the wall and talking to each other in 
Kichwa and laughing.          
                                                
47 Personal communication, email from Yuka, November 9, 2012.  
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 After class, Yuka, her colleagues and I discussed sex education in primary 
schools. Then, a middle-aged indigenous School Principal said that he agreed to provide 
a sex education class for the children if the teachers could do so. According to the 
Principal, some indigenous parents in his community still teach their children that babies 
are born from a mother’s mouth and he is concerned about that. On the other hand, he 
said that perspectives on sex education and the ideal educational approach vary between 
indigenous communities.48           
 As the indigenous school principal mentioned above noted, each indigenous 
individual and family has different ideas about family planning. The JOCV nurse 
volunteer, Keiko in Cotopaxi, told me that some indigenous females told her that they 
wanted to avoid having many children and a few of them asked her for information on 
family planning. Also, Keiko heard that indigenous females have knowledge of a 
medicinal plant (called ruda), which is still used today for natural abortion among 
females. In addition to that, Keiko observed that there were vending machines in the 
clinic that provided free condoms. Keiko has never seen visitors take condoms from the 
basket in the clinic’s consultation room nor anyone using the vending machine. However, 
somehow the quantity of condoms in the vending machine frequently decreases. So 
Keiko assumes that some of indigenous visitors are interested in, or feel the necessity to 
use birth control devices, but it is difficult to talk about family planning and to take 
condoms in public even in the clinic.49              
 Yuka also told me that the concept of family planning is still unacceptable and 
practicing birth control has to be done in secret in some indigenous communities. 
According to Yuka’s colleague, she decided with her husband to control the number of 
                                                
48 Interview, an indigenous male principal in Rabbit School, June 13, 2012.  
49 Interview, Keiko, July 7, 2012.   
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children; that is, they prevented pregnancy by following their family plan. However, this 
matter became controversial and they were subject to bashing in the community because 
the idea of family planning has not yet become widespread in indigenous communities. 
The colleague told Yuka that the idea of ‘family planning’ had been totally a taboo 
subject in her community until very recently. In addition, in terms of the usage of the 
medicinal plant to expedite natural abortion, Yuka heard about a very sad case. She was 
told that an indigenous female drank the medicinal plant tea for abortion. Before she died, 
nobody knew she tried to abort, but the hospital found out that she died due to the misuse 
of the medicinal plant for abortion.50       
 As illustrated by the JOCV volunteers’ experiences in heath field in indigenous 
development, JOCV volunteers working with indigenous people have recognized some 
indigenous families are interested in family planning as well as sex education for younger 
generations. Also, like the Peace Corps/Ecuador’s concerns, JOCV volunteers see that 
early pregnancy causes an increase in the drop out rate of indigenous girls from junior 
high school. However, the analysis of the JOCV volunteers’ practices show they tend to 
hesitate to introduce or recommend contraceptive devices to indigenous people as one of 
tools to prevent early pregnancy, unlike the Peace Corps volunteers. Ayako and Keiko 
disagreed on distributing contraceptive devices or holding workshops to explain how to 
use contraceptive devices for teenagers with the aim of birth control. They focus more on 
awareness programs for prenatal checkups and on the pregnant woman’s health and 
nutrition, explaining about a woman’s body cycle and showing an example of a 
contraceptive method based on the rhythm method (Ogino theory). I could not find any 
JOCV volunteers who held workshop to demonstrate the use of contraceptive devices or 
that distributed condoms in the JOCV working reports (from 2002 to 2010 which are 
                                                
50 Yuka, communication, email, November 11, 2012.  
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written by volunteers assigned to Ecuador). On the other hand, in general, in order to 
prevent AID/HIV and other sexually transmitted illnesses, the Peace Corps has promoted 
using contraceptive devices not only in Ecuador, but also in other Andean countries such 
as Peru and Bolivia since the 1960s.51         
 A female Peace Corps volunteer wrote about her experience and learning in the 
indigenous town of Alawsi in the Highland of Ecuador in terms of the restrictions they 
faced when they gave a sex education workshop for the first time in the indigenous 
community. She stated:           
      On Friday, the final day of our trip, we made a quick excursion to the indigenous  
      town of Alausi. We each gave different charlas this time.52 The HIV group gave       
      the nutrition charlas, while we gave the charlas on puberty. The only problem    
      was, right before we walked into the classrooms, we found out we weren't  
      allowed to refer to the anatomy of the vagina nor talk about anything else too in- 
      depth regarding puberty. We were new to this community and the indigenous kids  
      were very shy, so we didn't want to overstep any boundaries. In the end, we spent  
      the 30-45 minutes going over the definition of VIH/Sida (HIV/AIDS). It was a  
      wonderful learning experience.53 
This different approach between the JOCV volunteers and Peace Corps volunteers 
is quite possibly related to different approaches to sex education in schools in Japan and 
in the United States. A study of the U.S. public opinion on sex education in U.S. schools, 
which was published in 2006, showed that 82% of the respondents supported both 
abstinence and other methods to prevent pregnancy. In terms of condom instruction, 68 
% of respondents in the study supported it, although the federal government has 
recommended abstinence-only sex education.54 In contrast, the content of sex education 
                                                
51 Sheffield, “Peru and the Peace Corps, 1962-1968”; Siekmier, “A Sacrificial Llama?”   
52 ‘Charlas’ is English equivalent of ‘chatting,’ ‘discussion,’ and also it also means an interactive 
workshop.  
53 Julia Schreiber, “Welcome to Ecuador,” 100 spf: Julia’s Peace Corps Ecuador Blog, entry posted June 
29, 2012, http://100spf.blogspot.com/2012_06_01_archive.html [accessed February 15, 2013]. 
54 Bleakley, Hennessy and Fishbein, “Public Opinion in Sex Education in US Schools.”   
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in Japan is usually lecture style to explain the differences between male and female 
anatomy, menstruation’s mechanisms and sanitary instruction for girls, and about 
pregnancy including the rhythm method of contraception. Generally, schools in Japan do 
not teach about contraception in the sex education curriculum in primary and junior high 
schools. However, of course the contents of sex education varied by schools and teachers. 
Unlike the United States and other European countries, Japanese sex education is not a 
participatory type of discussion; generally, teachers give lectures following material in 
the textbooks and using visual aids such as video.55The difference in background in sex 
education in the two countries can possibly be one of reasons why Peace Corps and 
JOCV have different approaches to indigenous people regarding the issue of health as 
related to family planning. Ayako and the former JOCV nurse who was traveling to 
indigenous communities were always saying, “This might be none of our business. They 
have their life style,” after traveling to the communities and holding workshops. 
CONCLUSION  
This chapter focused on looking at the volunteers’ development practices and 
their experiences by considering indigenous development in the Ecuadorian highlands at 
the micro level. Both JOCV and Peace Corps offices in Ecuador said that they do not 
have an area or projects called ‘indigenous development,’ or projects that target 
indigenous populations and communities. Nevertheless, both the JOCV/Ecuador and 
Peace Corps/Ecuador offices have recognized that indigenous people in the rural areas 
are still a large group in need of economic and social development. Since JOCV has a 
more stable dispatch system for their volunteers, tracing which individual volunteers are 
                                                
55 Nozaki and Hayashi, “Ankeeto chōsa ni yoru nihon no seikyōiku no jittutai to mondai no kaiseki 
(yohō)” [An Analysis of the Actual Condition and Problems of Japanese Sex Education on Questionnaire 
Surveys (Preliminary Report)].    
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involved with indigenous organizations or with bilingual indigenous schools is easier to 
determine compared with the Peace Corps volunteers and their system, because their 
office expects their volunteers to create their own projects after arriving at the working 
site. In addition, under the fixed posting system, in recent years the JOCV office has 
assigned consistently their volunteers to the Board of Bilingual Education as I observed. 
In the case of the highlands of Ecuador, these days the JOCV office has been more 
systematically involved in indigenous development than the Peace Corps has.  
Although this chapter discussed almost exclusively the experiences of JOCV 
volunteers in the area of indigenous development due to Peace Corps lack of data, a 
comparison between the JOCV volunteers’ experiences and those of Peace Corps 
volunteers showed that they differ on some issues, but agree on others. In terms of 
education in indigenous communities, both JOCV and the Peace Corps volunteers were 
concerned that there are some “serious” problems in terms of their educational 
environment, which generally do not exist in Japan (e.g., late arrival of textbooks, poor 
school facilities, “irresponsible” teaching attitudes regarding the students’ learning and 
the difficulties of commuting).          
 Similarly, JOCV and Peace Corps volunteers were faced with difficulties to 
commute to and from indigenous communities, between communities, or from the town 
where they lived to the indigenous communities were they worked. As Ayako mentioned, 
this was a problem not only for JOCV and Peace Corps volunteers, but also for other aid 
workers from both national and international agencies who are involved in indigenous 
development. Due to the limitations to travel to remote indigenous communities there is a 
tendency to cooperate only with indigenous communities located relatively near towns or 
those who benefit from a good transportation system. Thus, indigenous communities 
located far from central towns tend to be neglected.       
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Both JOCV and Peace Corps volunteers felt that it is necessary to visit or teach in 
remote communities frequently; however, except in Ayako’s case, both the JOCV and 
Peace Corps offices do not provide special arrangements or compensation to help their 
volunteers reach indigenous communities (e.g., transportation means or reimbursement). 
Additional support for JOCV and Peace Corps volunteers, who are involved in working 
with remote indigenous communities, is necessary if JOCV and Peace Corps seriously 
want to tackle the problems that the indigenous peoples faced. Without resolving the 
problem of transportation to indigenous communities, these agencies are wasting their 
volunteers’ motivation, talents and intelligence and frustrating their willingness to 
creatively cooperate with local people.       
 One of the clearest differences between the JOCV and the Peace Corps volunteers 
in terms of their developmental approaches is in the case of sex education. As discussed, 
regarding the Peace Corps’ HIV/AIDS training resource kits, the Peace Corps focused on 
tackling problem of HIV/AIDS, unlike JOCV. This emphasis together with the different 
approaches the two agencies have and which they impart to their volunteers is quite 
possibly related to the different approaches to sex education used in schools in Japan and 
in the United States. This specific case shows that the way to consider and implement 
development practices is influenced by the way the aid agency’s country conceives of 
what is the ideal development practice. However, as the Peace Corps volunteer 
mentioned in the blog, both JOCV and Peace Corps volunteers were learning by 
themselves how to adjust their development practices to the cultural environment of the 
local indigenous communities. This illustrates how development practices have been 
shaped by social and cultural norms of the volunteers who worked on behalf of the Peace 
Corps and JOCV. That is, the differences expressed in the practices adopted reflect the 
differences between Japanese and U.S. societies. Likewise, the similar attitudes toward 
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development practices are likely to reflect the social and cultural norms the Japanese and 
the U.S. societies share.  
In addition to this, language, as a social practice, is the means through which 
volunteers are able to participate in the community and to prepare and successfully put 
into practice development concepts. Both JOCV and the majority of Peace Corps 
volunteers are non-native speakers of languages in Ecuador (Spanish, Kichwa or possibly 
other native languages). Also, as pointed out earlier in this chapter, language requires and 
enables appropriate understanding of indigenous communities, their cultures, and their 
needs, which is essential as volunteers prepare and implement development projects.   
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Conclusion 
 
 
The dissertation explored the process of constructing notions of development and 
development practices analyzed through the lens of Western and non-Western 
governmental aid agencies’ experiences in Latin America. By comparing these two 
agencies and their volunteers— Peace Corps and JOCV, I presented some examples in 
chapters, to demonstrate how aid practitioners’ cultural norms and common sense 
constructed notions and practices of development were similar or differed.  
Stepping back from my dissertation focus a bit, my work also presented in which 
the ways Japanese and U.S. societies have perceived issues of ethnicity and gender in 
their own societies. For instance, Japanese society’s attitude toward ethnicity in Japan has 
been described often as a “myth of homogeneity” (Chapter 5). JOCV’s way of treating 
issues of ethnicity and gender in their development discourse shows that tendency surely 
still exists. Compared with the Peace Corps, the JOCV is less conscious of incorporating 
the issues of ethnic diversity and homosexuality into JOCV’s representation and its aid 
approaches (including recruitment, training, and the way of representing the agency).   
    Also, as I explored in my research questions, I have faced to a big question— the 
question of what ‘development’ is and is supposedly or realistically meant to achieve? 
This question needs to be considered, as even in the twentieth-first century, cultural and 
social values are still so diverse across countries. So, how can we possibly summarize or 
determine a universal goal or model of development for people living in different cultures 
and with different social norms? My dissertation research showed that the donor’s aid 
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constructed development approaches reflect their own cultural and social norms 
regardless of whether they are from Western or non-Western countries. 
     The treatment of the issue of self-esteem is a case in point. The U.S. society places 
great value on cultivating and improving individual self-esteem in order to achieve 
economic and social success in society. Unlike the Peace Corps, the JOCV did not treat 
the issue of self-esteem as an important key for the beneficiaries’ societal change. This 
tendency was noticed not only in the agency’s approach, but also among the JOCV 
volunteer’s individual approaches to the indigenous communities. This different 
emphasis is because the aid practitioners from each country perceived differently what is 
self-esteem and its value in development.  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS/RESULTS  
 
Both JOCV and Peace Corps have operated their agencies under similar systems 
and they were established close to the same time. However, at the beginning of the 1960s 
Japan had not fully recovered from the scars of World War II. A Japanese radio program, 
called Missing Persons still broadcasted announcements searching for families, relatives 
and friends who had been separated since the war; the program was on the air until March 
31, 1962.1 Unlike the United States, Japan had experience as one of the largest aid 
recipients after the World War II. While Japan became one of the largest aid donors in 
the world, Japan still was paying back loans to the World Bank until 1990, and Japan 
used these loans for the reconstruction of the country. In terms of political ideology, the 
                                                
1 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 58.   
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U.S. occupation army promoted an U.S. version of ideal democracy in the Japanese 
government. That is, Japan and the United States political and economic situations were 
very different when JOCV and Peace Corps’ program started. Thus, the motivations in 
the United States to start the Peace Corps program were very different from those of 
Japan as it began the JOCV program.    
Although the U.S. Peace Corps and its notion of development were models of 
“development” for JOCV program, JOCV’s discourse of development and its 
development practices are not the same as the Peace Corps. For instance, the Peace Corps 
sent a large number of “pioneer-type” volunteers. These were young, white college 
graduates holding bachelor’s degrees, and they have represented the Peace Corps 
volunteers since the organization was founded. In the first two decades, only 5% of 
volunteers came from minority groups. Although the Peace Corps tried to recruit 
volunteers from minority groups, still White people represented 78 % of the Peace Corps 
volunteers.2 While the Peace Corps’ preferred to have “pioneer-type” volunteers, JOCV 
officials and Japanese politicians were particular about recruiting young Japanese who 
had ‘technical skills’ since the establishment of the program. Also, the Cold War climate 
did not influence much the JOCV’s management of its volunteers. For instance, the 
designation “anti-communists” never appeared in JOCV annual reports; moreover, 
questions about the association of JOCV and Japanese foreign policy toward Latin 
America have been rarely found in the Diet Record in Japan. On the other hand, Peace 
                                                
2 Peace Corps, “Fact Sheet,” http://files.peacecorps.gov/multimedia/pdf/about/pc_facts.pdf[accessed 
[accessed in March 20, 2013]. This Peace Corps “Fact Sheet” was uploaded January 18, 2013.  
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Corps volunteer training, particularly in the first decade, was likely to share the same 
paranoia against Communism prevalent within the United States, despite the agency’s 
leadership publicly rejecting to use the Peace Corps as an instrument of U.S. foreign 
policy.  
Latin American experiences highlighted the reasons why the Peace Corps was 
very much concerned about the political status of the agency. Depoliticizing the agency 
and its volunteers is one of the biggest concerns for the Peace Corps still today. 
Compared with JOCV, the Peace Corps’ management of volunteers has been more 
sensitive to avoid being seen as ‘political’ by the host countries because the agency 
experienced significantly more terminations of its operations in Latin America than did 
JOCV. Latin American responses to U.S. foreign policy sometimes made Peace Corps 
volunteers’ work difficult regardless of their efforts. In reality, as a strategy against the 
rise of Anti-Americanism, the Peace Corps has expected its volunteers to present a good 
image of Americans and American society in the host country. Thereby, depoliticizing 
the agency and preventing the actions of Peace Corps volunteers from being perceived as 
political are important to operate Peace Corps program smoothly in Latin America.  
In terms of JOCV and Latin America, stable relations between Japan and Latin 
America have made JOCV presence easier in Latin America, compared to that of the 
Peace Corps. In the first decade of the JOCV program in the region, JOCV’s allocation of 
volunteers probably was more or less related to Japan’s economic interests in the host 
countries (e.g., El Salvador and Costa Rica), rather than to its political interests or to 
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promote democracy in the conflict areas. For instance, in the case of Central America 
JOCV started programs where Japanese businesses were already established.  
A comparative case study in Ecuador showed that there is a gap between the 
agency’s development ideals and the development practices of volunteers in both Peace 
Corps and JOCV as these volunteers face and work with the realities of Ecuadorian 
society. In addition, both Peace Corps and JOCV agencies understand that the actions of 
their volunteers, as individuals, affect how their programs are perceived and the image of 
each agency. In the case of Peace Corps, its experiences in Latin America made the Peace 
Corps/Ecuador preoccupied with controlling their volunteers to make sure they did not 
compromise the image of the agency.    
Unlike these similarities between the Peace Corps and the JOCV in terms of the 
relationship between the agency and its volunteers, the difference in the ways the Peace 
Corps and JOCV address cultural and social contexts is quite possibly related to how 
each agency presents and implements their notion of development in Ecuador. A 
comparison between the Peace Corps/Ecuador and JOCV/Ecuador shows that the Peace 
Corps focus more on Ecuadorian recipients’ enthusiasm toward education, environment 
conservation, and family planning than JOCV does. Although JOCV focuses on the same 
issues as the Peace Corps, JOCV’s way of offering cooperating is implemented more 
through technology or skills-transfer to entities such as institutions or schools. In fact, 
while the Peace Corps focus on the social individual, JOCV focus on the society’s group. 
Moreover, the JOCV and the Peace Corps’ presentations of their “development” 
practices and achievements are different. The Peace Corps office shows how the aid 
 233 
recipients are changed by presenting their development “results” quantitatively. On the 
other hand, analyses of both JOCV working reports and JOCV annual reports, including 
brochures, show they prefer to highlight what their volunteers did and how they did, and 
it focuses less on the changes the recipients experienced.     
 Also, their cross-cultural policies for their volunteers likely reflect how Japanese 
and U.S. societies understand their own society in general cultural terms, as well as in 
terms of moral and religious preferences, ethnicity and sexual orientation. The JOCV is 
less mindful of incorporating the issues of ethnic diversity and homosexuality into 
JOCV’s development discourse as well as in the management of its volunteers. This 
tendency reflects that Japanese society implicitly subscribes to the dominated idea of 
Japan as a “homogenous” country.   
LEARNING FROM FOREIGN VOLUNTEERS’ EXPERIENCES: CAN OUTSIDERS 
CONTRIBUTE TO THE FIELD OF INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT?  
	 	  
To hone in and discuss the analyses of JOCV and Peace Corps volunteers’ 
experiences in indigenous development in the Ecuadorian highlands, first I will 
summarize the limitations of the volunteers’ involvement in the area, and then I will 
make some suggestions for future projects. First, in terms of the volunteers’ involvement 
in issues of indigenous rights, this study found that it is difficult for JOCV and Peace 
Corps volunteers to deal with that issue. Although both agencies sent their volunteers to 
indigenous organizations, as illustrated in Chapter 5, both agencies prohibited their 
volunteers from becoming involved in political matters in the host country. So, when they 
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assign their volunteers to any indigenous organization or NGO, the agencies need to 
provide special instructions to the volunteers to prevent them from risking involvement 
with political issues. Lack of clear, in-depth guidance will lead to forced termination of 
the volunteer’s assignment, particularly in the case of Peace Corps.  
Secondly, through reading JOCV working reports, interviewing volunteers, and 
visiting indigenous communities, I found that JOCV volunteers have greater concern 
about the lack of sufficient and appropriate infrastructures and other public services for 
indigenous communities in Ecuador than they do about the practice of traditional 
medicine when their assignments included visiting remote indigenous communities. 
Informing volunteers of the real conditions in rural indigenous communities before they 
begin working would greatly help volunteers and prevent disappointments. Such 
information will let volunteers know what they can or cannot do as they plan their 
projects (e.g., the lack of consistent water supply makes a sanitation program difficult if 
they plan to use running water during the workshop). The agencies at least need to 
roughly inform their volunteers about specific situations related to the area and their 
possible projects. Further, in the case of JOCV and JICA, which implement big projects 
with large budgets, JOCV volunteers who have worked in indigenous communities 
become a useful source of information to design future JICA relating infrastructure 
projects (e.g., maintenance of water and sewer service in the highlands of Ecuador). 
 In addition, as I emphasized in Chapter 6, the issue of the lack of transportation to 
visit indigenous remote communities became one of the most serious obstacles for both 
Peace Corps and JOCV volunteers who were, and are, involved in indigenous 
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development. They felt that it is necessary to visit or teach in remote communities 
frequently; however, except in Ayako’s case, both the JOCV and Peace Corps offices do 
not provide special arrangements or compensation to help their volunteers reach 
indigenous communities (e.g., transportation means or reimbursement). Additional 
support for JOCV and Peace Corps volunteers, who are involved in working with remote 
indigenous communities, is necessary if JOCV and Peace Corps seriously want to tackle 
the problems that the indigenous peoples face. As mentioned in Chapter 6 regarding 
Ayako’s experiences, this problem is not only reported by the Peace Corps and the 
JOCV, but also affects other international and domestic agencies that end up cooperating 
only with indigenous communities that are located relatively near towns. Ideally the 
agencies need a local assistant who knows not only how to get to the indigenous 
communities, but is well informed about local indigenous affairs. It is my opinion that the 
‘community visit’ type of activity is one of the most difficult types of JOCV activities (it 
can apply to Peace Corps volunteers, as well) as I described in Chapter 6.  
 Thirdly, in regard to possible future projects focused on indigenous communities, 
bilingual primary schools need to receive primary school teachers who are able to teach 
English because indigenous communities feel they are facing a lack of English teachers 
in their local schools. When I observed the English class in Rabbit School, a male teacher 
told the students they needed to learn English earnestly to prepare them for future 
opportunities such as work in the United States or in other foreign countries. In this 
community, I heard that some of children’s relatives have already experienced working in 
foreign countries as temporary migrant workers, in England, Spain and in the United 
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States. When I visited Loja province, a JOCV volunteer, Takeshi, told me that his student 
and his family were preparing to move to Spain so the student might not to continue to 
come to school.3 Of course, aside from specific cases such as those mentioned, remote 
indigenous schools communities welcome English teachers who ease the chronic lack of 
teachers in rural communities. Indeed, the Peace Corps would contribute greatly to 
alleviate this need.          
 Fourthly, the agencies and the volunteers tend to apply the same notions of their 
‘ideal’ practices to indigenous people and their society. In terms of education, a 
commonality between the JOCV and the Peace Corps volunteers is to promote their 
‘ideal’ school management on the basis of the donor country’s cultural values. On the 
other hand, one of the clearest differences between the JOCV and the Peace Corps 
volunteers in terms of their developmental approaches is in the case of sex education. The 
specific case discussed in Chapter 6 showed that the way to consider and implement 
development practices is influenced by the way the aid agency’s country conceives of 
what is the ideal development practice. However, indigenous peoples’ perceptions toward 
family planning and sex education in their communities and schools are not generalized. 
In other words, they have different opinions and experiences toward benefits and 
disadvantages brought by sex education and family planning into indigenous 
communities. Under this circumstance, both JOCV and Peace Corps volunteers were 
learning on their on how to adjust their development practices to the cultural environment 
of the indigenous communities; therefore, sharing their accumulation of experiences of 
                                                
3 Personal notes, Ecuador, June 23, 2012.       
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development practices with other volunteers is more helpful in designing correct and 
profitable indigenous development programs.4      
 The fifth issue is a question of whether the volunteers constitute simply 
manpower sources or not. This issue applies not only to the area of indigenous 
development but also to other areas. As I mentioned in Chapter 6, some of JOCV 
volunteers expressed their dissatisfaction that some host institutions and schools viewed 
them as free labor. Why did one of the JOCV volunteers express dissatisfaction in terms 
of his JOCV service in Ecuador? This volunteers’ displeasure with being treated as a 
source of labor is likely connected to the notion of development that the agency 
introduced and under which the volunteers are trained. In the case of the Peace Corps 
their volunteers are trained to think that they are suppose to make a difference to the 
people in their assigned sites; the volunteers’ work will help those in the host country, 
institution, or community lead a better life. In the case of JOCV volunteers, they are 
trained to be agents of ‘technology transfer.’ Due to the agency’s notion of development, 
volunteers feel added pressure to achieve some special outcome in the host country. 
However, in the case of remote indigenous bilingual primary schools, the scarcity of local 
teachers is serious and it is difficult to receive new teachers. Therefore, sending 
volunteers to indigenous bilingual schools as teachers is a meaningful contribution even 
if they do not do ‘something’ special and something that contributes to obvious change.
 Sixthly, in order to establish a mutual relationship between devel opment  
                                                
4 JOCV Working Report plays this role. JOCV office preserves JOCV volunteers’ working reports. New 
trainees check JOCV volunteers’ working reports before coming to Ecuador or in the middle of their 
activity through the internet. The JOCV Working Report also became public although there are some 
restrictions.   
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practitioners and beneficiaries, it is necessary to make clear to the host countries that one 
of JOCV and Peace Corps’ objectives is also ‘human resource development’ for Japanese 
and U.S. volunteers. In other words, the agencies would need to train the volunteers not 
only to provide skills and help during their assignments in the host country but also 
emphasize that the volunteers will be learning through exchanging knowledge with the 
people in the host country. An understanding and position that implies just ‘teaching and 
providing help’ creates unnecessary pressure for the volunteers in terms of their roles and 
possibly fosters an unequal power relationship between the volunteers (aid practitioners) 
and the beneficiaries (indigenous people).    
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
This research was significant in several ways. First, even though the number of 
non-Western donors is increasing in the field of development today, their notions of 
development and their practices are hardly ever discussed in academia. Critiques of 
postdevelopment theory showed that the theorists overstated that Western methodology 
of development was “pernicious” or “ethnocidal” to non-Western countries. However, 
there is no in-depth study of non-Western development discourses and practices, 
particularly in the field of indigenous development. This is what is lacking in 
postdevelopment theories. Therefore, my dissertation work contributed to show a case of 
non-Western development discourses and practices by using JOCV and its volunteers’ 
experiences and comparing it to that of the Peace Corps.     
 In addition, this comparative study illustrated how the agencies’ notions of 
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development were different and alike by comparing the two governmental people-to-
people foreign assistance practices—JOCV and Peace Corps. The study showed that the 
cultural and social contexts of these donors’ societies influenced the agencies’ notions of 
development. Further, the study shows how development practices have been shaped by 
the social and cultural norms of the volunteers who worked on behalf of the Peace Corps 
and JOCV. Also, the historical and political relationship between an agency and a host 
country influenced the agencies’ approaches to the host country; the case of Peace Corps 
in Latin America exemplified well this aspect of the study and how difficult it is to 
separate the agency’s image from U.S. foreign policy in Latin America.   
 This dissertation also contributed to show how the reporting of the volunteers’ 
experiences provided new practical suggestions particularly in the area of indigenous 
development. These volunteers’ reports are an excellent data source to evaluate 
volunteers’ commitment and profit from their experiences. In academia, the experiences 
accumulated by these volunteers have not yet been studied, even though these two 
agencies have accumulated first-hand experiences through participating in indigenous 
development in Latin America for approximately five decades.     
Also, this study connects East Asia with Latin America, two areas with countries 
that participate in development and in which the discussion of cross-cultural issues has 
rarely been undertaken. Scholars in East Asian Studies and Latin American Studies 
hardly ever compared and contrasted cultures in Latin America with those of Japan or 
other East Asian countries. Also, even though the Japanese Government has provided 
assistance in the name of “indigenous development” to some Latin American countries, 
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there has been no study of Japanese people’s representations of indigenous peoples in 
Latin America. Therefore, my research aimed to connect these two different area studies, 
East Asian Studies and Latin American Studies.   
Finally, this dissertation also presented the ways in which Japanese and U.S. 
societies have perceived issues of ethnicity and gender in their own societies through 
exploring two government aid agencies. The agencies’ views and their way of 
constructing and operating development deeply reflect their specific society’s cultural 
and social norms as well as their priorities in terms of foreign relations. At the same time, 
by exploring the volunteers’ development practices, the dissertation shows how these 
societies selected different approaches to “development,” and how volunteers 
experienced and perceived cross-cultural issues as foreign volunteers in Ecuador and 
among local indigenous communities.    
LIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
 
This study had to deal with some limitations, some of which were unexpected. 
First, my fieldwork data in Ecuador was almost exclusively obtained from the JOCV 
volunteers’ development practices, although I include what I could obtain from Peace 
Corps volunteers for comparative purposes. Political tension between the United States 
and the Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa exemplified by the expulsion of U.S. 
Ambassador, Heather Hodges in 2011 and the ongoing issue of Ecuador granting asylum 
to the founder of Wikiliks, Julian Assange, caused the Peace Corps/Ecuador’s officials to 
raise the level of protection of their volunteers. Moreover, when I was in Ecuador doing 
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fieldwork, President Correa announced the possibility of the future expulsion of USAID 
from the country because the Government of Ecuador was suspicious of USAID’s goals 
and role (but, at this writing, the President has not yet taken official action). However, 
Russia, which was also concerned about USAID’s political interfere through its aid 
grants, had already expelled USAID.5 Under these circumstances, the Peace 
Corps/Ecuador officials told me they could not help me contact Peace Corps volunteers 
due to “security” issues and “bad timing.” In addition, and for the same reasons, I could 
not obtain permission to access the Peace Corps volunteers’ working reports stored in the 
Quito office. The political tension between the two countries limited my fieldwork 
opportunities to visit and observe Peace Corps’ volunteers’ development practices in their 
assigned sites. Although these events hampered by data collection and diminished the 
amount of comparative material I could use, they also show how unforeseeable political 
events can influence the outcomes of aid programs as well as the lives of the volunteers 
present in the country.         
 The statistics regarding the number of volunteers by country presented in the 
JOCV and Peace Corps’ annual reports are not consistent. Organizational changes of the 
agencies affected the way in which they counted and reported their number of volunteers. 
It is not clear who is counted as a Peace Corps/JOCV volunteer and who is not, and these 
inconsistences changed over years. Some annual reports include the number of trainees, 
staff, officials, and even include the volunteers who did not complete the required two 
                                                
5 BBC News Europe, “Russia expels USAID development agency,” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
europe-19644897 [accessed in March 12, 2013].  
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years of service, or who dropped out during the training period. The different 
measurements the agencies applied caused gaps and inconsistencies in the number of 
volunteers who actually served as Peace Corps or JOCV volunteers even in their official 
reports and websites. This is true particularly in the case of the Peace Corps; the number 
of volunteers I tracked by using their annual report is probably much larger than the 
actual number.         
 Finally, the majority of my data regarding the Peace Corps came from white 
Peace Corps volunteers and their experiences in Latin America and particularly in 
Ecuador. As the Peace Corps Ecuador mentioned in the manual, race, gender, religion, 
sexuality, even marital status affected volunteers’ experiences differently in Ecuador. So 
my study does not represent everybody’s experiences and their perceptions toward 
development.    
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
This study made it clear to me that in terms of data collection from the Peace 
Corps, it is better and easier to obtain more data from Peace Corps ‘returnees’ than from 
the current volunteers working in the field. Peace Corps returnees are freer to speak and 
express their personal opinions regarding their experiences in the Peace Corps compared 
with the Peace Corps volunteers who ar e in the middle of their service. Actually, the 
Peace Corps volunteers I met personally in Ecuador said that they are prohibited to have 
any interviews with the local media without the Peace Corps’ permission. This is 
probably normal in host countries that tend to have mild anti-American policies or have 
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some on-going conflicts like Ecuador. As the Peace Corps’ official explained, the agency 
has the responsibility to protect its volunteers from any possible problem. Future 
researchers should try to access the Peace Corps returnees for information, as this method 
is more secure to fulfill one’s research goals, but also because they will be able to obtain 
more candid and in-depth critiques of the agency. Although I approached both the Peace 
Corps and the JOCV in the same manner, I had no problems obtaining information from 
the JOCV volunteers who were serving in Ecuador at the time I conducted fieldwork. 
JOCV/Ecuador office assisted me in accessing the volunteers who volunteered to 
participate in my research. Visiting their actual working site and talking with them and 
their local colleagues provided necessary data and gave me fruitful insights for my 
research.  
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Appendix 
 
Summary of JOCVs’ Profiles (192 JOCV Working Reports)  
Volunteer	   Type	  of	  Occupation	   Province	   	   Gender	  
Working	  
Term	  
Indig.	  
Develop.	  
Chino/
China	   	  
#1 Art  Chimborazo F 2 years     
#2 Community Development Chimborazo M 10 months ✔   
#3 Community Development Chimborazo n.d. 2 years ✔   
#4 Community Development Napo F 2 years ✔   
#5 Social Worker Loja F 2 years   ✔ 
#6 Nurse Pichincha F 2 years     
#7 Social Worker Pichincha F 2 years   ✔ 
#8 Afforestation Manabí M 2 years     
#9 Livestock Husbandry Morona-Santiago M 2 years ✔   
#10 Livestock Husbandry Elsewhere in Costa (n.d.) M 2 years     
#11 Math and Science Teacher Pichincha M 22 months      
#12 Math and Science Teacher Pichincha M 2 years     
#13 Home Economics n.d. F 2 years     
#14 Nurse Elsewhere in Oriente (n.d.) F 2 years ✔   
#15 Nurse Los Ríos F 2 years     
#16 Physical Therapist Manabí F 2 years     
#17 Physical Therapist El Oro  F 2 years     
#18 Physical Therapist Manabí F 2 years     
#19 Physical Therapist Manabí F 2 years     
#20 
Environmental 
Administration Galapagos F 2 years     
#21 
Environmental 
Administration Galapagos M	   2	  years	       
#22 Environmental Education Tena M	   2	  years	     ✔ 
#23	   Early Childhood Education Pastaza	   F	   2	  years	       
#24 Early Childhood Education Loja F 2 years   ✔ 
#25 Table Tennis Napo M 2 years   ✔ 
#26 Swimming Manabí M 2 years     
#27 Swimming Zamora-Chinchipe F 2 years     
#28 
Kendō  
(Japanese martial art) Azuay,Guayas, Pichincha F 1 month     
#29 Kendō  Azuay,Guayas, Pichincha M 5 month     
#30 Kendō  Guayas M n.d. (cont.)     
#31 Kendō  Guayas n.d. n.d. (cont.)     
#32 Kendō  Azuay,Guayas, Pichincha M 
2 years 
(cont.)     
 245 
#33 Kendō  Azuay,Guayas, Pichincha F 1 month     
#34 Kendō  Pichincha F 1 month     
#35 Kendō  Guayas, Pichincha M 1 month     
#36 Kendō  Pichincha and other places F 1 month     
#37 Kendō  Guayas, Pichincha M 1 month     
#38 Kendō  n.d. n.d. 1 month     
#39 Kendō  n.d. n.d. 1 month     
#40 Kendō  n.d. n.d. 1 month     
#41 Kendō  n.d. n.d. 1 month     
#42 Kendō  Azuay,Guayas, Pichincha M 2 years     
#43 Car Maintenance  Imbabra M 10 month     
#44 Car Maintenance  El Oro then trasfer to Azuay M 2 years     
#45 Car Maintenance  Cañar  M 1.7 year     
#46 Car Maintenance  n.d. M 2 years   ✔ 
#47 Baseball 
Azuay,Guayas, Pichincha, Loja, 
Manabí M 1 month     
#48 Baseball 
Azuay, Guayas, Pichincha, Loja, 
Manabí M 
more than 2 
years     
#49 Baseball Guayas M 1 month     
#50 Baseball Guayas M 1 month     
#51 Baseball Guayas, Manabí M 1 month     
#52 Baseball Guayas, Manabí M 1 month     
#53 Baseball Guayas, Manabí M 1 month     
#54 Baseball Guayas, Manabí M 1 month     
#55 Baseball Guayas M 1 month     
#56 Baseball Guayas M 1 month     
#57 Baseball Guayas, Manabí M 1 month     
#58 Baseball Guayas  M 1 month     
#59 Pottery  Tena M 2 years ✔   
#60 Tennis Pichincha F 2 years     
#61 Primary-school Teacher Pastaza F 2 years ✔ ✔ 
#62 Primary-school Teacher Zamora-Chinchipe F 2 years ✔ ✔ 
#63 Primary-school Teacher Pichincha M 2 years ✔   
#64 Primary-school Teacher Napo F 2 years ✔   
#65 Primary-school Teacher Cotopaxi M 2 years ✔   
#66 Primary-school Teacher Imbabra M 2 years ✔   
#67 Primary-school Teacher Pastaza F 2 years ✔   
#68 Primary-school Teacher Loja M 2 years ✔   
#69 Primary-school Teacher Pastaza F 2 years ✔   
#70 Primary-school Teacher Tungrarahua M 2 years ✔   
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#71 Primary-school Teacher Napo M 2 years   ✔ 
#72 Primary-school Teacher Pastaza M 2 years ✔   
#73 Clothing and Fashion n.d. F 2 years   	  	  
#74 Clothing and Fashion Pichincha F 2 years   	  	  
#75 Clothing and Fashion n.d. F 2 years     
#76 School Nurse Cotopaxi F 2 years     
#77 School Nurse Tungrarahua F 2 years     
#78 School Nurse El Oro F 2 years     
#79 School Nurse Pichincha F 2 years     
#80 PC Instructor  Zamora-Chinchipe M 2 years   ✔ 
#81 PC Instructor  Guayas n.d. 2 years     
#82 PC Instructor  El Oro F 2 years     
#83 PC Instructor  n.d. F 2 years     
#84 PC Instructor  Loja M 2 years     
#85 Machine Tools El Oro M 2 years     
#86 Computer Technology Los Ríos M 2 years     
#87 Computer Technology Pichincha F 2 years     
#88 Agriculture Pichincha M 2 years     
#89 Baseball Manabí M n.d.     
#90 Physical Education  Pastaza M n.d.     
#91 Agriculture Pichincha M 2 years   ✔ 
#92 
Clothes for Women and 
Children  Azuay (n.d.) M 2 years     
#93 Physical Education  Tungrarahua M 2 years     
#94 School Nurse Pastaza F 2 years     
#95 Primary-school Teacher Cotopaxi  F 2 years     
#96 Computer Technology Napo F 2 years     
#97 Physical Therapist Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas F 2 years   ✔ 
#98 Music  Pastaza F 2 years     
#99 Primary-school Teacher Pichincha F 2 years     
#100 Judō  Pichincha M 2 years     
#101 Community Development Los Ríos M 2 years ✔   
#102 Nurse El Oro F 2 years     
#103 Truck and Field  Azuay  F 2 years     
#104 Primary-school Teacher Pichincha F 2 years     
#105 Primary-school Teacher Pichincha F 2 years     
#106 Gymnastics  Manabí F 7 months     
#107 Machine Tools Chimborazo M 2 years     
#108 Computer Technology Azuay  M 2 years     
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#109 Prosthetics Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas F 2 years   ✔ 
#110 Music  El Oro F 2 years     
#111 Primary-school Teacher Chimborazo F 6 months     
#112 Primary-school Teacher Pichincha M 2 years   ✔ 
#113 Primary-school Teacher El Oro F 2 years     
#114 Primary-school Teacher El Oro F 2 years   ✔ 
#115 Primary-school Teacher Pastaza F 2 years ✔   
#116 Gymnastics  Manabí F 2 years      
#117 Primary-school Teacher Pichincha n.d.  2 years     
#118 Primary-school Teacher Tungrarahua F 2 years   ✔ 
#119 Primary-school Teacher Chimborazo F 2 years   ✔ 
#120 Primary-school Teacher Chimborazo F 2 years   ✔ 
#121 School Nurse El Oro F 2 years     
#122 Primary-school Teacher Napo M 2 years ✔   
#123 Electric Machine Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas M 2 years     
#124 Car Maintenance  Azuay  M 2 years     
#125 Electric Machine Azuay  M 2 years     
#126 Primary-school Teacher El Oro F 2 years     
#127 Music  Loja F 2 years     
#128 Home Economics n.d.  F 2 years   ✔ 
#129 Primary-school Teacher El Oro F 2 years     
#130 Swimming El Oro F 2 years     
#131 Kindergarten Teacher Loja F 2 years     
#132 
Japanese Language 
Teacher Pichincha F 2 years     
#133 Swimming Manabí M 2 years     
#134 Car Maintenance  Loja M 2 years     
#135 Computer Technology Manabí M 2 years     
#136 Car Maintenance  Pichincha M n.d.      
#137 Agriculture Bolívar M 2 years ✔   
#138 Table Tennis El Oro M 2 years     
#139 Car Maintenance  Azuay  M 2 years   ✔ 
#140 Physical Therapist Los Ríos F 2 years    ✔ 
#141 Environmental Education Napo M 2 years ✔   
#142 Primary-school Teacher Pichincha M 2 years     
#143 Car Maintenance  Cañar  M 2 years     
#144 Car Maintenance  Guayas M 2 years     
#145 Computer Technology Pichincha M 2 years     
#146 Electric Machine Pichincha M 2 years     
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#147 Basketball Manabí M 2 years     
#148 Primary-school Teacher Azuay  M 2 years     
#149 Baseball Guayas  M 2 years     
#150 Environmental Education Pichincha F 2 years     
#151 Primary-school Teacher Imbabra F 2 years ✔   
#152 Kindergarten Teacher Pastaza F 2 years ✔ ✔ 
#153 Music  Pastaza F 2 years     
#154 Community Development Morona-Santiago F 2 years ✔   
#155 Nurse Pichincha F 2 years     
#156 Primary-school Teacher Cotopaxi F 2 years     
#157 
Japanese Language 
Teacher Manabí F 2 years     
#158 Primary-school Teacher Loja F 2 years     
#159 Music  Pichincha F 2 years     
#160 Community Development Imbabra M 2 years ✔   
#161 Primary-school Teacher Imbabra F 2 years ✔ ✔ 
#162 School Nurse Pichincha F 2 years     
#163 Physical Education  Napo F 2 years     
#164 Agriculture Morona-Santiago F 2 years ✔   
#165 Primary-school Teacher Pichincha F 2 years     
#166 Vegetable Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas M 2 years     
#167 Nutrition  Los Ríos F 2 years     
#168 Music Pichincha n.d. 2 years     
#169 Tourism Loja F 2 years   ✔ 
#170 Social Worker Loja F 2 years     
#171 Physical Education  Manabí M 2 years   ✔ 
#172 Primary-school Teacher n.d.  M 2 years     
#173 Primary-school Teacher Pichincha F 2 years     
#174 Agriculture Morona-Santiago M 2 years ✔   
#175 Public Health  Imbabra F 2 years ✔   
#176 Primary-school Teacher n.d. M 2 years   ✔ 
#177 Math Teacher Pichincha M 2 years     
#178 School Nurse Tungrarahua F 2 years     
#179 Machine Tools Tungrarahua M 2 years     
#180 Livestock Husbandry Morona-Santiago M 2 years ✔   
#181 Judō  Pichincha M 2 years     
#182 Computer Technology n.d. M 2 years   ✔ 
#183 Clothing and Fashion Azuay F 2 years     
#184 Soil  Chimborazo F 2 years ✔ ✔ 
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#185 Tennis Pichincha F 2 years     
#186 
Japanese Language 
Teacher Manabí F 2 years     
#187 Car Maintenance  Pichincha M 2 years     
#188 Swimming Manabí F 2 years     
#189 Nutrition  Loja F 2 years     
#190 Primary-school Teacher  n.d.  F 2 years ✔   
#191 Math Teacher Pichincha M 2 years     
#192 Primary-school Teacher Pastaza F 2 years ✔   
Note: ‘Indig. Develop.’ (Indigenous development) showed volunteer’s work is related to indigenous 
development. ‘Chino/China’ means that his/her JOCV working report contained the volunteer’s experience 
of being called China/Chino in the street.  And, ‘n.d.’ stands for no-data. Some JOCV volunteers’ working 
reports are not complete. In such cases, I could not find in which province they worked. Also, in terms of 
gender I inserted ‘n.d.’ because some Japanese first names make it difficult to distinguish if the volunteer 
was male or female. Also, JOCV volunteers are not required to indicate their gender on the report. JOCV 
volunteers basically submitted their reports by each due date. JOCV volunteers are required to submit the 
first JOCV working report three months after they are dispatched and then each six months they are 
required to submit working reports to the JOCV office. So, ‘n.d.’(cont.) notation means that the volunteer 
who wrote the report was still working in Ecuador as of the summer of 2011. I also collected incomplete 
JOCV working reports from volunteers still working in the host country (e.g. I collected a JOCV’s report 
from a volunteer who had arrived only three months before in Ecuador and JOCV volunteers’ reports from 
volunteers who had one more year to compete their service in Ecuador) as of summer of 2011 when I did 
archival research.  Also, when I collected data I concentrated more on JOCV volunteers who had 
completed two years of service than on those who were in the country for short-terms. Thus, I did not 
collect gender and dispatched province from Kendo JOCV volunteers who were in service for one month 
(e.g., # 38, #39, #40, and #41).   
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